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Abstract 
This thesis focuses on the Rome Statute Amendments on the Crime of Aggression and the extent to 
which they represent a step forward in the advancement of international criminal justice. 
This thesis charts the development of the criminalisation of aggression and takes a critical look at the 
positions of delegations during the negotiations, the jurisdiction and entry-into-force provisions adopted 
in December 2017, and what these mean for international justice and the International Criminal Court.  
Although there remains considerable room for judicial refinement of the definition, particularly with 
regard to the scope of the ‘manifest’ threshold requirement, it nevertheless represents a significant step 
forward in the development of international criminal law, and provides a reasonable basis by which 
future acts of aggression can be judged.  
As to the jurisdictional remit, this thesis laments the restrictive nature of the framework adopted. The 
consent-based regime will seriously limit the prospect of future prosecutions. That being said, it was a 
willingness to find a delicate balance between a Security Council monopoly and an expansive regime 
that ensured an agreeable outcome, and there is virtue in that. 
The success of the aggression amendments has always been in the hands of states. With each 
ratification, the Court is strengthened. If the international community is serious about punishing the 
aggressive waging of war, it must rally behind the Court rather than undermine the promises made in 
Kampala.  
The real power of the amendments perhaps lies not in the frequency with which they will be used to 
punish crimes of aggression, but in the extent to which they confirm the aggressive waging of war as 
illegal under international law. The amendments represent an important step forward.  
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
In much the same way that history has been blighted by the waging of aggressive wars, it is also littered 
with attempts to criminalise them. We’ve seen the emergence of ‘just war’ theory in the early middle 
ages, the early development of international law and a rights-based approach during the renaissance 
period, and reliance on collective security through multinational organisations in the latter half of the 
twentieth century. It remains to be seen whether the twenty-first century will come to be characterised 
by a commitment to the rule of law and individual criminal responsibility, though the establishment of 
the world’s first permanent international criminal court and the criminalisation of state-led aggression 
are surely steps in the right direction. In December 2017, States Parties agreed by consensus at the 
Assembly of States Parties (ASP) that the crime of aggression would come into force on 17 July 2018, 
marking a monumental shift in the way in which the international community responds to the waging 
of aggressive war.  
In spite of this, serious doubts remain, not just about the definition of the crime and the limited power 
the Court has been granted to exercise it, but also about the extent to which these developments 
represent a positive step forward in the advancement of international justice and the international 
criminal court. This thesis will seek to examine this overarching question in detail, taking into account 
the big definitional and jurisdictional questions that states have now definitively answered, and offering 
thoughts on the way in which the answers to them will change the way we think about individual 
criminal responsibility.  
In order to do so we will need to look critically at the definitional and jurisdictional provisions adopted 
to assess whether they provide a sound basis for prosecuting atrocity crimes; the negotiations that took 
place and what they reveal about how states measure progress, specifically the extent to which the ICC 
should be empowered to act; the role of civil society and the extent to which civil society organisations 
agree that the amendments represent a step forward; the likelihood that the provisions adopted will 
result in successful prosecutions; and arguments that the provisions will fundamentally weaken the 
Court.  
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1.1. Statement of Aims & Original Contribution 
The primary question that this thesis will therefore seek to answer is whether the provisions that have 
now been adopted represent a step forward in the advancement of international criminal justice or 
whether they weaken an already beleaguered Court. This is not a novel question. It is one that has been 
asked numerous times over the years, both prior to the establishment of the International Criminal Court 
and during negotiations to establish a workable legal framework for the crime.  
Until now, however, there have been unanswered questions regarding the Court’s jurisdiction, 
specifically who will be bound by the provisions. The December 2017 ASP decision has definitively 
answered those questions, clarifying that only states that have ratified the aggression amendments – and 
not subsequently opted-out – will be bound. This thesis is, therefore, able to tackle the overarching 
question with clarity over the Court’s reach in light of the latest – and final – round of negotiations. It 
is also able – through empirical research in the form of interviews with those present and most involved 
– to provide a first-hand account of the negotiations and enable a critical analysis of not just where we 
ended up, but how we got there.  
The original contribution this thesis is able to make to the discourse, is thus two-fold. Firstly, it is 
entirely contemporary in that it is able to take into account the December 2017 ASP decision to activate 
the crime and the 17 July 2018 activation date. With this thesis submitted only a matter of weeks after 
the crime finally came into force, it is the most up-to-date account of the long journey of the crime of 
aggression, from conception to activation. This thesis is not restricted – as others that preceded it were 
– by having to speculate on the shape the jurisdictional remit might take. We now have clarity on the 
extent of the Court’s reach, and the doctrinal approach adopted throughout this thesis allows the 
provisions to be analysed both in terms of the two-tiered approach they create vis-à-vis the other crimes 
that fall within the mandate of the ICC and the extent to which they provide a workable basis for future 
prosecutions.  
Secondly, the empirical research conducted sheds light on the intricacies of state positions that led to 
the outcome we now have; demonstrates the extent to which states – and civil society – disagree about 
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what exactly constitutes a step forward for the ICC; and provides support for the thematic conclusions 
drawn throughout.  
1.2. Methodology 
The information gathered and used in this thesis originated from two major sources: pre-existing 
literature – which is plentiful and includes primary sources, academic commentary, media and civil 
society reports – and primary legal materials, including case law from the international tribunals and 
domestic courts, UN statutes, the ICC Statute itself, and the negotiated outcomes from Rome, Kampala 
and the December 2017 ASP.  
These sources were supplemented by interviews unique to this research, which helped to clarify and 
develop the major research questions. Independent research was used primarily to provide insight into 
the way in which discussions and negotiations to criminalise the crime of aggression had progressed 
over the years, and to provide a better understanding of the motivations behind influential state 
positions.  
Although original interviews were conducted, this thesis very much adopts a qualitative approach to 
research methods. In doing so, both doctrinal and socio-legal approaches are used.  
Ultimately, this thesis is concerned with the legal outcome of negotiations and much of the analysis 
relates to how the language adopted is to be interpreted. The extent to which states have adopted an 
understanding of the jurisdictional remit that is contiguous with the language drafted is a core part of 
this work and so doctrinal analysis was indispensable.  
That being said, the provisions adopted do not exist in a vacuum. There are wider socio-legal 
considerations that weighed heavily on states during the course of negotiations and which have 
demonstrably impacted the legislative framework we now have. Given the nature of international 
criminal law, and the profound interplay between politics, international relations and the law, a socio-
legal approach was needed to properly understand these wider connotations that needed to be taken into 
account.  
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This research was originally intended to rely heavily on elite interviews conducted with well-known 
and influential individuals that had been involved throughout the process. Many of these interviews 
were carried out and they provided valuable insight into the process, though it would be a stretch to 
assert that they form the basis of this thesis. The interviews are instead used to provide valuable insight 
into the process and to support thematic conclusions throughout the research.  
As with any elite interviews, there are a number of dangers and pitfalls, not least the risk of an unclear 
or distorted recollection of events that took place some years previously, as well conscious or 
unconscious bias that comes with being affiliated with one particular side of an argument.1 While these 
concerns cannot be discounted entirely, the negotiations and themes discussed throughout benefit from 
having been the subject of numerous articles and research pieces, allowing spoken accounts to be cross-
referenced with written ones. In many instances, the interviewees are also speaking about events that 
have either very recently taken place, or on issues which the participants have continued to work since. 
In any case, the interviews often provided valuable insight into the way in which delegations currently 
view the process, and were particularly helpful in understanding the way in which negotiations 
continued to unfold.  
The interviews were conducted with the ethical approval of the University of Sussex, in the most part 
in early 2016. Additional interviews were then conducted towards the end of 2017 in the run-up to the 
December 2017 ASP decision on the activation of the crime of aggression amendments, and afterwards 
to understand how activation discussions had played out.  
Six interview subjects were finally identified due to their familiarity with the negotiation process at 
various stages along the way. These included: 
1) William Pace, the longstanding Coordinator of the Coalition for the ICC, who has been an active 
participant first in the establishment of the International Criminal Court and latterly in the 
criminalisation of aggression. A participant in Rome at the conference to establish the ICC, as well 
                                                          
1 Richards, D. (1996), ‘Elite Interviewing: Approaches and Pitfalls’, Politics, Vol.16,  pp.199-204  
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as a leading member of the NGO community, his perspective was especially important in explaining 
the reasons behind the decision taken in Rome to include the crime of aggression within the ICC 
Statute yet defer discussions to establish a workable legal framework for it. He was also able to 
offer valuable insight into the role NGOs played in both Rome and Kampala.  
2) Chris Whomersley, former Deputy Legal Adviser to the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office. 
As the lead negotiator on behalf of the United Kingdom in Kampala, he was better positioned than 
most to explain the outcome and the intricacies of state positions. His insight into the understandings 
that the UK and likeminded states had taken away from Kampala on the correct interpretation of 
the Article 121 provisions was particularly instructive.  
3) A member of the UK Delegation to Kampala in June 2010, who provided valuable insight into the 
Review Conference negotiations, was able to set discussions in context and commented helpfully 
on dynamics, particularly outside of the negotiating room. 
4) A senior member of the UK delegation to the ASP 16 in December 2017. This interviewee was 
engaged immediately prior to the December 2017 decision and actively participated in the 
negotiations to activate the crime. These interviews were particularly valuable in documenting 
ongoing state efforts to influence the accepted interpretation of the Kampala amendments and 
ultimately to shape the jurisdictional remit of the Court going forward.  
5) A member of the UK FCO’s Legal Directorate, who engaged in helpful discussion on the legal 
issues still to be worked through in the years leading up to the December 2017 activation vote, and 
the role – or lack thereof – that NGOs sought to play in influencing ongoing discussions.  
6) A representative of Parliamentarians for Global Action, a key NGO working towards the domestic 
implementation of legislation through an established global network of parliamentarians. These 
discussions were helpful in shedding light on national support for the provisions, and the role that 
civil society played in their advancement.  
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It had been the intention to interview other individuals central to crime of aggression discourse, namely 
Claus Kreß, a prolific academic and member of Germany’s negotiating team in Kampala; Christian 
Wenaweser, President of the Assembly of States Parties and former Chair of the Working Group on the 
Crime of Aggression, along with his principle legal advisor Stefan Barriga; Harold Koh, US Department 
of State Legal Advisor and US lead in Kampala; and Benjamin Ferencz, a driving force behind the 
development of international criminal law since his time as a Prosecutor at the Nuremburg tribunals. In 
the end, all proved indispensable despite none being interviewed specifically for this thesis. They are 
all quoted throughout, largely because their contributions and thoughts are so widely documented as to 
make primary sources abundantly available, and each helped enormously to clarify and develop the 
major research questions. Instead, interviews were conducted with those who were intimately involved 
at various stages of the crime’s development but whose voices are less prominent in academic literature.  
Similarly, it had been the intention to explore in more depth the role NGOs played in driving forward 
the criminalisation of aggression. As later chapters will demonstrate, for numerous reasons, civil society 
was far less influential during the Kampala negotiations than it had been in Rome. As such, while the 
role they played is analysed, it does not instruct the central narrative of this thesis.  
The interviews conducted for this thesis were intended to allow the interview subjects to express their 
views without being influenced by the pre-conceived notions of the author. The interviews were semi-
structured and interview subjects were not held to a strict list of questions. Questions asked were 
designed to allow the interviewees to expand on themes that they believed to be essential and relevant 
to the development of the crime. In most instances, the interviewees were selected because of their 
proximity to historical events – be that the Kampala Review Conference or an Assembly of States 
Parties – and interviewees were invited to talk broadly about their experiences of those events. They 
would then be invited expand on issues relevant to the thesis as they arose or asked clarifying questions 
when necessary. The transcripts (on file with the author) reflect the conversational nature of the 
interviews. 
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William Pace was asked to talk about the role of the Coalition for the ICC – and civil society more 
generally – during the negotiations to establish the ICC, and if that influence was also exerted during 
the Kampala Review Conference.  
Chris Whomersley was asked to explain how the Kampala negotiations played out and to expand on 
the main areas of contention. Crucially, he was asked to describe his interpretation of the provisions 
agreed and offer thoughts on why disagreement persisted.  
A similar process was followed with regard to the other interviewees. They were asked broad questions 
designed to give them the freedom to discuss their experiences of the process and were encouraged to 
expand on issues that they thought were important.  
William Pace and Chris Whomersley were happy for quotes to be directly attributable. The other 
interviewees preferred to be anonymised as representatives of their respective organisations. The 
majority of interviews were recorded and later transcribed. For those who declined to have their views 
captured on tape, a written record was kept. While the majority of the content gleaned from the 
interviews provided background research, there are numerous quotes throughout the thesis which are 
used to support its substantive arguments.  
It will be clear to anyone reading that a particularly Anglo-American approach has been adopted, 
including when selecting the interviewees. This is due to a number of factors. First, it is a question of 
access. Much of the research for this thesis was conducted while I was employed by the UK Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office. Although my employment was wholly unconnected to this thesis, it did 
give me access to those in the diplomatic sphere that had been involved in both Kampala and the 
December 2017 ASP, and to UK members in particular.  
The prominence afforded to certain actors also reflects the reality of the negotiations. The empirical 
research conducted was intended to shine a light on these negotiations and, in particular, disagreement 
over who was to be bound by the provisions: interpretation of Article 121. The UK was at the forefront 
of those disagreements, and so input from UK representatives was deemed essential.  
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The role played by the United States is documented much more prominently than that of other powerful 
non-State Parties - namely Russia, China and India - largely because the US sought to exert far more 
influence over proceedings than did the others. Russia, China and India as non-States Parties  – much 
like the US – were all afforded observer status allowing them to participate in discussions but not to 
vote. While Russia, China and India participated in discussions, aligning themselves with particular 
movements or blocs or expressing opinions throughout, they were largely content to play a secondary 
role; one that reflected their observer status. The US, on the other hand, was actively engaged in 
securing an outcome deemed favourable to the US. Though they had not participated in much of the 
processes leading up to Kampala, during the Review Conference they sought to shape the debate, build 
alliances during negotiations, and secure additional understandings on some of the key issues.  
As to the overall approach, much of the discourse surrounding international criminal law is Anglo-
American. English speaking journals dominate the literature, with many of the most prominent 
commentators writing in English and American journals. That dominance can be felt throughout this 
thesis.  
1.3. Structure of the thesis 
The adoption of a workable legal framework to criminalise individual acts of aggression has been a 
long time in the making. The historical development of the crime (chapter 2) is instructive in 
understanding how we arrived at the substantive elements of the crime, including the definition and 
jurisdictional regime. A doctrinal analysis of both the definition and the jurisdictional regime will be 
carried out in chapters 3 and 6. Only through understanding exactly what was agreed can we seek to 
analyse whether this means the Court’s hand is strengthened by the provisions. This means deciding 
whether they provide a sound legal basis for the Court to successfully prosecute those responsible for 
atrocity crimes or whether they are so restrictive as to make it unlikely anyone will ever face justice for 
waging an aggressive war.  
As to the definition adopted (chapter 3), most of the work was done not at the Kampala Review 
Conference in 2010, but in preparatory meetings in the decade beforehand and by the ILC in preparing 
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a General Assembly-adopted definition in 1974. Indeed, the 1974 definition was presented to the 
Review Conference largely unchanged, and was adopted without further discussion in Kampala. That 
does not mean, however, that it is uncontroversial. The definition marks the crime of aggression as 
exceptional in a number of ways, which also serve to ensure that the crime is more politically charged 
than the other core international crimes. It is limited to persons who are ‘in a position effectively to 
exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a state’, and is vague on the extent to 
which ‘grey-areas’ of international law are caught up in the definition. This has ensured a lukewarm 
reception from a number of states, unsurprisingly those most likely to resort to force. This thesis will 
examine in detail these provisions, including the enumerated acts that constitute the crime, the mental 
state of any perpetrator, the extent to which the definition adequately accounts for the changing nature 
of war – including the rise of cyber-warfare – and the rise of non-state actors, and, perhaps most 
controversially, the extent to which the threshold for what constitutes a crime of aggression is high 
enough to prevent pre-emptory self-defence and humanitarian intervention from falling within the remit 
of the Prosecutor.  
Before moving on to chapter 6 and the substantive elements of the jurisdictional regime, we will first 
examine the negotiations that took place in Kampala (chapter 4) to agree that regime and the entry-into-
force mechanism adopted. The negotiations were conducted largely in good faith, and were notable for 
the active role played by the United States and the decision by the Chair to attempt to accommodate US 
concerns, despite the US not being a State Party to the ICC Statute. The way in which the negotiations 
progressed and the various positions adopted by delegates gives crucial insight into how the 
international community views the role of the Court and the power it should have. This chapter therefore 
gives valuable insight into how different states want international criminal justice to progress and the 
extent to which they are prepared to cede control to the Court in deciding when individual acts should 
be punished. 
Despite agreement having been reached in Kampala, one issue of interpretation persisted over the 
Court’s jurisdiction, specifically who was to be bound when the provisions came into force. 
Disagreement lingered over whether states must ratify the amendments in order to be bound by them, 
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or whether all states would be bound once the amendments were activated, unless they formally opted 
out. We will evaluate the positions of the two camps that occupied these positions, looking critically at 
this outstanding issue and the negotiations that took place at the 2017 ASP to arrive at an agreeable 
solution (chapter 5). Once agreement had been reached on who would be bound by the provisions, the 
final hurdle to adoption of the amendments was a decision to be taken by the ASP. This hurdle was 
cleared in December 2017 when the ASP adopted by consensus the provisions and set the date of 17 
July 2018 for their coming into force. This date has now passed and the crime of aggression is a crime 
punishable at the International Criminal Court.  
As to the jurisdictional regime (chapter 6), a novel approach was adopted that separates the crime of 
aggression from the other core crimes insofar as it substantially limits the ICC's exercise of jurisdiction 
over the crime in cases absent Security Council referral. In adopting a consent-based approach to the 
crime, delegations have given states the choice as to whether or not they will be bound by the provisions, 
introducing an explicit opt-out provision into the amendments. This chapter will take a critical look at 
the final package adopted and the strengths and weaknesses of the Review Conference compromise.  
Crucial to the establishment of the International Criminal Court – and the development of international 
criminal law more generally – has been civil society and non-governmental organisations (chapter 7). 
Civil society played a central role both before and during the Rome Conference to establish the ICC. 
With participating organisations accredited by the umbrella organisation, the Coalition for the ICC, they 
were organised and effective. Exerting substantial influence throughout the process, they facilitated 
contact with States Parties, arranged meetings on various ICC issues, coordinated demonstrations and 
press conferences, lobbied governments, ministers, and parliamentarians, compiled regular reports 
which were then disseminated through the media, and embedded members in state delegations. This 
was not the case in Kampala. While civil society continued to play a role, it was much diminished. We 
will look at the factors influencing this decline, including geopolitical factors that served to dampen 
enthusiasm for the aggression amendments, and differences in policy positions that explain why civil 
society groups were unable to unite behind a common position. The varying interpretations held by 
states as to what constitutes a step forward in the advancement of international criminal justice are 
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rightly central to this thesis. This chapter seeks to balance those interpretations with views from civil 
society organisations. Ultimately, it will be shown that civil society was as divided as states when it 
came to the intricacies of the aggression amendments.  
One of the major criticisms of the aggression amendments is the extent to which, in order to secure 
compromise, states watered down the jurisdiction of the Court to such an extent that few cases of 
aggression will fall within its scope (chapter 8). There have been persistent claims that few 
investigations or prosecutions will result from the amendments. Here, recent examples of state-led 
aggression can be instructive, and the provisions are applied to these conflicts to offer the reader an 
insight into the type of crimes the international community had in mind when the crime was added to 
the Rome Statute. These inform thoughts on the extent to which the amendments may come to alter the 
international order by imposing additional considerations on those that might seek recourse to war.  
In answering the overarching question of this thesis, it is necessary to examine the various arguments 
put forward by those who believe that – far from representing a step forward in the advancement of 
international criminal justice – the aggression amendments actually weaken an already beleaguered 
court (chapter 9). Those that claim the Court is fundamentally weakened by the provisions point to 
inconsistencies between the amendments and established international law practice on the need for state 
consent. Others contend that the aggression provisions – governed as they are by the principle of 
complementarity – are ill-suited to domestic courts insofar as states will be required to sit in judgement 
over another State’s decision to resort to force. These are legitimate concerns, all of which are 
addressed, along with further claims that the amendments will impede international efforts to promote 
peace and stability around the globe by undermining state willingness to participate in humanitarian 
intervention; weaken the hand of negotiators in peace deals; and impede the Court’s ability to punish 
other atrocity crimes.  
It will become clear throughout this thesis that events in Kampala and the December 2017 decision to 
activate the amendments represent steps taken towards the end goal of eradicating impunity for atrocity 
crimes and the waging of aggressive wars. They do not mark an end point in that endeavour. This thesis 
21 
is intended to review these events and the decisions taken. It will show that the amendments are 
imperfect. That is the necessary consequence of multilateral negotiations. The reader is urged to recall 
an aphorism familiar to anyone that has engaged in multilateral negotiations: that we should not let the 
perfect become the enemy of the good.  
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Chapter 2 – Historical Development of the Criminalisation of Aggression 
This chapter will seek to provide a chronological account of the criminalisation of the crime of 
aggression. The first half of this chapter will chart the chronological development of the jus ad bellum 
and evolution of the concept of aggressive war as a scourge in need of a remedy. This will take us to 
Nuremburg and the establishment of aggressive war as a punishable act. The second half of this chapter 
will chart the major milestone attempts in the twentieth century to then define aggressive acts and 
simultaneously hold individuals accountable for them through the establishment of an international 
criminal court. The emergence of NGOs as a progressive force will also be touched on. This will take 
us through proceedings in Rome and the preparatory meetings in preparation for the agreement 
reached at Kampala on the codification of the crime of aggression. This chapter will seek to provide 
historical context that will allow an assessment of the likelihood that the provisions adopted thus far 
will lead to the prosecution and punishment of those most responsible for crimes of aggression. 
2.1. Evolution of the concept of aggressive acts of war as a punishable act 
2.1.1. Jus ad bellum pre-Nuremberg 
The tribunals of the twentieth century and the establishment of the International Criminal Court 
represent seminal moments in the development of international criminal law, seeking as they do to 
establish a precedent that individual responsibility for aggression will not go unpunished as a criminal 
act. Yet it was not until the Nuremburg and Tokyo trials at the end of the Second World War that 
aggression was finally recognised as a crime under international law,2 and only within the last few years 
have we arrived at a definition of the crime of aggression that is coupled with a jurisdictional remit that 
can be exercised by a permanent international criminal court. This chapter will provide a brief overview 
of that progress.  
For as long as humans have occupied this earth there has been evidence of the prominent role war has 
played in almost every known civilisation. Wars were commonly seen as ‘acceptable political practices, 
                                                          
2 Sayapin, S. (2014) ‘The Crime of Aggression in International Criminal Law: Historical Development, Comparative Analysis and Present State’, T. M. C. Asser 
Press / Springer, p.3 
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and sometimes even as noble endeavours uniting peoples in their human destiny and exclusively capable 
of displaying all human virtues and vices.’3 With war glorified as an accepted, even integral function 
of the international relations of states, there was no appetite for criminalising aggressive state behaviour. 
Treaties that did exist took a very different diplomatic form to those that now govern international law. 
Used not as tools in the service of international law and the furtherance of peace, they were instead 
enacted in preparation for war through the forging of alliances, or at the close of war to declare the 
terms of surrender and impose the new post-war order.4  
It was not until the middle ages that attempts were made to regulate the waging of war. The Islamic 
faith and Sharia law prohibited wars between Muslims more than thirteen centuries ago,5 yet these 
restrictions were intrinsically linked to, indeed firmly rooted in, religious doctrine. Similarly, European 
‘Just War’ theory – initially developed in the context of Catholic theology but later to transition into a 
universal, secular and moral theory grounded in law – also sought to limit the conditions for war. Traced 
back as far as the fourth century to St. Augustine, ‘just wars’ were said to comprise both the principles 
of ‘just cause’ and of ‘legitimate authority’. With regard to the former, St. Augustine wrote that ‘a war 
is usually considered just if it makes retribution for injustice, when a people or a state must be punished 
for their unwillingness to make good for the damage caused by their subjects, or to return what they 
had acquired illegally.’6 The principle of just cause was considered to be a matter of moral theology, 
ensuring that the question of whether a war was ‘just’ fell within the jurisdiction of the Church.7  
This classic version of just war theory as bound to the church began to be challenged around the 
sixteenth century by Francisco de Vitoria and Francisco Suarez. Vitoria added to it the idea that war 
could be just in circumstances where the people were seeking to overcome a violation of their rights.  
Suarez added further that the just cause principle would allow the victim to punish those guilty of 
                                                          
3 Coppieters B, Fotion N, Apresyan R (eds) (2002) Moral Restraints on War: Issues and Examples. Gardariki, Moscow, p.4 
4 For a much more detailed account see Sayapin’s ‘Historical Background of the Criminalization of Aggression’, Op. Cit.  
5 A practice that still ensures that modern Muslim states are unlikely to wage large-scale wars against other Muslim states, though the Iran-Iraq conflict represents 
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6 Coppieters, Fotion, Apresyan, Op Cit. p.33 
7 Jokic, A. (2012) ‘What’s a Just War Theorist?’ Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology, Vol.4(2), p.92 
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injustice.8 Both were attempts to integrate the classic conception of just war into a secular, rights-based 
and legalistic doctrine.9 The principle of legitimate authority reaffirmed the state as the primary entity 
empowered to wage war.10  
These attempts to limit the scourge of war, and, crucially, to do so through a rights-based paradigm, 
marked a key breakthrough in the early development of customs of war, and their later influence should 
not be underestimated. As will be demonstrated further in this chapter, just war theory would continue 
to develop into the modern era to form the core ethical foundation of the modern jus ad bellum.11  
It was not long before these foundations of a rights-based approach were built upon with another key 
contribution to the modern conception of the jus ad bellum, this time from the ‘father’ of international 
law, Hugo Grotius. A Dutch lawyer perhaps best known for his 1625 treatise De jure belli ac pacis libri 
tres (‘Three Books of the Law of War and Peace’), Grotius believed that war must be limited by 
compliance with inalienable rights emanating from human nature, and he divided the laws governing 
these rights into those of a natural character and those of a positive character. Positive law included a 
subsection entitled human law, which in turn encompassed international law to regulate interactions 
between entire peoples.  
This concept of inalienable individual rights to be governed within the auspices of a new category of 
international law established, in the words of Hedley Bull, ‘one of the classic paradigms that has since 
determined both our understanding of the facts of inter‐state relations and our ideas as to what 
constitutes right conduct therein. This is the idea of international society: the notion that states and rulers 
of states are bound by rules and form a society or community with one another, of however rudimentary 
                                                          
8 Sayapin, Op Cit. pp.19-20 
9 Jokic, Op Cit. p.93 
10 In modern times, this competence has been extended to international bodies comprised of individual states, namely the UN Security Council and regional 
security and military organisations such as NATO. 
11 Sayapin, Op Cit. p.21 
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a kind.’12 Gotius’s concept partially set the intellectual framework for the peace agreement that would 
come to be reached following the Thirty Years War.  
The Thirty Years War raged between Catholics and Protestants in Europe until 1648, the devastating 
effects prompting the need for a new European political order. The major powers convened to devise a 
peace based upon the concept of equal, autonomous states and the presumption against external 
interference, guaranteeing states the absolute authority to regulate their domestic affairs.13 
Underpinning this new peace were a series of treaties that mandated that states must first attempt to 
resolve disputes peacefully before resorting to war.14 This agreement, the Peace of Westphalia, gave 
concrete expression to the idea of an international society which Grotius had propounded, and the theory 
upon which it was based came to dominate the field of international relations for several centuries until 
modern institutions such as the UN Security Council and concepts such as individual criminal 
responsibility and universal jurisdiction led to a loosening of the paradigm’s influence.15  
In this post-Westphalian phase, the concept of aggressive war-making as the supreme international 
crime was also beginning to gain traction. As the Swiss jurist, Emmerich de Vattel wrote in his 1758 
work Law of Nations, the sovereign who takes up arms without a lawful cause is ‘chargeable with all 
the evils, all the horrors of the war: all the effusion of blood, the desolation of families, the rapine, the 
acts of violence, the ravages, the conflagrations, are his works and his crimes. He is guilty of a crime 
against the enemy, he is guilty of a crime against his people, finally, he is guilty of a crime against 
mankind in general, whose peace he disturbs, and to whom he sets a pernicious example.’16  
Despite this, the horrors of war continued to cast a dark shadow over mankind. When the 1789 French 
Revolution and the Napoleonic wars destroyed peace in Europe, the majority of European powers were 
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once again forced to meet – much like in Westphalia almost 150 years before – to redefine the political 
foundations of Europe. The ensuing Vienna Congress of 1814 did ensure peace between the great 
powers of the Austrian, Russian, Prussian and Ottoman empires17 for the following 40 years, but was 
unable to prevent the Crimea War between 1853-1856. When the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 
followed, Gustav Moynier – a Swiss founding member of the International Committee of the Red Cross 
– in 1872 made the first proposal for a permanent international criminal court in modern times. This 
would prove to be the start of a rich history of civil society involvement in the development of 
international criminal law.  
Further attempts to regulate warfare were made in The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 – 
convened by Russia with the intention of agreeing a revision of the declaration concerning the laws and 
customs of war18 – but which were severely constrained by notions of state sovereignty.19 The 
conferences took important steps to establish legal and institutional mechanisms to regulate the law of 
armed conflict – mechanisms which would come to be recognised as constituting customary 
international law by the Nuremburg and Tokyo tribunals. The Hague Conventions prohibited the 
employment of certain means of waging war,20 but the obligatory force of those conventions was 
confined to limited sections - for instance, armed conflicts originating in the context of pecuniary 
disputes. General recourse to war remained uninhibited by these conventions, and the regulations in no 
way designated such practices as criminal.21 
The conventions failed to prevent the onset of the First World War, and it took the destruction wrought 
during this four year period for renewed momentum to gather in the form of various resolutions and 
protocols aimed at curbing the scourge of aggressive war.  
A key driver behind these various resolutions and protocols was the push for a post-war settlement 
whereby peace was based not on the competing interests of states but on collective security and the rule 
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19 Ibid. 
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of law. Speaking in 1917, then President of the United States, Woodrow Wilson, claimed that this new 
order ‘must be based upon the common strength, not upon the individual strength, of the nations upon 
whose concert peace will depend.’22  
The end of WWI marked the real starting point in the history of prosecutions for international crimes.23 
The Peace Treaty of Versailles of 1919 was largely concerned with civil reparations to be paid by 
Germany following WWI, though it did also look to establish the personal criminal responsibility of 
Kaiser William II. It did not make specific reference to the crime of aggression, which had at that stage 
not come into being as a concept, but did envisage ‘a special tribunal for the trial against the former 
German Head of State charged for a supreme offence against international morality and sanctity of 
treaties.’24 While the trial of Kaiser Wilhelm as the former German Head of State ultimately failed after 
the Netherlands refused to extradite him on the basis that such a supreme offence did not appear in 
Dutch penal law or any of the treaties the Netherlands had concluded, Versailles did mark an important 
step forward in changing attitudes towards war, moving us towards a place where war ceased to be a 
legitimate instrument under international law in the nineteenth-century sense.25  
The League of Nations was to follow, founded in 1920 as a result of the Paris Peace Conference. A 
precursor to the UN, the League of Nations sought to prevent wars from occurring by rigorously 
requiring League member states to settle all of their disputes peacefully.26 While the Covenant of the 
League did not include a general prohibition against war, it did bring about a seismic shift in 
international relations, seeking to establish effective mechanisms for regional cooperation and security. 
The substantive chapters of the Covenant of the League of Nations embodied the central idea of the 
league: collective security, together with the various procedures for peaceful settlement of disputes. 
Signatories to the Covenant bound themselves to submit all serious disputes to peaceful settlement and 
promised to join in common action against any other which made war in violation of the Covenant. Such 
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common action was to take the form of economic sanctions as its primary coercive mechanism and, if this 
were not enough, of military intervention.27 
The League of Nations was also responsible for forming international legal instruments that would 
contribute to establishing the prohibition of aggressive war under customary international law.28 These 
included the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance in 1923, which declared ‘aggressive war an international 
crime,’ and that signatories would ‘undertake that no one of them will be guilty of its commission.’29 
The draft text was unable to find consensus, but this was due largely to an inability to define the acts 
that would constitute aggression rather than any principled objection to aggression as an illegal act, a 
problem that – as we shall see in later chapters – would come to blight the international community for 
many years to come. Similarly, a draft Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes of 
1924 was also proposed, asserting ‘that a war of aggression constitutes a violation of this solidarity and 
an international crime.’30 Signed but not ultimately ratified, it nevertheless led the Nuremberg Tribunal 
to note in its Judgment that it was ‘signed by the leading statesmen of the world, representing the vast 
majority of the civilized states and peoples, and may be regarded as strong evidence of the intention to 
brand aggressive war as an international crime.’31  
The Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, also known as the General Treaty for the Renunciation of War as an 
Instrument of National Policy, went even further, ‘condemning recourse to war for the solution of 
international controversies, and renouncing it, as an instrument of national policy in their relations with 
one another.’32 The Pact was not without its flaws, chief amongst them its failure to define the crime of 
aggression. In practical terms, the Pact also famously failed to prevent the Italian invasion of Abyssinia 
in 1936,33 or the outbreak of the Second World War a little over 10 years later, despite the major 
protagonists being signatories to it. The idea that a treaty could – at that time – prevent all future wars 
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was always going to be naive, and opinion divides over whether the Pact was largely a historical 
irrelevance34 or the start of a new world order.35 Nevertheless, the treaty does mark an important step 
in the development of international law in that it would come to be relied upon by the founders of the 
Nuremburg tribunal, keen to judge Nazi crimes against previously agreed international standards. 
With the Sixth Pan-American Conference of 1928 declaring that ‘war of aggression constitutes an 
international crime against the human species, [and that] all aggression is illicit and as such is declared 
prohibited,’36 a body of law was forming that would inform the provisions adopted at the Nuremberg 
and Tokyo tribunals to try those most responsible for the horrors of the Second World War.37  
The UN War Crimes Commission, established in October 1943 to undertake preparatory investigative 
work for the future prosecution of the Axis’ major war criminals, also contributed to that body of law.38 
The Commission was ultimately unable to reach consensus on whether aggressive war amounts to a 
criminal act, but the process gave rise to intensive debate39 that challenged pre-existing international 
law, which concerned itself with placing limitations on states’ previously unqualified right to resort to 
the use of force40 rather than the criminalization of aggression.  
Following the end of the Second World War, the Charter of the UN was signed on 26 June 1945, laying 
out new rules governing the use of force by states. The. The opening paragraph of Chapter I of the UN 
Charter establishes that the organization's first purpose is: 
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“to maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective 
measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of 
acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace…”. 
Article 2(4) further sets out that:  
"All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." 
Chapter VII then provides that: 
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the 
peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall 
be taken […] to maintain or restore international peace and security.  
These provisions transformed the prohibition of war into a prohibition of the use of force, while 
article 2(4) would come to be relied upon as the basis for the definition of the crime of aggression. 
But while these precedents had given birth to the idea of possible penal sanction for the unlawful 
use of force, the enforcement of this sanction – either through an International Criminal Court 
(ICC) or at the national level – was still some way off.41 
2.1.2. Nuremberg  
Nuremberg provided a breakthrough. Three months after the end of the Second World War, the allied 
powers signed the ‘London Agreement’ creating the International Military Tribunal known as ‘the 
Nuremberg Tribunal’ to prosecute those most responsible for Nazi atrocities. The Tribunal’s procedure 
combined elements from the common, civil and criminal law procedures of the British, American, 
French and Soviet systems.42 As the first tribunal set up to criminalise aggressive acts of war, 
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Nuremberg struggled to affirm a sound legal basis for the prosecutions. While states had been working 
towards its criminalisation, they had thus far failed to define crimes against peace or to punish those 
who committed them. As such, there was no firm legal precedent for such an international court. Much 
effort was made by the allied powers to link ‘crimes against peace’ as it appeared at Nuremberg to the 
Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928.43  
The London Agreement enumerated three crimes to be tried at Nuremburg: War Crimes, Crimes against 
Humanity, and Crimes against Peace. Crimes against Peace would form the bedrock of the future 
prohibition of crimes of aggression. Article 6 of the Tribunal’s Charter affirmed that Crimes against 
Peace were primarily constituted by ‘the planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of 
aggression.’44 In punishing Crimes against Peace, Nuremberg recognised the waging of a war of 
aggression as the ‘supreme international crime’, adopting the view that that ‘the crime which 
comprehends all lesser crimes, is the crime of making unjustifiable war.’45  
Nuremberg established a legal precedent for the proposition that waging a war of aggression is an 
international offence, leading the American Chief Prosecutor Robert Jackson to report back to President 
Truman that henceforth nobody could deny or fail to know that the principles on which the Nazis had 
been convicted constitute law, and that this prohibition of aggressive war had become a law with a 
sanction.46  
It is certainly true that Nuremberg cemented the notion that international laws protecting humans could 
supersede traditional ideas of state sovereignty, leading to a proliferation of international NGOs 
working to document, publicise and denounce abuses,47 but it remained unclear what exactly was meant 
by aggression, with no definition of the constitutive acts offered. Nuremberg ensured twelve 
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convictions for crimes against peace48 but despite Jackson’s famous promise that, from that moment on 
the waging of aggressive war would not go unpunished, the acts that constitute aggression could only 
be inferred from the Tribunals Charter and judgments. Renewed attempts to define the crime – as well 
as to establish an independent international court to prosecute individuals for breaches of it – would 
continue until the end of the twentieth century, progression charted in the latter half of this chapter.  
2.2. Defining Aggression and establishing the International Criminal Court 
2.2.1. Post-Nuremburg  
The immediate aftermath of the Second World War showed initial promise for those committed to 
preventing future atrocities, with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Genocide 
Convention adopted in 1948. When drafting the Genocide Convention, the United Nations Secretariat 
had initially included a model statute for a court, but the proposal was considered too ambitious for the 
time and the conservative drafters stopped short of establishing such an institution.49 The General 
Assembly instead issued a resolution calling upon the International Law Commission (ILC), a UN 
commission of legal experts charged with the codification and progressive development of international 
law, to prepare both a code of crimes against the peace and security of mankind,50 and a draft statute 
for an international criminal court. The ILC submitted its draft statute in 1952, followed by a draft code 
of crimes in 1954.51 52  
Despite these important attempts to enshrine the protection of human rights within internationally 
recognised norms and prohibit atrocity crimes, war and violations of these norms continued unabated. 
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The Israel-Arab war,53 massacres in India and Pakistan,54 and the enactment of apartheid in South 
Africa55 are just a few examples of internationally recognised conflicts, in which countless atrocities 
took place.  
With no shortage of acts of state aggression on the world stage, and codification of law designed to 
prohibit such acts in its infancy, the forty years immediately after Nuremberg have been described as a 
period of slow progress in the development of international criminal law.56 As Benjamin Ferencz 
subsequently stressed, ‘with fighting going on all over the globe – including in India, Pakistan, Cyprus, 
the Congo, Cambodia, Vietnam and the Middle East – it was clear that it was easier to commit 
aggression than to define it.’57 
Progress was further hampered by the onset of the Cold War, which ushered in a period of increased 
political tension, making advancement on the war crimes agenda virtually impossible,58 and agreement 
to the definition of aggression and other crimes remained elusive.59 
During this time, the UN Security Council – often hampered by the veto power of the Soviet Union and 
the US – proved itself reluctant to find that there had been an act of aggression,60 though it did adopt 
                                                          
53 For an overview of the Israel-Arab Wars, see Bregman, A. (2016) ‘Israel's wars: a history since 1947’, Routledge, 4th Ed; Morris, B. (1998) ‘1948: A History 
of the First Arab-Israeli War’, Yale University Press; Bloom, M. (2001) ‘Atrocities and armed conflict: state consolidation in Israel, 1948–56’, Conflict, 
Security & Development; Pappéé, I. (2009) ‘The Vicissitudes of the 1948 Historiography of Israel’, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 39 (1); Oren, M.B. (2002) 
‘Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East’, Random House Publishing; Nassar, J.R. (1997) ‘The Culture Of Resistance: The 
1967 War In The Context Of The Palestinian Struggle’, Arab Studies Quarterly, Vol. 19 (3).  
54 See Ganguly, S. (2002) ‘Conflict unending: India-Pakistan tensions since 1947’, Columbia University Press; McMahon, R.J. (1996) ‘The Cold War on the 
Periphery: The United States, India, and Pakistan’, Columbia University Press; Schofield, V. (2010) ‘Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unending 
War’, I.B.Taurus.  
55 See Cobban, H. (2015) ‘Amnesty after Atrocity?: Healing Nations after Genocide and War Crimes’,  Routledge; Gibson, J.L and Gouws, A. (1999) ‘Truth 
and Reconciliation in South Africa: Attributions of blame and the struggle over apartheid’, American Political Science Review; Hayner, P.B. (2002) 
‘Unspeakable truths: Confronting State Terror and Atrocity’, Routledge.  
56 Robert H Jackson Centre, ‘The Influence of the Nuremberg Trial on International Criminal Law’, https://www.roberthjackson.org/speech-and-writing/the-
influence-of-the-nuremberg-trial-on-international-criminal-law/ (accessed 10 July 2018) 
57 Ferencz, B. (1975) ‘The United Nations Consensus Definition of Aggression: Sieve or Substance?’ George Washington Journal of International Law and 
Economics, 708. 
58 Schabas (2007), Op Cit., p.9. 
59 Robert H Jackson Centre, Op Cit. 
60 Weisbord, N. (2008) ‘Prosecuting Aggression’, 49(1) Harv Int‟l LJ 161, p.169. Nineteen condemning South Africa for aggression against several African 
States (between 1976 and 1987); six condemning the minority regime of Southern Rhodesia for aggression against various African States (between 1973 and 
1979); two condemning acts of aggression perpetrated against Seychelles (in 1981 and 1982); two condemning Israel for aggression against Tunisia (in 1985 and 
1988); one condemning aggression against Benin (in 1977); and one condemning Iraq for aggression against diplomatic premises in Kuwait (in 1990). 
34 
resolutions condemning acts of aggression in Southern Rhodesia,61 South Africa,62 Benin,63 Tunisia,64 
and Iraq.65  
Failure to act on other occasions often forced the UN General Assembly to break the deadlock through 
its ‘Uniting for Peace’ resolution,66 which empowers the General Assembly to act ‘if the Security 
Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in any case where there appears 
to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression.’67 On 11 occasions, the General 
Assembly has made a recommendation for members to take collective action in response to a threat to 
the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression.68 While valuable in terms of ensuring that acts of 
aggression were denounced, the General Assembly is no less an inherently political body than the 
Security Council,69 and was further hampered by there being no accepted definition of the crime. Work 
to agree a definition and ultimately a mechanism for identifying and prosecuting it continued.  
Several Special Committees on the Question of Defining Aggression were set up by the General 
Assembly from 1952 to 1965, and in 1974 the big breakthrough came. The fourth Special Committee 
was successful in drafting the definition annexed to the UN General Assembly’s ‘Definition of 
Aggression’ resolution.70 This was adopted unanimously.  
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Relying heavily on the Soviet Union’s 1933 draft definition,71 the General Assembly’s 1974 resolution 
was intended as a guide for the Security Council to determine when acts of aggression had been 
committed rather than as a definitive legal basis for determining individual criminal responsibility.72 
Nevertheless, it still constitutes a significant step forward, serving as the basis for the agreement to be 
reached in Kampala. Later chapters will analyse in detail the provisions agreed in Kampala, and so we 
will not duplicate much of that analysis by dedicating too much time to the 1974 definition, but it is 
certainly worth highlighting the provisions agreed and briefly discussing the reactions to them.  
Article 1 of the resolution condemns ‘the use of armed force by a state against the sovereignty, territorial 
integrity or political independence of another state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter 
of the United Nations.’73 Article 2 then confirms that the first use of force in contravention of the UN 
Charter will be prima facie evidence of aggression, but that the Security Council retains the authority 
to decide whether an act of aggression has taken place.  Article 3 then provides a non-exhaustive list of 
actions that constitute aggression against another state, summarised as: (a) An invasion or attack, or any 
military occupation or annexation; (b) Bombardment or the use of any weapons against another state; 
(c) The blockade of ports or coasts; (d) An attack on the land, sea or air forces, or marine and air fleets; 
(e)  The use of armed forces within the territory of another state without the agreement of the receiving 
state; (f) Allowing territory to be used by another state in the perpetration an act of aggression against 
a third state; (g) Sending armed hands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries to carry out acts listed above.74  
These articles confirm that aggressive acts are those which involve armed measures, rather than some 
other form of coercion, be it economic, ideological or otherwise.75 The list of actions that constitute acts 
of aggression are also indicative, and not meant to exclude other forms of aggression.  
                                                          
71 The Soviet Union posed a draft definition of aggression to the Committee on Security Questions to the General Commission of the Disarmament Conference 
for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments on 6 Feb 1933. The definition was slightly revised on 24 May 1933 but was never adopted.  
72 See Bartman C.S. (2010). ‘Lawfare and the Definition of Aggression: What the Soviet Union and Russian Federation Can Teach Us’, 43 Case W. Res. JIL 
73 Ibid., p.180. 
74 UN General Assembly ‘Definition of Aggression’ resolution 3314, Op. Cit. 
75 That other conceptions of force, such as economic or ideological coercion, ultimately fell outside the definition is considered in more detail in: Grzebyk, P. 
(2013) ‘Criminal Responsibility for the Crime of Aggression’, Routledge at p.53. That other forms of coercion could be considered aggression was discussed 
throughout the twentieth century. See, for example, McDougal, M.S. and Feliciano, F.P. (1959) ‘Legal Regulation of Resort to International Coercion: Aggression 
and Self-Defense in Policy Perspective’, Yale Law Journal, Vol. 68 (6); Editors, (1974) ‘The Use of Nonviolent Coercion: A Study in Legality under Article 2(4) 
36 
One part of the definition has led to further debate concerning whether there should be any reference to 
the consequences of committing aggression or not.76 This debate centred on reference to ‘war of 
aggression’ as something apparently distinct from ‘aggression’ in Article 5(2), where it states: a ‘war 
of aggression is a crime against international peace. Aggression gives rise to international 
responsibility.’ Some have argued that a ‘crime of aggression’ for which an individual may be held 
accountable must be a ‘war’ of aggression, therefore asserting that individual criminal responsibility 
only attaches to the most flagrant violations of international law.77 Indeed in the Nuremberg Charter’s 
provision on aggression referred to a ‘war of aggression’ within the category of ‘crimes against the 
peace’, and the 1970 General Assembly Declaration on Friendly Relations included the sentence: ‘A 
war of aggression constitutes a crime against the peace, for which there is responsibility under 
international law.’78 In opposition to those arguing that this created a two-tier system of responsibility, 
some states called for this to be updated. They argued for there to be no reference to ‘war of aggression’ 
or to ‘crime’. Instead, these states simply wanted a reference to state responsibility, and clarification 
that a state’s responsibility flows from aggression.  
What is clear is that states were focused on the consequences for states in Article 5(2), and not on 
individual accountability. While arriving at a definition was hailed as a watershed moment by Benjamin 
Ferencz,79 states were quick to point out that the 1974 General Assembly resolution was a guide for the 
UN Security Council, rather than an instrument of criminal prosecution.80 Indeed, when charged with 
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reviving the work on a definition of the crime in 1996, the ILC concluded that the 1974 definition was 
‘overly political and lacked legal precision.’81  
Ferencz has subsequently described his frustration that ‘no one seemed to recall that the General 
Assembly had mandated a code and court to serve as the basis for enforcing the Nuremberg 
principles.’82 In the end, the General Assembly definition was never utilised as the basis for prosecution 
in a criminal trial. Despite it being dismissed by the ILC, the definition to be adopted in Kampala came 
to rely heavily on the 1974 formulation.83 It also contributed to the growing body of customary 
international law on the crime of aggression. Indeed in writing on potential consequences of invading 
Iraq, Attorney General Goldsmith was later to warn Tony Blair of possible prosecution for the crime of 
aggression which he recognised ‘was customary international law and which therefore automatically 
formed part of the country’s domestic law.’84 The British House of Lords in R. v. Jones (2006) also later 
confirmed that the crime of aggression formed part of customary international law.85  
While the push for an agreed definition of the crime of aggression had progressed, the prospect of an 
established court to prosecute those that violated its provisions stalled. Despite the impasse, civil society 
organisations continued to work towards the formulation of codified international law and the 
establishment of an international criminal court, while NGOs like the International Law Association 
continued to propagate the court idea as a matter of principle.86 From the 1970s through to the end of 
the cold war period, the International Law Commission ‘continued to work on a code of international 
crimes, and individuals like Benjamin Ferencz, a former prosecutor of the Nuremberg tribunal, and M. 
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Cherif Bassiouni, an Egyptian professor of criminal law, continued to devote academic treatises to the 
idea of a permanent court.’87  
In 1981, the International Law Commission was again asked by the General Assembly to revive the 
work on its draft code of crimes. Doudou Thiam, the newly appointed special rapporteur for the file, 
carried out substantial work in addressing a range of questions, including definitions of crimes.88 A 
substantially revised version of the 1954 draft code of crimes was prepared, and in 1991 was sent to 
Member States for their reaction.  
While the code would come to be essential for defining the crimes to be prosecuted by an international 
criminal court, work still needed to progress on the statute for the institution itself. In 1989, a formal 
proposal was presented to the General Assembly, calling for the establishment of an international 
criminal court to prosecute those complicit in the illicit trafficking in drugs across national borders ‘and 
other transnational criminal activities’, and the International Law Commission was given the task of 
drafting a statute for such a court. Seizing the opportunity, the International Law Commission proposed 
that the mandate for the court should also incorporate crimes against peace and security of mankind - 
including aggression, genocide and crimes against humanity - and by 1994, the Commission had a final 
version of its draft statute for an international criminal court.89 
2.2.2. The road to Rome via the ad hoc tribunals 
When, in 1994, the Commission submitted the final version of its draft statute for an ICC to the General 
Assembly, it recommended that states convene a conference to turn the draft into a binding treaty. When 
the UN General Assembly opted instead to subject the draft to further discussion, a coalition of NGOs, 
frustrated by delay, decided to take action. In February 1995, the Coalition for an International Criminal 
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Court (CICC) was founded as ‘a broad-based network of NGOs and international law experts,’90 with 
the aim of facilitating progress on the text. 
Two years later in 1996, the Commission adopted the final draft of its ‘Code of Crimes against the 
Peace and Security of Mankind.’ The International Law Commission’s draft statute focused on 
procedural and organisational matters, and the code of crimes defined the crimes and the associated 
legal principles. Both would play a seminal role in the preparation of the Statute of the International 
Criminal Court.91  
Later that year, a Preparatory Committee was established to begin work redrafting the draft text, and a 
date was set for a conference to establish the Court. The conference would take place in Rome over the 
summer of 1998. In the intervening years, the CICC and related NGOs supported ‘the emergence of a 
like-minded group of countries who were in favour of swift establishment of a strong court, [acting] as 
a counterweight to the permanent members of the Security Council on the one hand and members of 
the Non-Aligned Movement on the other, both of which were reluctant to establish an independent court 
with supra-national powers.’92 
While the Commission had been grappling with its draft statute, the ethnic cleansing taking place in 
Yugoslavia and the genocide in Rwanda were shocking the conscience of the world, providing renewed 
impetus to those calling for comprehensive international rules and a permanent court to deter and punish 
those involved in atrocity crimes. In February 1993, the Security Council decided upon the 
establishment of a tribunal mandated to prosecute ‘persons responsible for serious violations of 
international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991’93 and 
in November 1994, following a request from Rwanda, the Security Council created a second ad hoc 
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tribunal, to prosecute genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian law committed 
in Rwanda and neighbouring countries during 1994.94 
Due to the internal nature of the conflicts in Yugoslavia and Rwanda, focus instead turned to genocide, 
crimes against humanity and war crimes, with the crime of aggression not included within the mandate 
of either ad hoc tribunals. The tribunals were intrinsically linked, sharing the same prosecutor and 
Appeals Chamber. The body of case law that flowed from these ad hoc tribunals was hugely significant 
in clarifying legal principles as they relate to the prosecution of atrocity crimes, and many of the findings 
were to be incorporated directly into the Statute for the ICC. The crimes included in the Rome Statute, 
along with the definitions used, owe a lot to both the Statutes of the ad hoc tribunals and to their growing 
jurisprudence.95 
The events in Yugoslavia and Rwanda represented a turning point. This manifested itself not just in the 
development of international criminal law and renewed interest in a permanent institution to punish 
atrocity crimes, but also in the role civil society groups were to play. As Bassiouni notes, the activities 
of human rights organisations in publicising the atrocities taking place were integral in propagating the 
idea that perpetrators could and should be punished.96  
Even instances in which the ad hoc tribunals erred provided lessons for subsequent drafters. The Rome 
Statute developed alternative modes of liability, placed greater emphasis on crimes of sexual violence, 
and sought to re-establish the centrality of states and state sovereignty at the ICC through the principle 
of complementarity.97 
Women’s groups were particularly inspired by the example of the Yugoslavia tribunal in their work for 
an ICC.98 The widespread use of rape as a weapon of war and component of ethnic cleansing brought 
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women’s experiences to the fore. Taking into consideration the concerns of women’s groups, ‘an officer 
for gender issues was appointed within the prosecutor’s office of the ICTY; and it was decided to allow 
rape victims to give testimony anonymously, and to seriously prosecute rape as a war crime.’99  
2.2.3. Rome  
Following agreement at the Preparatory Committee on the establishment of an international criminal 
court, the Rome Conference was convened, taking place from 15 June to 17 July 1998. More than 160 
governments participated in the conference. By the end, 120 nations voted in favour of the adoption of 
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Seven nations voted against the treaty (including 
the United States, Israel, and China), while 21 countries abstained. This marked an ‘historic 
achievement,’100 establishing for the first time a permanent international criminal court to prosecute the 
crimes that most shocked the conscience of humanity. 
During the Rome Conference, the international community focused again in earnest on the prospect of 
prosecuting the crime of aggression. While it was widely accepted that the crime of aggression should 
form part of the ICC’s jurisdictional remit, as evidenced by the fact that the crime was included within 
the Rome Statute as one of the four core crimes, opinion was divided on both the definition of the crime 
and the role that the Security Council would play in proceedings. Rather than stall the adoption of the 
ICC Statute and the birth of the fledgling institution, a compromise was reached. The ICC Statute 
recognised in Article 5 that the jurisdiction of the Court shall be limited to the most serious crimes of 
concern to the international community as a whole, and that should include the crime of aggression.101 
The ICC Statute also, however, ensured that the Court shall only exercise jurisdiction over the crime of 
aggression ‘once a provision is adopted defining the crime and setting out the conditions under which 
the Court shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to this crime’.102 
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The ICC Statute explicitly recognised the crime of aggression as a crime under customary international 
law, and committed the international community to agreeing a definition and jurisdictional remit for the 
crime. The Court’s Preparatory Commission was tasked with preparing ‘proposals for a provision on 
aggression, including the definition and Elements of Crimes of aggression and the conditions under 
which the International Criminal Court shall exercise its jurisdiction.’103 These proposals were to be 
submitted ‘to the Assembly of States Parties at a Review Conference, with a view to arriving at an 
acceptable provision on the crime of aggression for inclusion in this Statute.’104 
The role of civil society organisations in the process which led to the adoption of this Statute was 
‘almost unprecedented in international treaty negotiations, rivalled only by its contribution to the 
Landmines Ban Treaty, concluded six months earlier.’105 Indeed the CICC credits civil society with 
some of the most important aspects of the statute, such as its strong provisions for gender crimes and 
the independence of the prosecutor.106 More than 200 NGOs attended the Conference, including 
women’s organisations, peace and conflict resolution organisations, groups focused on global 
governance and strengthening the United Nations. The major international human rights organisations, 
including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, and Bar Associations including the 
International Commission of Jurists, were heavily involved in the ICC negotiations.107 As William Pace, 
Convenor of the CICC, admits, such was the level of influence wielded by civil society that the CICC 
was asked by the United Nations to organise the accreditation of NGOs to the Conference, ‘a unique 
form of self-regulation not attempted before at international conferences.’108  
The CICC has been described as being extremely effective in pushing its agenda, enabling NGOs to 
lobby state representatives from their region; targeting delegations thematically on issues such as gender 
justice, victims, children, and peace; and reporting on proceedings from the working groups of state 
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representatives.109 Delegations were pushed toward more progressive positions, partly through debates 
in their domestic newspapers110 as a result of CICC reporting.  
2.2.4. Road to Kampala 
With a permanent court, finally in place – and provisions adopted to punish war crimes, crimes against 
humanity and genocide – attention now turned to the crime of aggression. The search was for a workable 
definition and agreeable jurisdictional remit to govern the crime of aggression at the ICC. In accordance 
with the mandate agreed in Rome, the Preparatory Commission met on a number of occasions, seeking 
to form a proposal on the crime of aggression worthy of consideration by a Review Conference. The 
Working Group on Aggression was formed, making significant progress in preparing the first 
Coordinator’s Discussion Paper, presented in July 2002. 
The 2002 Discussion paper helped to shape the ensuing discussion on the crime of aggression. It sought 
to provide a working definition of the crime, as well as discussion on the role of the Security Council.111 
In recognition of the work of the Working Group on Aggression and the entry into force of the ICC 
Statute on 1 July 2002, the Assembly of States Parties established the Special Working Group on the 
Crime of Aggression (SWGCA).112 This group was composed of ICC States Parties, interested non-
party states, and a number of independent experts and representatives of NGOs.113  
2.2.4.1. Defining the crime of aggression 
Building on the 2002 Discussion paper, the SWGCA’s work culminated in a 2009 Discussion Paper. 
Informed by the General Assembly’s 1974 definition of aggression, this Discussion Paper provided the 
basis for negotiations at the Review Conference to follow. Indeed, it was decided that the 2009 
Discussion Paper’s definition was to be adopted verbatim during the Review Conference, allowing 
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negotiations to focus on the more controversial elements of the Court’s jurisdictional remit and the role 
of the Security Council.  
A definition of aggression for the purposes of prosecution by a criminal court had finally been agreed. 
Those provisions read: 
Article 8 bis 
1. For the purpose of this Statute, ‘crime of aggression’ means the planning, preparation, 
initiation or execution, by a person in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct 
the political or military action of a State, of an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity 
and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations.  
2. For the purpose of paragraph 1, ‘act of aggression’ means the use of armed force by a State 
against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in 
any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations. Any of the following 
acts, regardless of a declaration of war, shall, in accordance with United Nations General 
Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974, qualify as an act of aggression:  
(a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of another State, or any 
military occupation, however temporary, resulting from such invasion or attack, or any 
annexation by the use of force of the territory of another State or part thereof;  
(b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory of another State or the use of 
any weapons by a State against the territory of another State;  
(c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces of another State;  
(d) An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air forces, or marine and air fleets 
of another State;  
(e) The use of armed forces of one State which are within the territory of another State with the 
agreement of the receiving State, in contravention of the conditions provided for in the 
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agreement or any extension of their presence in such territory beyond the termination of the 
agreement;  
(f) The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at the disposal of another 
State, to be used by that other State for perpetrating an act of aggression against a third State;  
(g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, 
which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount to the 
acts listed above, or its substantial involvement therein.  
The work of the SWGCA in arriving at this definition was sub-divided into two areas: individual 
conduct and the conduct of the state.114  
Addressing the area of individual conduct, the SWGCA adopted the phrase ‘by a person in a position 
effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a state.’115 In line with 
the approach taken at Nuremberg, the crime of aggression was distinguished from the other crimes 
within the ICC’s remit in that aggression is seen as an absolute leadership crime.116 Unlike war crimes, 
the act of waging war will not lead directly to ordinary soldiers being punished.  
In dealing with the second sub-heading, it was decided that provisions should remain within the confines 
of customary international law, in that the crime of aggression should only extend to states. This was 
despite strong arguments that transnational private organisations can be a serious threat to international 
peace.117 While it was decided that the illegal use of armed force should constitute the punishable state 
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act, the question of how exactly to define this illegal use of armed force was more controversial. Opinion 
was broadly split between those states that favoured an inclusive definition such as that adopted in 1974, 
and those that wanted a higher threshold.118 The result was a compromise in which the 1974 definition 
of the UN General Assembly resolution 3314 was referenced in Art.8(2), along with the threshold 
requirement contained in Art.8(1) that an act of aggression must constitute a manifest violation of the 
Charter of the United Nations in its ‘character, gravity and scale.’  
2.2.4.2. Conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction 
A third element of the work of the SWGCA related to the conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction. 
Much of the work needed to reach agreement on this crucial element would fall to the delegations at 
the Review Conference in Kampala. 
Agreeing on the conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction rested to a large extent on the role of the 
Security Council. The five permanent members of the Security Council favoured an approach set out in 
a 1994 International Law Commission (ILC) Draft Statute. This approach required a prior determination 
of an act of aggression by the Security Council as a precondition of ICC proceedings. This was strongly 
opposed by the overwhelming majority of states participating in negotiations, and since agreement 
could not be reached it was left to the Review Conference to find a way forward.  
Intimately linked to this issue, was the question of whether the Court should have the power to exercise 
its jurisdiction over the crime of aggression even in cases where the alleged aggressor state had not 
consented to the new provisions on the crime of aggression.119 If consent of the new provisions by the 
aggressor state was needed before ICC proceedings could be initiated, the permanent members of the 
Security Council may well be more inclined to forgo their insistence on the need for a prior Security 
Council determination. While a number of states favoured adoption of the Article 12 provisions that 
regulate the exercise of jurisdiction for the other international crimes, it soon became clear that in order 
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to gain the consent needed, a special entry-into-force mechanism was going to have to be negotiated. 
This too was left to the Review Conference. 
Despite a number of jurisdictional issues remaining unanswered,120 the SWGCA did make important 
progress in addition to providing a workable definition of the crime. It was agreed that any 
determination of the Security Council would not be prejudicial to a future finding of the Court. It was 
also confirmed that the three trigger mechanisms that apply to the other international crimes would also 
apply to the crime of aggression, namely referral of a crime to the ICC by a State party or the Security 
Council, or the initiation of an investigation proprio motu by the Prosecutor of the Court.  
With these provisions and a definition of the crime accepted, along with a clear idea of the parameters 
of discussion to follow, the stage was set for Review Conference negotiations. 
The following chapter will provide an in-depth account of the provisions adopted in Kampala that, 
contained within Article 8 bis, define the crime of aggression and the associated acts that result in 
individual criminal responsibility.  
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Chapter 3 – Examination of the Definition of the Crime of Aggression 
This chapter will seek to provide an in-depth account of the provisions adopted in Kampala that, 
contained within Article 8 bis, define the crime of aggression and the associated acts that result in 
individual criminal responsibility. The first part of this chapter will briefly look at the format of the 
definition, examining the rationale behind sub-dividing the broader definition into two parts: the first 
that defines a crime of aggression and establishes the threshold of illegality, and the second that 
elaborates in concrete terms which actions amount to acts of aggression. The second and third parts of 
this chapter take each of those elements of the definition in turn, critically assessing what they provide 
and analysing how the provisions might be interpreted by the Court. The final section of this chapter 
looks at the mental elements of the crime and the implications for defendants seeking to argue they did 
not possess the requisite mens rea. This chapter is closely linked to its sister Chapter on Jurisdiction 
which similarly examines the jurisdictional provisions adopted in Kampala.  
3.1. The Structure of Article 8 bis 
Discussions that took place in preparation for the Kampala conference, namely those of the Special 
Working Group for the Crime of Aggression (SWGCA), provided a working definition of the crime, 
albeit one that still needed to be formally adopted. While states were keen to address a number of 
concerns they had about the definition – leading to the Understandings to be adopted in Kampala, they 
understood that reopening the definition would inevitably lead to its total unravelling.121 As such, 
support for the definition stood firm and was adopted in Kampala as Article 8 bis.  
Article 8 bis is thus divided into two paragraphs, the first (Art.8 bis (1)) defines the ‘crime of aggression’ 
and the second (Art.8 bis (2)) elaborates the constituent parts of an ‘act of aggression’. Both elements 
must be satisfied before individual criminal responsibility can be assigned and so it is necessary to fully 
understand both here. In order to take a critical look at the definitional provisions agreed in Kampala, 
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it is important to first go back and understand the rationale of the drafters – and the position of states – 
in arriving at this two-part definition.  
As a starting point for defining the crime of aggression, there had been little progress made since 
Nuremberg, and customary international law largely rested there.122 As such, only aggressive war led 
to criminal responsibility. The drafters were faced with the modern reality that instances of state 
aggression are rarely declared, and not every unlawful use of force by a state falls within the modern 
conception of aggression. A new concept needed enumeration. Largely – and sensibly – avoiding 
attempts to capture the meaning of war, it was instead decided that the definition provided by the 
General Assembly in resolution 3314, which incorporated both a general definition of the crime of 
aggression to be read along with a list of acts of aggression, would be relied upon in some form.  
As touched upon in the previous chapter addressing the historical development of the criminalisation 
of aggression, states were broadly divided over whether an inclusive or narrow definition should be 
adopted: an inclusive approach whereby the acts of aggression listed in Article 3 of the annex to 
Resolution 3314 would be included without any additional threshold, or a narrower definition 
incorporating both the general definition of the crime of aggression along with an even higher threshold 
requirement. In the end, the SWGCA presented a compromise in the Chair’s 2009 Non-paper on the 
Elements of Crimes, whereby the list of acts of aggression from the Resolution 3314 definition were 
included along with the resolution’s accompanying chapeau comprising a more general definition of 
the crime of aggression. This was to be supplemented by a threshold requirement stipulating that the 
acts must be of such a degree that they constitute a manifest violation of the UN Charter.  
The decision to include a general definition of the crime of aggression along with the enumerated acts 
was a necessary one as the acts of aggression adopted almost verbatim from Article 3 of the annex to 
Resolution 3314 in Article 8 bis (2) do not contain any requirement of illegality. If read in isolation, 
these fail to rule out uses of force that are not sufficiently serious as to amount to a crime of 
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aggression.123 Furthermore, it is only through the introduction of a higher threshold that the ‘manifest 
illegality’ applies to the definition as a whole. These and other issues related to the threshold 
requirement are dealt with in more detail below.  
At the time of drafting, the Resolution 3314 definition was intended as an aid to the Security Council 
in determining acts of aggression rather than as a definitive legal definition of the crime. This goes some 
way to explaining why it fails to address these grey areas of international law, but to have adopted it for 
the purposes of the ICC without further elaboration would not, in the words of Claus Kreß, have 
adequately responded to the fundamental challenge posed to any attempt to define the crime of 
aggression.124 As Elizabeth Wilmshurst recognises, the formulation adopted will require the ICC to rule 
on whether the collective act of the state is in breach of international law, and the Court will need to 
consider any defences under international law which are available to the state.125 These will be 
considered further below.  
3.2. The Crime of Aggression 
This opening paragraph of Article 8 bis defines the crime of aggression in general terms and establishes 
the basis for the individual criminal responsibility of possible perpetrators. Article 8 bis (1) reads:  
For the purpose of this Statute, ‘crime of aggression’ means the planning, preparation, 
initiation or execution, by a person in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct 
the political or military action of a State, of an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity 
and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations.  
This section contains three elements that, along with an act of aggression contained within Art.8 bis (2), 
must be present for a crime of aggression to have occurred. These are (1) individual conduct: that an 
individual must have been involved in the ‘planning, preparation, initiation or execution’ of the crime; 
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(2) leadership requirement: that those acts must have been carried out ‘by a person in a position 
effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a State’; and (3) 
threshold requirement: that the act ‘by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation 
of the Charter of the United Nations.’ 
3.2.1. Individual conduct: ‘planning, preparation, initiation or execution’ 
As to what would constitute the acts of commission, the SWGCA chose to remain faithful to the 
language used at Nuremburg, only substituting ‘waging’ for ‘execution’.126 This substitution was 
considered a necessary result of the definition of the state act element of the crime being broadened to 
‘act of aggression’ in place of ‘war of aggression’.127 No views expressed in the SWGCA reveal that 
any substantive difference of meaning, however, was intended.128 
As Barriga has noted: 
‘execution’ could be seen as the odd sibling among these words, as all the others describe the 
typical activity of the leader, whereas it is usually the soldier who executes an act of aggression 
by actively engaging in combat. Then again, modern warfare would allow a leader to execute 
a devastating act of armed force by a simple push of a button.129 
Unlike Article 6(a) of the NIMT Charter and Article 5(a) of the IMTFE Charter, Article 8 bis (1) does 
not criminalize the ‘participation in a common plan or conspiracy’. As interpreted by Nuremberg, 
conspiracy differed little from planning and preparation;130 the charge of conspiracy was in effect 
superfluous, and led to criticism of the Tribunal.131  
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It is not necessary that an individual be involved in all four of the acts of commission, with participation 
in any one of those stages sufficient to establish individual responsibility. This was first confirmed in a 
discussion paper submitted to the SWGCA at the 2005 Princeton inter-sessional meeting:  
While individual criminal responsibility for a crime of aggression presupposes that a complete 
collective act, i.e. an actual use of force, actually occurs, it is possible for an individual to incur 
criminal responsibility for an act of participation which is confined to the planning or 
preparation stage of the collective act. It would seem that the criminalization of such acts of 
participation has a sound basis under customary international law and has so far been largely 
uncontroversial.132 
It is perhaps just as well that participation in only one of these constitutive acts is required, as it may 
prove difficult to distinguish the ‘planning’ from the ‘preparation’ of an act of aggression,133 and indeed 
the ‘initiation’ from the ‘execution’. As regards aggressive war, planning has been described as ‘the 
formulation of a design or scheme for a specific war of aggression’, while preparation has been 
interpreted as comprising ‘the various steps taken to implement the plan’ before the outbreak of the 
war.134 Similarly, initiation has been taken to mean acts confined to the commencement of the use of 
armed force, while the execution would comprise any subsequent military operation.135  
3.2.2. Leadership and State requirements: ‘a person in a position effectively to exercise 
control or direct the political or military action of a State’ 
The second element of Art.8 bis (1), that the acts must be carried out by ‘a person in a position 
effectively to exercise control or to direct the political or military action of a state’, reaffirms Council 
Control Law No. 10 of 1945136 in recognising the crime of aggression as a ‘leadership crime’ in that 
only those most responsible will be held accountable for it.  
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In practice, targeting those most responsible is a feature of all international crimes. What is a notable 
distinction is the idea that only those in certain positions, with certain amounts of power, are capable of 
committing the crime of aggression. This reality, that ordinary soldiers would never be prosecuted for 
it, differentiates the crime of aggression from the other three crimes covered by the Rome Statute.  
One other notable difference is that, while the other three crimes are focused on the protection of the 
individual or a group of individuals, the crime of aggression is focused on protecting the sovereignty, 
territorial integrity or political independence of another state, rendering it logical to reduce the possible 
actors of this crime to the leaders of the state or military apparatus.137  
This does not in the strictest sense exclude religious or industrial leaders from its scope of application, 
but given the crime’s focus on ‘armed force’ it would require them to be in a position to influence the 
political or military actions of the respective state.138 This supports the findings of Nuremburg, that 
business men too participated in the Nazi conspiracy to wage aggressive war and were to be deemed 
criminally responsible,139 and the assertions of Control Council Law No. 10 of 1945 which expressly 
included among persons to be deemed responsible for crimes against peace those who ‘held high 
position in the financial, industrial or economic life’ of Germany, one of its allies, co-belligerents or 
satellites.140 While not impossible that those in positions of power might seek to instrumentalise that 
power in influencing political and military figures, the high threshold imposed does make it unlikely 
that - for the purposes of an ICC investigation - such financiers, industrialists or economists would ever 
wield sufficient control or direction over state or military apparatus as to be held accountable for an act 
of aggression.141 
Further, through this explicit link between the crime and the state, Art.8 bis (1) precludes the prosecution 
of non-state actors. For some this is a glaring omission. Harold Koh who led the US Delegation to 
Kampala, criticised this delineation on the basis that it risks preventing the prosecution of crimes that 
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have recently emerged as the ‘greatest potential security threats facing the international community,’142 
namely cybercrimes which are often committed by non-state actors and in ways unconnected to 
traditional state apparatus. Others have already highlighted the ‘inconsistency of a system that allows 
the prosecution of acts of aggression committed by the leaders of a state while providing for an implicit 
‘exemption’ for non-state leaders (such as those at the top of the hierarchy of Al-Qaeda or Hezbollah) 
from the jurisdictional reach of the Court relating to the same acts.’143 For Mauro Politi, a former Judge 
at the international Court, this appears to be a serious shortcoming, and one which the Court will not be 
in a position to remedy by way of interpretation.144 
For others however, the concept of aggression has – since its inception in the theory of international 
law – been understood in its relationship with the state, with no obvious reason for now changing this 
conceptual understanding. The very notion of international criminal law was borne of a need to restrict 
the resort to force by states through the curtailing of state sovereignty. As discussed previously, states 
have a habit of waging war on other states and non-state actors alike. That the crime as drafted excludes 
non-state actors reflects this reality, and to suggest that the system is flawed because it does not 
incorporate non-state actors would be to wilfully ignore that historical trend.  
It is also worth noting that armed attacks by non-state actors would almost certainly be covered by other 
relevant rules of international law including those of the Rome Statute. Furthermore, such uses of force 
would be almost implausible without, at least, the implicit support or acquiescence from states 
harbouring the non-state actors perpetrating the attacks.’145 
 
 
                                                          
142 For Harold Koh this was cyber warfare, but one might also include the actions of non-state actors such as ISIS in any critique of the scope afforded to the ICC 
in prosecuting the crime of aggression. See Koh, H. (2015) ‘The Crime of Aggression: The United States Perspective’, Faculty Scholarship Series. Paper 5006 
available at http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/5006 (accessed 10 July 2018) 
143 Politi, M. (2012), ‘The ICC and the Crime of Aggression – A Dream that Came Through and the Reality Ahead’, Journal of International Criminal Justice, 
p.287 
144 Ibid.  
145 Sayapin, Op Cit. p.260 
55 
3.2.2.1 ‘Aided, abetted or otherwise assisted’ 
As just highlighted, Article 8 bis requires that the perpetrator be ‘in a position effectively to exercise 
control over or to direct the political or military action of a State.’ This sets a high threshold: the person 
planning, preparing, initiating, or executing the acts must presumably hold a high-ranking position in 
the aggressor state. ‘Control’ or the ability to ‘direct’ the state’s action is required. This differs from 
Article 25(3) of the Rome Statute, which establishes modes of liability for the other crimes. Article 
25(3) distinguishes between principal perpetrators and accomplices, those who are involved in 
instigating, ordering, aiding and abetting, or otherwise contributing to the commission of a crime. 
During the negotiations on the crime of aggression, there was a debate as to whether the Article 25 
regime should also apply to the crime of aggression or whether the modes of liability should be set out 
solely in Article 8 bis.146 The former was eventually adopted, clarifying that Article 8 bis is to be read 
together with Article 25(3) of the ICC Statute. As such, Article 25(3) applies to the crime of aggression 
as well, making it possible for an individual to be prosecuted for having aided, abetted or otherwise 
assisted in planning, preparing, initiating or executing an act of aggression, as long as the leadership 
requirement to be discussed next is also met: that it applies ‘only to persons in a position effectively to 
exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a State.’ 
It has been argued that applying Article 8 effectively renders Article 25(3) redundant for the purposes 
of aggression, in that the crime would only apply to principal perpetrators,147 however a closer look at 
what is meant by ‘effective control’ indicates this might not be the case. As Nuremburg demonstrated, 
it seems unlikely that ‘control’ need be absolute, with many of those convicted at Nuremburg not in a 
sufficiently high-ranking position as to be able to exercise control over the entire war effort. Such a 
reading would render fewer more than Hitler responsible for the crime. Control over the ‘political or 
military action’ of the state is also relevant. This arguably widens the scope of aggression beyond those 
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that took the actual decision to go to war, to those that were sufficiently high up in the hierarchy to be 
able to shape the political policy of the aggressor state or influence military decision making.  
As such, in any given situation, a government minister may be involved only indirectly in planning, 
preparing, initiating, or executing the act of aggression but could thus be found to have been an 
accomplice rather than a principal perpetrator of the crime of aggression. The same may apply to high-
ranking officials within the military.148 
Indeed, the discussion paper above envisages two examples in which an individual could be prosecuted 
for having aided, abetted or otherwise assisted in the commission of a crime of aggression: ‘(1) a high-
level state official commences to participate in a meeting aimed at preparing an act of aggression, but 
is prevented from taking part in the decision-making; and (2) a high-ranking military officer is close to 
giving an important order during the execution of an act of aggression, but is prevented from completing 
the act of ordering.’149 
3.2.3. Threshold requirement: ‘its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest 
violation’ 
The final part of Article 8 bis (1) establishes that in order for the instances of state aggression listed 
under Article 8 bis (2) to entail individual criminal responsibility, the act must ‘by its character, gravity 
and scale, constitute a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations.’ This ensures that only 
the most serious examples of state aggression would be punishable.  
The intention to establish a high threshold for the crime was further confirmed in an Annex adopted 
along with the Kampala provisions, containing seven ‘Understandings regarding the amendments to the 
Rome Statute of the ICC on the crime of aggression.’150 These Understandings were negotiated by the 
states at Kampala and are to be read in conjunction with both the Article 8 definition and the Article 15 
jurisdictional provisions. While the extent to which these understandings have any legal effect is 
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unclear,151 they still represent an important part of the negotiations and provide valuable insight into the 
views of the negotiating states.152 Understanding 6 confirms aggression as ‘the most serious and 
dangerous form of the illegal use of force; and that a determination whether an act of aggression has 
been committed requires consideration of all the circumstances of each particular case, including the 
gravity of the acts concerned and their consequences.’  
With regard to any assessment as to what constitutes a manifest violation, both the Understandings at 7 
and the Amendments to the Elements of Crimes for Article 8 bis in paragraph 3 clarify that ‘the three 
components of character, gravity and scale must be sufficient to justify a 'manifest' determination.’153 
While use of the word ‘and’ would indicate that all three criteria need to be satisfied for an act of 
aggression to be considered manifest, the Understandings also state that ‘no one component can be 
significant enough to satisfy the manifest standard by itself,’ leaving open the possibility that the 
presence of two of the criteria would be sufficient.154  
The term ‘manifest violation’ is new and cannot be found in the Resolution 3314 Definition of 
Aggression, though the attempt to restrict international law to the most serious violations is not without 
precedent and brings to mind the ‘grave breaches’ regime of the Geneva Convention’s humanitarian 
provisions. The requirement that there be a ‘manifest’ breach introduces an objective qualifier that 
captures the qualitative difference between an ‘act’ and a ‘crime’ of aggression.  
That being said, the perceived lack of precision regarding the term ‘manifest’ has led to criticism that 
the definition is too narrow – failing to encapsulate a myriad of incidents that are not considered 
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‘manifest’, and too broad – failing as it does to clarify whether acts of humanitarian intervention or pre-
emptory self-defence would be considered manifest violations.  
In response, Kai Ambos has argued that ‘given the highly normative content of any qualifier attempting 
to capture the criminal essence of a certain act and the general problem of describing concrete human 
conduct in a sufficiently precise form using abstract legal terms, it is difficult to conceive any objective 
definition which would express the substance of the threshold clause more precisely.’155 The inclusion 
of the term ‘manifest’ introduces a high threshold that, combined with the existence of character, gravity 
and scale, should be sufficient clarification that only the most serious examples of aggression should be 
prosecuted.156  
Indeed, at the time of drafting, the SWGCA emphasized that this clause ‘would appropriately limit the 
Court's jurisdiction to the most serious acts of aggression under customary international law, thus 
excluding cases of insufficient gravity and those falling within a grey area.’157 While this confirms the 
intention to prevent the ICC from being burdened with instances of border incursions and other minor 
incidents,158 it also raises the prospect that the manifest threshold was intended as a catch-all phrase, 
through which uses of force that fall within this ‘grey area’ of international law – namely pre-emptive 
self-defence and humanitarian intervention – are also excluded.  
3.2.3.1. ‘Grey areas’ of international law: humanitarian intervention and pre-emptive self-
defence 
This raises a particularly important question: can the manifest threshold preclude the use of pre-emptive 
self-defence or humanitarian intervention from being considered a crime of aggression? It is a question 
to which there is currently no definitive consensus.  
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As will be seen further below in this chapter, the mental elements adopted for the crime stop short of 
requiring that the perpetrator made a legal assessment as to whether the state’s actions constituted a 
manifest violation of the UN Charter. As such, these provisions specifically exclude the defence of 
mistake of law, ensuring that the extent to which state actions of pre-emptive self-defence or 
humanitarian intervention comprise a crime of aggression rest solely on the Court’s interpretation of 
the manifest threshold provision.  
Humanitarian intervention is a term used to describe action taken for ‘claimed’ humanitarian purposes 
but without Security Council authorisation and without the agreement of the state concerned.159 While 
international law provisions would on the face of it appear to prohibit the use of force absent prior 
Security Council authorisation or in genuine self-defence, opinion is divided over whether relatively 
recent cases of international intervention highlight an emerging norm of customary law allowing the 
implementation of the responsibility to protect (R2P) doctrine, or that such intervention is indeed 
already lawful based on the continued existence of a customary law right which has not been displaced 
by the UN Charter.160 
A thorough analysis of the extent to which humanitarian intervention and responsibility to protect have 
become established parts of customary international law will not be replicated here. There is plenty of 
analysis on this already out there.161 It is important to note though, that the US were keen to carve out 
such an exemption for the crime of aggression. Indeed, when negotiating the Kampala provisions, the 
US unsuccessfully attempted to establish in the Understandings that the use of force to prevent 
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes should not fall within the definition, arguing that the 
provisions as drafted presented ‘a concomitant risk that a broad or vague definition will discourage 
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states from using force in cases where they should.’162 This comes after the US and its allies invoked 
humanitarian narratives - in addition to security concerns - as part of their rhetorical justifications for 
the US-led invasion of Iraq,163 and has led to questions over whether that invasion constituted a manifest 
violation. One might similarly question the NATO intervention in Yugoslavia, given that NATO 
members acted without the explicit authorization of the Security Council.164 Both will be considered in 
much more detail in chapter 8.  
The law related to self-defence is much clearer, with Article 51 of the UN Charter establishing the 
‘inherent right of individual or collective self-defence’, and the ICJ confirming in its Nicaragua case 
on the use of force.165 . Pre-emptive self-defence however, that is, against an attack that is threatened 
and neither ongoing nor imminent, is more controversial.166 While it might seem logical that self-
defence must come after an attack has begun or is imminent, it has been argued that it is unrealistic in 
all cases to expect states to await until this point is reached. As Arendt outlines, when the UN Charter 
was drafted, the main purpose of the law was to address conventional threats posed by conventional 
actors: states. WMD and terrorism pose threats unanticipated by traditional international law, and could 
render a state incapable of mounting an effective defence if it were required to wait for an armed attack 
to be imminent. It can be very difficult to determine whether a state possesses WMD, and by the time 
its use is imminent, it could be extremely difficult for a state to mount an effective defence. Similarly, 
terrorists use tactics that may make it all but impossible to detect an action until it is well underway or 
even finished.167 As Wilmshurst notes, the ICJ has left open the issue of the lawfulness of a response to 
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the threat of an imminent armed attack,168 while the claim to ‘pre-emptive self-defence’ to prevent the 
emergence of a security threat is widely rejected as impermissible under international law.169  
In concrete terms, the objective threshold forces us to consider the differences between classic crimes 
of aggression and recent acts with the potential to meet the threshold. Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 
for instance, is similar in nature – even if not in scale – to Nazi attacks on neighbouring countries in 
1939, comprising as it did both acts contained within Article 8 bis (2) and meeting the ‘manifest 
violation’ threshold contained within Article 8 bis (1) that is necessary for it to be deemed a crime of 
aggression. The US-led invasion of Iraq in contrast might not amount to a crime of aggression due to 
the absence of a ‘manifest violation’ of the UN Charter if it is accepted that the invasion was justified 
on the basis of Security Council resolution 678 of 29 November 1990.170 More pertinently, in the build-
up to the US-led invasion of Iraq, much was made of the use of chemical weapons by Saddam Hussein 
on his own people. As were claims contained within the UK government’s ‘September Dossier’– later 
repeated by then Prime Minister Tony Blair in the run-up to the war – that Iraq possessed Weapons of 
Mass Destruction and was capable of deploying them within 45 minutes of an order. These issues - and 
the case of Iraq specifically - will be discussed in more detail in chapter 8, which applies the provisions 
to historical cases to give a sense of the likelihood that successful prosecutions may arise in the future.  
Such claims bring into sharp focus the relevance of claims to humanitarian intervention and pre-emptive 
self-defence to the crime of aggression and the role the Courts will have in interpreting the Kampala 
provisions. What is clear is that the Court will have to make a judgement as to the extent to which acts 
of aggression meet the threshold requirement established in Article 8. It remains to be seen how 
expansive a view the Court will take.  
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3.3. The Act of Aggression 
With Article 8 bis (1) providing a general definition of the crime of aggression, Article 8 bis (2) then 
clarifies the state actions that would constitute an act of aggression. When such acts are committed, and 
concurrently the criteria set out in Article 8 bis (1) are satisfied, individual criminal responsibility for 
the crime of aggression is established.  
The first subparagraph of Article 8 bis (2) adopts the chapeau from the Resolution 3314 Definition of 
Aggression, setting out in general terms that: 
[An] ‘act of aggression’ means the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, 
territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations.  
The wording of this general definition is well established in international law. The Resolution 3314 
definition of aggression from which it is derived was in turn based on Article 2(4) of the UN Charter 
that has been variously referred to as ‘the cornerstone of peace in the Charter,’ ‘the heart of the United 
Nations Charter’ and the ‘basic rule of contemporary public international law.’171  
 The definition adopted in Kampala makes some alterations from the UN Charter’s 1945 prohibition of 
force, excluding from the definition of aggression the mere threat of force; ensuring that only ‘armed’ 
force is encapsulated; and including ‘sovereignty’ together with territorial integrity and the political 
independence of the victim State.172 These changes raise the threshold for what constitutes an act of 
aggression, making it consistent with the intention to limit the Court's jurisdiction to the most serious 
acts of aggression and exclude cases of insufficient gravity.  
The second subparagraph of Article 8 bis (2) then elaborates which individual acts prima facie qualify 
as acts of aggression. It is established that the acts enumerated (a) to (e), ‘regardless of a declaration of 
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war, shall, in accordance with UN General Assembly resolution 3314 of 14 December 1974, qualify as 
an act of aggression.’ These acts comprise: 
(a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of another State, or 
any military occupation, however temporary, resulting from such invasion or attack, or any 
annexation by the use of force of the territory of another State or part thereof;  
(b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory of another State or the 
use of any weapons by a State against the territory of another State;  
(c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces of another State;  
(d) An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air forces, or marine and air 
fleets of another State;  
(e) The use of armed forces of one State which are within the territory of another State with 
the agreement of the receiving State, in contravention of the conditions provided for in the 
agreement or any extension of their presence in such territory beyond the termination of 
the agreement;  
(f) The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at the disposal of another 
State, to be used by that other State for perpetrating an act of aggression against a third 
State;  
(g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, 
which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount to 
the acts listed above, or its substantial involvement therein. 
This list of acts is also taken verbatim from the Resolution 3314 definition of aggression. As discussed, 
these acts will need to be of such gravity, character and scale as to constitute a manifest violation of the 
UN Charter, ensuring that only the most egregious instances of blockades, bombardments, attacks etc. 
will be deemed a crime of aggression.  
As well as illuminating which acts qualify as an act of aggression, the definition also gives an indication 
as to which scenarios it does not cover. These include the lawful use of force through individual or 
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collective self-defence or actions authorised by the Security Council. A number of other prominent 
exclusions have already been discussed, namely and the use of force by non-state actors; and actions 
that do not meet the ‘manifest violation’ threshold, under which humanitarian intervention and even 
pro-democratic intervention may fall. Cyber-attacks has also be raised as a notable exclusion. While 
not explicitly excluded, cyber-attacks will only be considered an act of aggression if they fall within the 
enumerated acts of Article 8 above and meet the ‘manifest’ threshold.173 
It is clear from paragraph (a) that the intention is to protect the ‘territorial integrity’ of the state from 
invasion, attack, military occupation or annexation arising from the use of force. Both invasion and 
annexation have long been regarded as international crimes, the manifest illegality of which derives 
from their inclusion in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.174 The terms attack and military occupation 
however are less well established as grave breaches of international law, leading some to question the 
legitimacy of their inclusion.175 Indeed Harold Koh has used the inclusion of military occupation to 
suggest that it would, on the face of fit ‘appear to characterize as aggression such things as the Allied 
occupations following World War II.’176 In the face of such criticism it must be remembered that all 
other conditions, including but not limited to the threshold requirement and the absence of Security 
Council authorisation, must be met for such an attack or occupation to be considered a crime of 
aggression. What is more, Article 8 is clear that only occupations resulting from the unlawful use of 
force would be considered an act of aggression.  
Similarly, in paragraph (b), bombardment and the use of weapons are not per se breaches of 
international law. This does not, as Harold Koh has suggested with reference to the use of weapons, 
open the door to the possibility that ‘brief skirmishes of relatively little real consequence’ would be 
covered by the act. Their inclusion does not preclude the need for all other criteria contained within 
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Article 8 bis to be met, and nor, incidentally, does it preclude due regard being paid to the rules of 
international law applicable to the use of specific types of banned weapons.  
Paragraph (c) deals with blockades of ports and coasts, while paragraph (d) is concerned with attacks 
on the ‘land, sea or air forces, or marine and air fleets’. In both instances, the intended targets are 
implicitly a part of the state’s territory, and thus have been included within the crime’s remit. 
Paragraphs (e) and (f) are concerned with situations whereby one state allows its territory to be used by 
another, and seeks to regulate the conduct of both states as party to the agreement. Again, Harold Koh 
expresses concern that this could lead to accusations of aggression arising out of minor violations of 
bilateral agreements. The arrangements and the conduct of states entering into them are governed by 
the detail of the relevant bilateral treaty, and only grave breaches would fall within the remit of the ICC. 
The inclusion of such host state provisions raises the possibility that a host state could be held complicit 
in facilitating or tolerating an act of aggression due to the actions of the resident state. It is proposed 
that once aware of unlawful acts being perpetrated within the host state’s territory, the host state must 
adopt ‘lawful – unilateral or multilateral – measures available to their state to stop their occurrence.’177 
The final paragraph (g) deals with the sending of ‘armed groups, irregulars or mercenaries’, which carry 
out acts of such gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, a practice that the ICJ has confirmed as in 
violation of customary international law in its famous Nicaragua judgment.178 That the sending state is 
responsible for the actions of armed groups is also enshrined within the 2001 Articles on Responsibility 
of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA), namely Article 8.179  Article 8 sets out that ‘the 
conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of a state under international law if 
the person or group of persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control 
of, that state in carrying out the conduct.’180 
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The need for those committing the crime of aggression to be in a positon to effectively to exercise 
control was discussed earlier in this chapter. Here the concept of effective control is raised once more, 
this time in relation to the state’s control over armed groups that it sends. The concept of ‘effective 
control’ has been discussed at great length at the ICJ, namely the Nicaragua, Armed Activities and 
Bosnia Genocide cases, and the ICTY in its Tadić case. The established case law confirms the 
continuing validity of the effective control standard as set out by the ICJ in its Bosnia Genocide case.181 
Affirmed in its Nicaragua judgment, the test requires that the ‘state’s instructions be given, in respect 
of each operation in which the alleged violations occurred, not generally in respect of the overall 
operations taken by the persons or group having committed the violations’.  
There has been criticism that this standard imposes too high a threshold for what constitutes effective 
control, particularly in cases where there is common purpose between the state and a non-state actor 
could give states ‘the opportunity to carry out criminal policies through non-state actors or surrogates 
without incurring direct responsibility therefore’.182 
That debate will not be replicated here,183 suffice to say that the case law has evolved to a point where 
there is at least a degree of certainty surrounding what constitutes effective control. The decision to 
include paragraph (g) within the definition of the crime of aggression makes it abundantly clear that 
states will not be exempt from prosecution for the crime of aggression when committed by armed groups 
that they have sent and over whom they exercise control, in line with customary international law and 
established case law on how that is constituted.  
3.3.1. Exhaustive nature of the list 
The SWGCA discussed whether this was to be considered an exhaustive list of possible state actions, 
and indeed debate has continued subsequently. Stefan Barriga, Lichtenstein’s Deputy Permanent 
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Representative to the UN and a principal legal adviser to the Chairs of the negotiations on the crime of 
aggression, recalled that it was decided it should be considered ‘semi-open’ or indeed ‘semi-closed’,184 
whereby the possibility of other incidents constituting aggressive acts was left open, but on the proviso 
that they too meet the conditions contained within the broader Article 8 bis.  
The exhaustive nature of this list potentially carries legal consequences, with some suggesting there is 
scope for a defendant to challenge an ‘open’ definition as violating the principle of legality or nullum 
crimen sine lege. Those concerned argue that an open definition would lack the requisite specificity, 
not being sufficiently specific as to respect the basic criminal law premise that the law penalises ‘only 
acts which are outlawed according to a broad consensus in society, both as to their illegal nature and to 
individual criminal accountability.’185 The essence of the principle of legality is that an individual may 
not be prosecuted for conduct she could not know was punishable, and requires the law to be so clear 
as to make its consequences foreseeable.186 The requirement of legal clarity is also considered a general 
principle of international criminal law.187 
In the context of the crime of aggression, these arguments essentially beg the question: could the 
employment of vague terms result in the Court ruling that cases are inadmissible or that accused persons 
are not guilty because their conduct cannot unarguably be said to fall within the definition of the crime? 
In essence, where is the dividing line between acts captured by the definition, and those excluded, to be 
drawn?188 
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This concern was raised at the time of adoption, with US Ambassador for War Crimes Stephen Rapp 
warning at Kampala that ‘individuals must know whether conduct crosses the line into that which is 
forbidden before they act and not learn the answer in the crucible of trial.’189  
The answer to these concerns is two-fold. Firstly, as Jennifer Trahon has argued, a semi-closed list with 
a chapeau that closes it, as envisaged above, should not violate the principle of legality.190 Indeed 
international criminal law is abound with phrases in need of substantial judicial interpretation, and that 
does not detract from the fact that the definition provides a detailed list of acts that would – when 
coupled with the manifest threshold – constitute a crime of aggression. This provides a core of 
prohibited conduct that will satisfy the definition of the state act element of the crime of aggression on 
any reading. In other more difficult instances, the Prosecutor and the Court will have to decide whether 
the definition is satisfied, and rule in favour of accused persons where the test has not been met.  
Secondly, there are a multitude of international instruments ready to attest to the recognition of 
aggression as a crime under customary international law. The influential House of Lords judgment in R 
v Jones (2006) is just one of them, attesting as it did that ‘the core elements of the crime of aggression 
have been understood, at least since 1945, with sufficient clarity to permit the lawful trial of those 
accused of this most serious crime.’191  
Arguments that the definition lacks the requisite precision to be considered legally binding therefore 
appear unpersuasive, but what is clear is that the ICC will be forced to take positions on politically 
controversial aspects of the jus ad bellum. Whether or not the ICC is best placed to make those decisions 
goes to the heart of the debate over the merits of the criminalisation of aggression before the ICC, a 
question that will be explored in chapter 9, looking at whether the amendments represent a positive step 
forward for the Court.   
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3.4. Mens Rea 
Anyone familiar with even basic concepts of domestic criminal law will recognise the need to establish 
the perpetrator’s mental state in relation to the alleged crime. This standard also applies in international 
law, and for the purposes of the ICC the general clause of Article 30 of the Rome Statute is instructive. 
Article 30 (1) stipulates that, ‘unless otherwise provided, a person shall be criminally responsible and 
liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court, only if the material elements are 
committed with intent and knowledge.’192 It is ‘intent and knowledge’ that are key here. Article 30 goes 
on to clarify that a person has the requisite intent when in relation to the conduct he ‘means to engage 
in [it]’ and in relation to the consequences he ‘means to cause [it] or is aware that it will occur in the 
ordinary course of events.’ Knowledge consists of an ‘awareness that a circumstance exists or a 
consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events.’193  
The material elements of ICC crimes can therefore be broken down into conduct, consequences, and 
circumstances, and the mental elements into intent and knowledge.  
As Weisbord helpfully summarises, for the conduct element of a crime, the defendant has the culpable 
mental state if he or she ‘intends to engage in the conduct.’ For the consequence element, the defendant 
has the culpable mental state if he or she ‘means to cause that consequence or knows that it will occur 
in the ordinary course of events.’ The culpable mental state for the circumstance element is also 
knowledge. A defendant who knows that a required circumstance exists has the culpable mental state 
for this material element of the crime.194 
In assessing the mental elements of the crime against the material elements contained within Article 8, 
the perpetrator must first have ‘planned, prepared, initiated or executed an act of aggression.’ This 
represents the conduct of the crime of aggression and therefore the mental element required is intent. 
Paragraph 2 of the Introduction of the Elements of Crimes for Article 8 confirms that the defendant 
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does not need to have the specific intent to commit an act contrary to the UN Charter.195 The defendant 
is merely required to have meant to plan, prepare, initiate or execute an act.  
Second, the perpetrator must be a person in a position to effectively exercise control over or direct that 
action of the state. This leadership requirement represents the circumstance that must be present for an 
act to constitute a crime of aggression. Consequently, the defendant must know that he or she is in a 
position to exercise control over or direct the actions of the state. It follows that someone who has 
effective control but is not aware of the influence they are exerting would not possess the requisite mens 
rea.  
The third requirement is the material state act of aggression that is contained within Article 8 bis (2) 
and which flows from the planning, preparation, initiation or execution.  
The fourth element of the crime establishes that the required mental element is knowledge. That is that 
‘the perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established that such a use of armed force 
was inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations.’ Mere knowledge of facts indicating that a 
state had used armed force would not suffice,196 but conversely it is also not necessary that the 
perpetrator made a legal assessment as to whether the use of armed force is inconsistent with the Charter 
of the United Nations.197 Element 5 adds to this understanding that the state act of aggression, by its 
character, gravity, and scale, constitutes a ‘manifest’ violation of the UN Charter, and element 6 clarifies 
that in order to satisfy the mental element the perpetrator must know of the factual circumstances 
amounting to a manifest violation of the UN Charter.198 
The effect of elements 3, 4, 5 and 6 is to establish that although a legal assessment that the state acts 
constitute a manifest violation of the UN Charter is not necessary, knowledge of the factual 
circumstances amounting to a manifest violation are. The Chairman of the SWGCA in his Non-paper 
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on the Elements of Crimes offered examples of such facts that would establish the inconsistency of the 
use of force with the Charter of the United Nations, and which the defendant must know: ‘(1) the fact 
that the force was used against another state; (2) the fact that there was no prior or imminent attack by 
the targeted state; and (3) the fact that there was no Security Council resolution expressly authorizing 
the use of force.’199 
It becomes clear that although the provisions require no formal legal evaluation to have been made, in 
practice it is difficult to separate knowledge of the facts establishing a manifest violation from a legal 
evaluation. As Weisbord points out, to establish that the defendant knew that a manifest violation had 
taken place seems to require proving that the defendant had some knowledge of the law of the Charter.200 
As will be seen later, the possibility of raising a defence of mistake of law is intentionally restricted by 
the requirement that a legal evaluation is not needed for the mental elements of the crime to have been 
met. If requiring a defendant to have such a knowledge of the facts that it, in practice, amounts to a 
legal evaluation, the validity of this restriction is called into question. In any case, the SWGCA seems 
to have been satisfied that the high threshold established by the ‘manifest’ requirement would make it 
unlikely that a defendant could successfully raise such a defence. This is examined further below.  
The requirement that the perpetrator had knowledge of the factual circumstances amounting to a 
manifest violation leaves open the possibility that despite committing an act of aggression, the leader 
responsible reasonably believed that the state’s actions did not amount to a manifest violation of the 
UN Charter. Considered first by a small group of legal experts and diplomats convened to draft the 
elements of the crime of aggression, the group envisaged a leader who planned, and therefore had 
knowledge of, a small-scale border skirmish that got out of control and, unbeknownst to him, resulted 
in a large-scale invasion of a neighbouring state (a manifest violation of the UN Charter).201 In such a 
case, it could be argued that the leader should be exempt from criminal liability for the crime of 
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aggression on the basis that a reasonable leader would not have known that the act of aggression would 
be a manifest violation of the UN Charter.  
In spite of this, these mens rea provisions depart somewhat from traditional criminal law concepts in so 
far as a perpetrator may be convicted on the basis of knowledge of – rather than the stricter requirement 
of intent to commit – the state act of aggression. Similarly, a perpetrator who has knowledge of a military 
operation but does not intend to violate the UN Charter can still be punished under some 
circumstances,202 specifically when it is adjudged that a reasonable leader should have foreseen such an 
outcome.  
The mental elements of the crime bear heavily on the way in which the provisions relate to the ‘grey 
areas’ of international law and the way in which pre-emptory self-defence and humanitarian 
intervention will be dealt with by the court.203 Anyone relying on either of these principles would in 
effect be arguing that they lacked the requisite mens rea in that the state’s actions were not considered 
to constitute a manifest violation of the UN Charter. As discussed above, it is presumed that the 
inclusion of the manifest threshold was indeed intended specifically to exclude such actions that fall 
within this grey area.204 Nevertheless, as Elizabeth Wilmshurst points out, ‘the law lacks the necessary 
certainty if state leaders cannot predict in advance whether they will be vulnerable to prosecution or not 
depending upon whether the ICC eventually concludes that the law is sufficiently controversial for the 
violation not to be ‘manifest’.’205 That these acts should fall short of the ‘manifest’ standard will reassure 
some, but the fact that ‘manifest’ is an objective term to be decided by the Court goes to the heart of 
the US’s unease at the mens rea provisions adopted in Kampala. Their unsuccessful attempts to secure 
assurances along these lines in the Understandings only serves to further underline that not all state 
leaders are confident they can predict what the ICC will conclude.  
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3.4.1. Mistake of Fact and Mistake of Law 
The mens rea of the crime of aggression raises the possibility that the defence of mistake of fact or the 
defence of mistake of law could be raised. Article 32 (1) and (2) of the ICC Statute establish that either 
can be grounds for excluding criminal responsibility ‘only if it negates the mental element required by 
the crime.’  
As to a mistake of fact, given that the mental element of the crime is a knowledge of the facts, a mistake 
of fact exists when ‘a person presumes the existence of a factual circumstance, which prompts him to 
bring about the material elements of a crime, not knowing that the objective nature of the factual 
circumstance is different (for example, less dangerous or grave), and the individual would probably 
refrain from performing the conduct if he or she knew the true nature of the presumed factual 
circumstance.’206  
The defence of mistake of fact is related to mistaken self-defence (or putative self-defence)207 and a 
brief discussion of the mens rea test to be applied to both is necessary to demonstrate the limits of each. 
The example of the shooting down of a foreign civilian aircraft, which is misperceived for a military 
one, as it enters a state’s airspace and does not identify itself to ground services because of equipment 
breakdown,208is a useful one for conceptualising the similarities between the two.  
We will first deal with the test to be applied to self-defence, and then address whether the defence of 
mistake of fact is open to any accused that fails to meet the self-defence test. 
Putative self-defence concerns mistakes made as to the factual conditions of self-defence and not with 
the mental element of the alleged crime. The relevant self-defence test enshrined in the ICC Statute is 
set out in Article 31(1)(c), which reads in abbreviated form: 
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‘The person acts reasonably to defend himself or herself or another person ... against an 
imminent and unlawful use of force’. 
Here, Article 31(1)(c) supports a purely objective standard. The words ‘[t]he person acts reasonably to 
defend himself or herself or another person... against an imminent and unlawful use of force’, pertain 
only to the defendant’s reaction, not to his or her perception of the threat. No reference is made to the 
accused’s mental state and as such, Article 31(1)(c) does not appear to apply where the defendant is 
mistaken, even reasonably mistaken, as to the existence of a threat. 
This is a different approach to the one taken in domestic jurisprudence, whereby some form of 
consideration of the defendant’s mental state is considered. The United States, for instance, employs a 
hybrid test that combines a subjective and an objective element by considering the accused’s perception 
as well as reaction. The defendant’s belief in an impending attack must be reasonably held in the sense 
that he genuinely held it, and that belief must have been objectively reasonable under the circumstances.  
Forming somewhat of a common law  exception, English criminal law establishes an entirely subjective 
test. Self-defence can be claimed where the defender honestly believed in the existence of a threat: it is 
immaterial if that belief is unreasonable.209 An acquittal is therefore permitted even where the defendant 
makes a wholly unreasonable mistake as to the existence of a threat.210  
The ICC Statute has, however, departed from this standard. One might read ‘acts reasonably’ as 
meaning ‘reacts to a perceived threat reasonably’, thereby requiring only a reasonable belief in the 
existence of a threat, which is the approach taken by UK common law outlined above. Had the drafters 
included wording that hinged on the accused’s ‘reasonable belief’, a subjective standard might have 
been applied. On the ordinary wording of the provisions adopted, however, an objective test appears to 
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have prevailed. The ‘reasonable belief’ test did appear in earlier drafts of Article 31(1)(c) but was 
ultimately rejected in favour of the current provision, which was intended to operate objectively.211  
As such, it seems that the drafters intended that Article 31(1)(c) exclude defendants who commit crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the ICC on the basis of mistaken beliefs in the existence of threats, irrespective 
of the reasonableness of those beliefs.212With putative self-defence ruled out under Article 31(1)(c), the 
question becomes: could a defendant who was mistaken as to the existence of a threat instead rely on 
the defence of mistake of fact?  
It might be thought that cases of mistaken or ‘putative’ defensive force, where the defendant is mistaken 
as to the existence of a threat, would fall under Article 32 (1) on mistake of fact. As we have already 
seen, however, mistake of fact:   
“shall be a ground for excluding criminal responsibility only if it negates the mental element 
required by the crime.” 
Accordingly, the subject-matter of the mistake envisaged by Article 32 is strictly concerned with an 
offence element (specifically, the mens rea of the offence) and has nothing to do with a defence element 
such as a defendant's belief that circumstances exist which warrant his or her acting in self-defence.213 
A defendant who makes a mistake as to the material existence of a threat may therefore still possess the 
requisite mental element of the offence.  
This may prove to be problematic for the ICC in that a strictly objective test rules out putative self-
defence, while also leaving the defendant with no recourse to the defence of mistake of fact in cases 
that do not negate the mental element of the crime. A thorough analysis of this issue can be found 
                                                          
211 See, e.g. Report of the Preparatory Committee on the ICC, above n 19, 99 (art N: Proposal 1); 1998 Draft Statute, above n 21, 58 (art 31(1)(d)). See also M 
Cherif Bassiouni (ed), The Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Documentary History (1998) 319–20, 377.  
212 An exception to this exists in extreme cases of mental illness: Rome Statute, above n 1, art 1(1)(a).  
213 Yeo, S. (2008) ‘Commonwealth and International Perspectives on Self Defence, Duress and Necessity’, Current Issues In Criminal Justice, Vol.19 (3), pp.349-
352 
76 
elsewhere in the literature,214 though it is worth noting that the stance taken by the ICC Statute has been 
criticised as too draconian in insisting on the factual reality of the threat and ignoring altogether the 
belief of the defendant.  
As to a mistake of law, as a general rule, ignorance of the law is not grounds for excluding criminal 
responsibility. This is confirmed by Article 30 which expressly states that ‘a mistake of law as to 
whether a particular type of conduct is a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court shall not be a ground 
for excluding criminal responsibility.’ As touched upon above, for the avoidance of doubt, paragraph 2 
of the Introduction of the Elements of Crimes for Article 8 further sets out that ‘there is no requirement 
to prove that the perpetrator has made a legal evaluation as to whether the use of armed force was 
inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations’ and similarly ‘there is no requirement to prove that 
the perpetrator has made a legal evaluation as to the ‘manifest’ nature of the violation of the Charter of 
the United Nations.’215 These provisions clarify that as it is not necessary that the perpetrator carried 
out an evaluation into – and had legal knowledge of – the extent to which his actions contravened the 
law, a defence of mistake of law is bound to fail.  
Explaining the rationale for not requiring legal knowledge on the part of the perpetrator, the Chairman 
of the SWGCA explicitly stated in his Non-paper on the Elements of Crimes that ‘specifying a mental 
element of ‘knowledge of factual circumstances’, as opposed to a mental element of ‘knowledge of law’ 
may, in principle, have the effect of limiting the availability of certain mistake of law arguments.’216 
The extent to which limiting the scope of such defences is in line with the Rome Statute remains to be 
seen, although the exclusion of the possibility to rely on a mistake of law may seem severe, excluding 
as it does grey areas of international law such as pre-emptory self-defence and humanitarian 
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intervention. As Claus Kreß points out, such grey areas of international law are already accounted for. 
‘The objective requirement of manifest illegality already has the effect of excluding from the state 
conduct element any use of armed force that falls into the ‘grey area’ of the prohibition on the use of 
force. The objective requirement of manifest illegality thus (partly) serves as a functional equivalent of 
a mistake of law defence in legally controversial cases.’217  
With the ‘manifest violation’ clause establishing an objective requirement, it will be for the Court to 
decide, on a case-by-case basis, which actions can be justified and which amount to manifest violations 
of the UN Charter.  
3.5. Concluding remarks 
The definition marks the crime of aggression as exceptional in a number of ways, setting it apart from 
the other international crimes. The crime of aggression is embedded in peace maintenance even more 
deeply than the other core crimes, given its direct link to jus ad bellum (‘manifest violation of the 
Charter of the United Nations’).218 Aggression is also a leadership crime, with prosecution for acts of 
aggression limited to those most responsible. As the newly adopted definition states, perpetration is 
limited to persons who are ‘in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or 
military action of a state.’219 At the same time, the concept remains tied to state-led aggression, resisting 
attempts to widen its scope. These differences were critical in shaping negotiations leading up to the 
Kampala agreement, and also cast light on why aggression is more politicised, and thus more 
controversial, than the other international crimes. 
There is broad acceptance that there remains considerable room for judicial refinement of the 
definition,220 particularly with regard to the exhaustive nature of the enumerated acts of aggression and 
the extent to which the threshold requirement excludes acts of pre-emptory self-defence and 
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humanitarian intervention. Indeed, the impact of the manifest threshold provision is seen throughout 
this chapter, and states and commentators alike will be keen to establish some clarity over its reach.  
Nevertheless, Article 8 bis represents a significant step forward in the development of international 
criminal law and customary international law more broadly. Representing the most important normative 
advance with regard to the crime since Nuremberg, it moves us beyond traditional conceptions of 
aggressive war, and provides both a basis by which future acts of aggression can be judged and the 
definitional tools the Court needs in its pursuit of those guilty of committing crimes of aggression. 
With the definition largely agreed, the vast majority of time at the Kampala Review Conference was 
devoted to setting out the conditions for the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction over it. The following 
chapter will provide an account of these negotiations, providing critical insight into the positions 
adopted by delegations and the rationale behind the decisions taken.  
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Chapter 4 – The Kampala Negotiations 
This chapter will seek to provide an account of the negotiations that took place at the 2010 Review 
Conference in Kampala to agree an amendment to the Rome Statute that would define the crime of 
aggression and set out the conditions for the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction over it. Through insight 
provided by those present and intimately involved it will offer an insider account of the manner in which 
the negotiations were conducted, the alliances that were formed, and the compromises that were made. 
Central to this will be the intention of delegations – at the time – with regard to the way in which the 
amendments would enter into force, and specifically to whom they would apply. This will provide 
context to the provisions adopted and will shed light on the intentions of the drafters and the manner in 
which the provisions should be interpreted going forward.  
4.1. The Negotiations 
The Review Conference on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court took place 
in Kampala, Uganda over 10 working days from 31 May to 11 June 2010. A picturesque resort 
overlooking the shores of Lake Victoria played host. The resort was initially built in 2001 to 
accommodate the visiting Presidents and Prime Ministers at the 2007 Commonwealth Conference 
(CHOGM), and delegations largely stayed in the resort, with formal discussions taking place in the 
adjacent Conference Centre rooms. Delegations describe an ebullient atmosphere that permeated the 
opening days of the Conference. With preparation years in the making through various preparatory 
conferences in The Hague and New York, there was a sense that tangible gains were finally within 
reach.221  
The Review Conference accommodated a huge number of participants. ICC States Parties in attendance 
numbered 84, with 32 non-States Parties (including the United States) also present. 500 civil society 
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organisations registered to attend, comprising international organizations, NGOs, and numerous other 
international experts and observers.222  
Leading up to the Review Conference the Special Working Group met eight times between 2003 and 
2009 in both New York and The Hague. These meetings were then supplemented by further informal 
talks – the ‘Princeton process’ – hosted largely by the Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination at 
Princeton University. In keeping with the tradition adhered to during these sessions, it was seen as 
integral to the credibility and future workability of any agreement reached in Kampala, that every effort 
was made to accommodate States Parties and non-States Parties alike. While only States Parties would 
ultimately have a vote on the adoption of any negotiated outcome, those leading the conference were 
keen to achieve a consensus decision between all parties, and this requirement was written into the 
conference Rules of Procedure.223 All delegations were also acutely aware that a divisive vote on such 
a sensitive issue would all but certainly have spelled trouble for the Court.224 The need for near 
unanimity was as much a practical requirement as an ideological one. Article 121(3) that governs the 
adoption of amendments to the Statute requires a two-thirds majority of States Parties (111 at the time) 
for the adoption of an amendment – that is, at least 74 votes. With only 84 States Parties present in 
Kampala, and with some delegations leaving before the final meeting of the conference, a very small 
dissenting minority would be able to block any agreement.  
While delegations met principally to discuss the proposed amendment to the Rome Statute that would 
incorporate a definition of aggression and the conditions for the exercise of the jurisdiction of the Court 
over the crime, aggression was not the only issue up for discussion at the Review Conference. A 
‘stocktaking’ of international justice took the form of four panels that were held during the first week 
of the conference. Also on the agenda were two further proposed amendments to the Rome Statute, the 
first a Belgian war crimes amendment and the second a proposal to delete Article 124, which permits 
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states to opt out of certain war crimes provisions of the Statute for seven years. This meant that 
delegations had considerably less time to focus on reaching an agreement on the crime of aggression 
than the 10 working days’ duration of the Review Conference.  
The primary formal arena for working through outstanding issues at working level in Kampala was the 
Working Group on the Crime of Aggression (WGCA), which met on numerous occasions during the 
Review Conference and was chaired by Prince Zeid of Jordan, a former President of the Assembly of 
State Parties to the Rome Statute. These formal discussions were supplemented, as is common in 
multilateral negotiations, by countless meetings between smaller configurations of delegations and the 
Chair in the margins. These informal meetings were integral to the process being driven forward and a 
number of likeminded groups emerged. Among them the permanent members of the Security Council, 
the African Group (which was keenly interested in reaching a consensus on this issue on African soil), 
the Group of Latin American and Caribbean Countries (with strong leadership from Argentina and 
Brazil), the Group of Eastern European States, and a largely Western group.225  
In terms of process, in the lead up to the conference on 25 May 2010 the Chair of the WGCA issued a 
draft Conference Room paper which would form the basis of discussions going forward.226 Ideas put 
forward in the negotiations in working group format, in private discussion and through circulated non-
papers by delegations or groups of delegations were then used by the Chair to shape this draft paper. 
This resulted in two further revisions issued by the Chair. Once the WGCA had made sufficient 
progress, the remaining issues were transferred back – via progress reports – into the hands of the 
President of the Review Conference.227 It is in these plenary sessions of the ASP that formal agreement 
could be reached. 
As President of the Assembly of States Parties, and himself a former Chair of the Working Group on 
the Crime of Aggression, the Review Conference and plenary sessions of the ASP were overseen by 
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Christian Wenaweser, Permanent Representative of Liechtenstein to the United Nations, aided by his 
deputy Stefan Barriga. Prince Zeid, Christian Wenaweser and Stefan Barriga proved central figures 
during the Review Conference and played crucial roles throughout.  
The Conference was formally opened by Christian Wenaweser, and at the first meeting on 31 May 2010 
statements were delivered by Ban Ki-moon, United Nations Secretary-General; Judge Sang-Hyun Song, 
President of the Court; Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor of the Court; former United Nations 
Secretary-General, Kofi Annan; and H.E. Yoweri Museveni, President of Uganda.228 
With the scene set, delegations began work on the three outstanding issues: the definition, the need for 
state consent, and the role of the Security Council.  
4.2. The Definition  
As discussed in the chapter 2 charting the historical development of the criminalisation of aggression, 
from the eight sessions of the Special Working Group between 2003 and 2009, supplemented by the 
Princeton Process, a draft definition of the crime was agreed without brackets. Heading into the 
conference there had been little indication from the negotiating partners that this definition could not 
be agreed. However, renewed interest in the ICC and the crime of aggression by the United States in 
late 2009 cast doubt on this assumption.  
The Bush administration’s hostility to the ICC is well documented229 and its policy of non-engagement 
with the Court ensured that – despite many of the meetings taking place on its territory – the US was 
not present during the Special Working Group’s preparatory meetings, nor was the US present for the 
Princeton process. The election of Barack Obama represented a watershed moment, with the US 
suddenly eager to engage with the process. In March 2010, the US presented its position at the ASP 
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through Department of State Legal Advisor Harold Koh, provoking a degree of trepidation from those 
States Parties that had been working towards agreement for years. The US articulated serious concerns 
over the draft amendments. From an ideological point of view, the US questioned the wisdom of 
overburdening the Court with what it envisaged would come to be seen as a political crime. 
Procedurally, it considered the draft definition to be overly broad and a departure from customary 
international law, and rejected the notion that domestic courts should be empowered to sit in judgment 
over the use of force by other states. In negotiating terms, they aligned themselves with the other 
permanent members of the Security Council in expressing a strong preference for both a consent-based 
regime and an exclusive role for the Security Council in determining when acts of aggression have been 
committed.230 
Despite these strong reservations, the US found itself isolated in its push for the definition to be 
reopened, unable even to convince the other permanent Security Council members of the merits of 
attempting to narrow it down. As the Chair of the negotiations recognised, delegations understood that 
‘reopening the definition would inevitably lead to its total unravelling.’231 As such, support for the 
definition stood firm forcing the US to pursue a different approach during the Review Conference: 
seeking to establish a set of ‘understandings’ that would be annexed to the amendments and would serve 
to elaborate how the provisions were to be interpreted. Such a list of understandings regarding some of 
the jurisdictional issues had already been prepared and had been included in Annex III to the Chair’s 
25 May 2010 Conference Room paper. These understandings – once agreed – would remain in annex 
to any adopted amendment and were intended to be interpretive, offering further clarity on what had 
been adopted, though the legal weight they carry is still disputed.232 The US now sought to add to this 
list additional understandings in relation to the Article 8 bis definition.  
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Work on the understandings eventually included in the 25 May Conference Room paper had begun in 
the lead up to Kampala through the Special Working Group and the Princeton Process, although the 
term ‘Understandings’ was not used at the time. In the final meeting of the SWGCA in February 2009 
the Chair submitted a non-paper highlighting that ‘a number of issues [had] surfaced which the Review 
Conference might usefully address when adopting the amendments on aggression.’233 His non-paper 
went on to suggest draft language for discussion.  
This proposal formed the basis of the consolidated list of Understandings annexed to the 25 May 
Conference Room Paper. Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Understandings asserted that the Security Council 
would be able to refer any state to the Court irrespective of its acceptance of jurisdiction. It left open 
however, the issue of whether referrals would be possible from the time of adoption, or from entry into 
force. Paragraphs 3 and 4 dealt with jurisdiction ratione temporis, while paragraphs 5 and 6 set out 
possible approaches with regard to acceptance of the amendment on the crime of aggression in the event 
the amendment comes into force in accordance with Article 121(5). Discussion of these Understandings 
are contained further below.  
With the Chair of the Review Conference keen to ensure US buy-in, the German delegation led by 
Claus Kreß was tasked to lead a separate negotiating track to reach agreement on the Understandings, 
forcing the other delegations to consider the inclusion of provisions dealing with definitional aspects of 
the amendment.  
Harold Koh reiterated US concerns with the draft Article 8 bis definition and set out the US desire to 
address these concerns through the Understandings in his opening statement on 4 June 2010.234 A formal 
list of six draft understandings contained within a non-paper by the US then followed on 7 June 2010. 
This non-paper translated the US concerns into concrete solutions for addressing them. The opening 
paragraph of the US non-paper sought to address concerns that the amendments as drafted departed 
from customary international law, and suggested the inclusion of an understanding that the amendments 
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should ‘not be interpreted as constituting a statement of the definition of ‘crime of aggression’ or ‘act 
of aggression' under customary international law.’ The second understanding sought to ensure that the 
amendments would ‘not be interpreted as creating the right or obligation to exercise domestic 
jurisdiction with respect to an act of aggression committed by another state.’ The third understanding 
would establish that only the most serious and dangerous forms of illegal use of force would be 
considered to constitute aggression, and that in arriving at such a decision, all the circumstances of each 
particular case, including the purpose for which force was used and the gravity of the acts concerned or 
their consequences, must be considered. It also sought to distinguish between acts of aggression and 
crimes of aggression, whereby it is ‘only a war of aggression that is a crime against international peace.’ 
The fourth understanding addressed US concerns that humanitarian intervention might be considered 
an aggressive act in light of the amendment and included language that would ensure that ‘an act 
undertaken in connection with an effort to prevent the commission of any of the core crimes contained 
in Articles 6 [Genocide], 7 [Crimes against Humanity], or 8 [War Crimes] of the Statute would not 
constitute an act of aggression.’ The fifth understanding reiterated that an aggressive act could only be 
considered a manifest violation if it was committed without the consent of the relevant state, was not 
taken in self-defence, and was not authorised by the Security Council. And the sixth understanding 
explained that ‘all three components of character, gravity, and scale must be sufficient to justify a 
“manifest” determination.’  
These six understandings can broadly be summarised as attempts to address US concerns that the Article 
8 bis definition exceeds the limits of customary international law to the extent that the right to exercise 
domestic jurisdiction is granted to states and humanitarian intervention is not explicitly excluded, 
resulting in too few reassurances that only the most serious crimes will be considered acts of aggression.  
The extent to which a right to exercise domestic jurisdiction is granted to states goes to the heart of the 
issue of complementarity, something discussed in the lead up to Kampala. As will be seen further below 
in this chapter, including an understanding that establishes that the amendment does not give way to 
domestic jurisdiction ultimately proved uncontentious and was eventually adopted. As it does not, 
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however, directly concern the definition of the crime, it was not considered as part of the German-led 
process. The other paragraphs of the US non-paper were.   
As Claus Kreß recalls, ‘in light of the by then solid consensus on draft Article 8 bis and the late hour in 
the negotiations, the great majority of delegations were understandably reluctant to enter into a 
discussion of these proposals. Yet, there was also the feeling that it would be unwise not to engage with 
a delegation of the United States that had come to Kampala in a conspicuously open and constructive 
spirit.’235 As such, extensive bilateral and regional consultations were conducted on 8 and 9 June 2010.  
From these consultations, Claus Kreß reports that delegations indicated flexibility to consider elements 
that sought in an abstract way to ensure that only the most serious uses of illegal force would constitute 
aggression. Conversely, it became clear that any attempts at divorcing draft Article 8 bis from customary 
international criminal law would not fly. Similarly, delegations were reluctant to address the issue of 
excluding from the scope of the definition genuine forcible humanitarian interventions, despite a 
minority of delegations looking favourably on the US suggestion. This reluctance to discuss the idea 
that genuine humanitarian intervention should be excluded from any conception of aggression was not 
per se an out-and-out rejection of principle. Rather there was widespread concern that it would be 
‘inappropriate to deal with key issues of current international security law in the form of understandings 
drafted not with all due care, but in the haste of the final hours of diplomatic negotiations.’236 The 
German delegation instead decided to pursue a ‘minimalist approach’, presenting to delegations two 
generally worded proposals aimed at satisfying US concerns about the seriousness and gravity of the 
crime.  
The first, ‘Understanding X’, set out that ‘a determination whether an act of aggression has been 
committed requires consideration of all the circumstances of each particular case, including the 
purposes for which force was used and the gravity of the acts concerned and their consequences; and 
that only the most serious and dangerous forms of illegal use of force constitute aggression.’ While 
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generally well received, the Iranian delegation suggested a formulation more closely aligned to the 
language of Article 2 in the annex of General Assembly resolution 3314.237 The US delegation agreed, 
and the following text was eventually adopted as Understanding 6: 
‘It is understood that aggression is the most serious and dangerous form of the illegal use of force; 
and that a determination whether an act of aggression has been committed requires consideration 
of all the circumstances of each particular case, including the gravity of the acts concerned and 
their consequences, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.’  
The second proposal, ‘Understanding Y’, set out that ‘in establishing whether an act of aggression 
constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations, each of the three components of 
character, gravity and scale must independently be sufficient to justify a ‘manifest’ determination.’ The 
Canadian delegation expressed concerns that this formulation might be overly restrictive in requiring 
that all three components independently be sufficient to justify a ‘manifest’ determination. In their view, 
there might be examples of State force whereby two of the components were definitively manifest 
violations, while the third was only almost a manifest violation. In such a scenario, the threshold may 
be met in accordance with the requirements of draft Article 8 bis (1) but would fall short of the threshold 
established by draft Understanding Y. Article 8 bis (1) requires that an act of aggression, by its 
character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation. It was a reading of the three components 
together that was important. The US agreed to a redraft on the basis that it was also specified that one 
component alone would not be enough to satisfy the manifest requirement. As such, the following was 
adopted as Understanding 7: 
‘It is understood that in establishing whether an act of aggression constitutes a manifest violation 
of the Charter of the United Nations, the three components of character, gravity and scale must be 
sufficient to justify a “manifest” determination. No one component can be significant enough to 
satisfy the manifest standard by itself.’ 
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From these understandings, the US gained clarity over a number of points: (1) only ‘the most serious 
and dangerous’ forms of illegal use of force constitute aggression; (2) the determination whether an 
illegal use of force constitutes aggression ‘requires consideration of all the circumstances of each 
particular case,’ including ‘the gravity of the acts concerned and their consequences;’ and (3) an 
underscoring that the three factors in determining whether an act of aggression is a manifest violation 
of the UN Charter – character, gravity, and scale – must be read conjunctively. For Harold Koh, the use 
of the word ‘and’ in Article 8 bis (1) was based on an understanding that any one element would not be 
sufficient for this purpose and that all must be present,238 though as the Canadian intervention made 
clear, they must all be present to the extent that read together they constitute a manifest violation, not 
that they must each constitute a ‘manifest’ determination in their own right.  
While these were important clarifications for the US, they did not address all areas of concern. In 
relation to the Understanding 7 assertion that character, gravity, and scale must be read conjunctively, 
it failed – in Harold Koh’s view – to address the way in which the Court might interpret the word 
‘manifest’. The US would have preferred to establish that it was only a war of aggression that could 
constitute such a violation, a formulation they felt would have brought Article 8 bis more in line with 
Resolution 3314.  
Perhaps the biggest regret for the US delegation was their inability to agree in the Understandings a 
clear exemption for humanitarian intervention. For the US, ‘a true humanitarian intervention should not 
be considered ‘aggression’ and should not entail the risk of international criminal prosecution’, and the 
language they put forward would have excluded the use of force to prevent the very atrocity crimes that 
the Rome Statute itself aims to prevent: genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.239  
For the other delegations, the manifest violation threshold established both in Article 8 bis and in the 
new Understanding 6 was enough to satisfy concerns that the definition would be applied too liberally. 
As explained above, there was also a strong sense that the final days of negotiations did not allow 
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sufficient time for deliberation of, nor were the Understandings the appropriate mode of expression for, 
key issues of current international security law. We return to humanitarian intervention in later chapters, 
looking at the extent to which – in the absence of absolute clarity – the aggression amendments might 
have a dissuasive effect on states’ willingness to participate in genuine acts of humanitarian 
intervention.  
4.3. Jurisdictional issues 
With Article 8 bis all but agreed, along with two understandings (6 and 7) addressing at least some of 
the US concerns over the definition, two big issues remained to be resolved at the Review Conference. 
Both were intimately linked and were issues on which the delegations initially appeared to have adopted 
irreconcilable positions.240 The first issue was whether the Security Council should play a primary or 
exclusive role in the exercise of jurisdiction, specifically whether the ICC should only be allowed to 
proceed on the basis of a Security Council pre-determination that a crime of aggression had been 
committed, or whether the ICC should be able to act in the face of Security Council inaction.241 This 
was described as the ‘question of questions’ facing delegations.242 The second question was whether 
some form of expressed consent by the alleged aggressor state should be required, which would demand 
a more restrictive jurisdictional regime than applies for the other international crimes. This was 
effectively a balancing act, seeking to accommodate States Parties and non-State Parties alike. 
Delegations had precious little time to reach agreement on these two issues.  
4.3.1. Jurisdictional Filters 
With regard to the ‘jurisdictional filters’ question – who could trigger an investigation – a great deal of 
important work had already been carried out as part of the Princeton Process. Adopted by the SWGCA 
in February 2009 were proposals outlining the conditions for the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction over 
the crime of aggression. Importantly, these proposals indicated consensus that all three existing 
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jurisdictional triggers in the Rome Statute would apply to the crime of aggression – Security Council 
referrals, State Party referrals, and proprio motu investigations of the Prosecutor. This – at least 
superficially – brought the crime of aggression into line with the other ICC crimes.  
For the permanent members of the Security Council, this was a significant concession in that it ceded 
the exclusive competence of the Security Council to initiate investigations. In return for this concession, 
the proposals outlined a more restrictive procedure that was to be followed in the event that states or 
the Prosecutor sought the initiation of an investigation. It was established that once the Prosecutor has 
established a reasonable basis to process with an investigation, she must notify the UN Secretary-
General who would in turn notify the Security Council. If the Security Council then determined that an 
act of aggression had been committed, the Prosecutor could proceed with an investigation. This 
established that the Security Council would always be given the first opportunity to determine 
conclusively whether an act of aggression had occurred, though it was made clear as a procedural matter 
that a determination of an act of aggression by an organ outside of the Court shall be without prejudice 
to the Court’s own findings.  
Two questions regarding the jurisdictional filters issue remained to be answered by delegations in 
Kampala, both concerning the extent to which the Security Council would have final say over a decision 
to proceed with an investigation. The first was whether, following a referral by the Security Council, 
the Prosecutor would have to return to the Security Council for a determination of aggression in the 
event that one had not already been given. The second was whether, in the event of a state referral or 
investigation proprio motu, a Security Council green light in the form of a determination was also 
required before an investigation could proceed. In other words, could the Prosecutor proceed with an 
investigation on the basis of either a referral alone, or in instances where the Security Council declined 
to make a determination of aggression, either because a permanent member had vetoed such a proposal 
or through outright inaction? And if so, under what circumstances?  
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The starting point in negotiations at Kampala was the Chair’s 25 May Conference Room Paper, which 
presented six options contained under two broad alternatives.243 
‘Alternative 1’ would retain the Security Council as the exclusive filter, and contained two options: 
prevent investigations entirely in the event that no Security Council determination had been made, even 
in the event of a Security Council referral (option 1); or allow investigations to proceed in instances 
where the Security Council has referred the situation to the Court but declined to make its own 
determination of aggression (option 2). To opt for option 1 would be to impose an additional filter on 
Security Council referrals and the other two trigger mechanisms alike: that the Court must always seek 
a determination of aggression from the Security Council, even if the Security Council had referred the 
situation themselves. Delegations decided to leave these two options open in the WGCA sessions, 
leaving them instead to the Plenary sessions towards the end of the Review Conference, discussed 
below. The focus of the WGCA instead turned to narrowing down the options contained in ‘Alternative 
2’, and to providing a workable alternative to an exclusive Security Council filter.  
‘Alternative 2’ provided a further four options under which the Prosecutor may proceed with an 
investigation in the event that no determination had been made by the Security Council. All four options 
would be subject to a six-month wait from the date of notification. After this six-month period had 
expired and the Security Council had not made a determination of aggression, investigations could 
commence on the basis of: 1) no further filter mechanism, and thus the Prosecutor could immediately 
proceed with an investigation; 2) a ruling by the Pre-Trial Chamber of the Court; 3) a General Assembly 
decision; or 4) a ruling by the ICJ.  
Work to narrow down these four options took place behind the scenes in the form of bilateral meetings 
between interested parties and Prince Zaid as Chair of the WGCA. These were then followed up with 
the first formal debate which took place on Friday 4 June 2010.244 Following fruitful discussions, the 
Chair issued a Rev.1 of his Conference Room Paper on 6 June 2010. The options of having no further 
                                                          
243 Conference Room Paper on the Crime of Aggression, Review Conference of the Rome Statute (25 May 2010), RC/WGCA/1 
244 Kreß & Holtzendorff, Op Cit. p.1202 
92 
filter mechanism or a deciding role for either the General Assembly or the ICJ had been rejected, a 
decision which met with no opposition.245 This narrowed the question to one simple proposition: should 
the ICC’s pre-trial judges be able to authorise proceedings after six months of Security Council 
inaction?  
The challenge now confronting delegations was how to balance the competing positions of those in 
favour of retaining the Security Council as the exclusive filter (Alternative 1) and those of the opinion 
that an internal mechanism should be in place to prevent gridlock in the event of Security Council 
inaction (Alternative 2). 
A turning point came in the form of a non-paper submitted by Argentina, Brazil and Switzerland on 7 
June 2010, the ‘ABS Proposal’. Whereas the provisions as outlined in the Chair’s 25 May Conference 
Room Paper and subsequent 6 June Rev.1 had dealt with the three trigger mechanisms of Security 
Council referrals, State referrals and proprio motu investigations uniformly, the ABS Proposal sought 
to divide them. It was suggested that a new Article 15 ter deal with Security Council referrals, while 
Article 15 bis would govern state-referred and proprio motu investigations.  
The ABS Proposal divided the trigger mechanisms in order to allow delegations to apply different 
regimes in relation to both state consent and entry into force (both of which will be dealt with below) 
depending on whether the investigation was initiated by the Security Council or one of the other two 
trigger mechanisms. This distinction also paved the way for safeguarding the primary right of the 
Security Council to initiate investigations, while allowing delegations space to negotiate a more 
restrictive regime for the other trigger mechanisms. It also paved the way for delegations to apply 
different provisions in relation to how the trigger mechanisms would be filtered.  
The ABS Proposal received praise for its ingenuity and it significantly influenced the course of further 
negotiations.246 The proposed distinction between Security Council referrals in Article 15 ter and the 
other two trigger mechanisms in Article 15 bis was included in the WGCA Chair’s Rev.2 of his 
                                                          
245 Ibid. 
246 Ibid. 
93 
Conference Room Paper on 7 June 2010. This established the assumption that, in case of Security 
Council referrals, the ICC would exercise its jurisdiction without further conditions under Article 15 
ter, though it was still undecided whether in the event of a Security Council referral the Prosecutor 
would be compelled to seek a further determination from the Security Council before any investigation 
could progress. In the case of the other two trigger mechanisms, delegations also needed to decide 
whether the Pre-Trial Chamber could authorise an investigation after 6 months of Security Council 
inaction. This would become the very last question for delegations to reach agreement on. At the time 
of Rev.2, and in order to strengthen the appeal of this option in the eyes of those delegations concerned 
about the possibility of ‘politically motivated and meritless cases,’247 it had been suggested to enhance 
this filter by involving all judges of the Pre-Trial Division or by subjecting the decision of the Pre-Trial 
Chamber to an automatic appeals process. The former would prove to be a useful suggestion.  
The WGCA had made substantial progress on the question of jurisdictional filters, separating the trigger 
mechanisms to allow proprio motu and state referrals to be subject to a more stringent regime than 
Security Council referrals, and narrowing down the possible mechanisms available in the event of 
Security Council inaction. The remaining issues were left to the Plenary sessions of the final days of 
the Review Conference, with Christian Wenaweser now seeking to build on the work of Prince Zaid 
and delegations in the WGCA.  
After submitting his ‘Non-paper by the President of the Assembly of States Parties’ at 11pm on 10 June 
2010 which dealt with issues of consent and entry into force discussed below, Ambassador Wenaweser 
then issued a second non-paper at 4.30pm the following day, 11 June 2010. On the issue of trigger 
mechanisms, it sought to answer both remaining questions.  
As to the question of whether a Security Council referral must also contain a prior determination of 
aggression, Ambassador Wenaweser contended that given that it was cumbersome for the Prosecutor 
to go back to the Security Council for a determination of aggression when the referral initially came 
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from the Security Council itself, this additional filter should be deleted from Article 15 ter altogether.248 
In practical terms this made sense. If the Security Council made the referral in the first place, it hardly 
seemed necessary that the Prosecutor should be forced to return for a determination ruling. Those 
initially in favour of an exclusive role for the Security Council accepted this line of argument, reassured 
that the initial decision to refer a situation remained under the control of the Security Council.249 As 
such, the final compromise was brought in line with Article 13 (b) and the other crimes under the ICC 
Statute. A referral by the Security Council would empower the Prosecutor to act without further 
conditions.  
As to the question of how the Court might proceed with state referrals and proprio motu investigations 
in the event of Security Council inaction, the non-paper proposed to allow pre-trial judges to authorise 
proceedings, bringing the crime of aggression into line with the other international crimes. As such, in 
instances in which a Security Council referral or determination was not forthcoming, after six months 
of Security Council inaction the ICC’s pre-trial judges would be able to authorise an investigation that 
was initiated either by the Prosecutor proprio motu or by a state referral. This approach was, however, 
balanced by making direct reference to Article 16 of the ICC Statute, which allows the Security Council 
to suspend ICC proceedings. It also provided that the competence to authorise the Prosecutor to proceed 
would fall not upon the three-judge Pre-Trial Chamber as originally envisaged, but upon the six judges 
of the Pre-Trial Division as a whole.250 As previously suggested, this was intended to impose a higher 
threshold on the decision to authorise an investigation to proceed, reassuring those states concerned that 
political motivations could be behind any decision to investigate.  
Throughout the negotiations, states had been moving towards a position whereby the Security Council 
would be the primary but not exclusive trigger mechanism. Due in part to these additional restrictions 
placed on the two trigger mechanisms, states were prepared to accept the Chair’s proposals. These were 
not the only conditions placed on proprio motu and state-referred investigations, however. Further 
                                                          
248 Ibid. p.529 
249 Ibid.  
250 Ibid. p.530 
95 
restrictions regarding state consent and the entry-into-force of the provisions were needed in order to 
gain consensus. These conditions are explored below.  
4.3.2. A Consent-based regime and Entry into Force 
The second major issue to be decided by delegations in Kampala was whether some form of prior 
expressed consent to the provisions by the alleged aggressor-state should be required, which would 
demand a more restrictive jurisdictional regime than applies for the other international crimes. This 
question of aggressor-state consent was closely linked to the adoption of provisions for the entry into 
force of the crime which would detail which states were to be bound and at which point the provisions 
would come into effect.  
Entry-into-force had been discussed at length in the preliminary meetings running up to Kampala and 
debate continued to rage during the negotiations. Delegations’ views on which legal procedure should 
be followed to bring the provisions into force were determined by their preference for how expansive 
the jurisdictional remit of the Court should be.  
The rules for amending the ICC Statute and incorporating the aggression provisions were already in 
place, set out in Article 5(2) of the ICC Statute, which defers the exercise of jurisdiction until: 
‘a provision is adopted in accordance with Articles 121 and 123 defining the crime and setting 
out the conditions under which the Court shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to this 
crime.’251 
Article 123 establishes that the provisions of Article 121, paragraphs 3 to 7, shall apply to the adoption 
and entry into force of any amendment to the Statute considered at a Review Conference. The problem 
was that Article 121 contained two possible entry-into-force procedures – in paragraphs (4) and (5), and 
Article 5(2) failed to specify which of these procedures should apply.  
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While it was initially suggested by some that the provisions could be adopted without the need to 
explicitly amend the ICC Statute (a mechanism that would require only a two-thirds majority of the 
Review Conference for the provisions to apply to all states), as Stefan Barriga recalls, such an expansive 
approach was rejected by a number of delegations who would not accept the notion that the aggression 
amendments could be added to the Statute without having to submit this substantive and sensitive matter 
to the parliamentary process of ratification.252 As a result, states were left to choose between Article 
121(4) and Article 121(5).  
As a general rule, in order to amend provisions within the ICC Statute, Article 121(4) applies. This 
establishes that seven-eighths of the States Parties must have ratified the provisions and that they will 
then apply to all states one year after this threshold is reached. This establishes a very high threshold 
(7/8ths), but also stipulates that once that threshold is reached all States Parties will be bound.  
An exception is contained in Article 121(5). Article 121(5) applies when the relevant provisions amend 
the core crimes (genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and aggression) listed in Articles 5, 6, 
7 and 8 of the ICC Statute. Article 121(5) states that for such amendments, the provisions ‘shall enter 
into force for those States Parties which have accepted the amendment one year after the deposit of their 
instruments of ratification or acceptance.’ This establishes no threshold, but ensures that the provisions 
shall only apply in respect of a state that has ratified or accepted the provisions. This seemed to be in 
line with the Review Conference’s intention to advance a consent-based approach to the crime that 
differentiated it from the others within the ICC Statute.  
The issue therefore centred on whether the aggression provisions could be incorporated within the ICC 
Statute simply by adding them to Articles 5, 6, 7 and 8, thereby amending the ICC Statute but not the 
core crimes (an Article 121(4) understanding) or whether incorporating the provisions signalled an 
amendment to the core crimes (an Article 121(5) understanding).  
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As Stefan Barriga recalls, during discussions in the run-up to Kampala, the majority of States Parties, 
including many European states, had leaned towards an Article 121(4) application, bringing the 
aggression provisions into line with the other core crimes. As Kampala loomed however, and 
preliminary agreement on the definition of aggression was made by the SWGCA in February 2009, 
states began to wake up to the realisation that the provisions could in fact be adopted in Kampala. This 
prompted a change of position from several delegations who instead expressed a preference for the 
consent-based regime of Article 121(5).  
Those delegations favouring a consent-based regime counted Australia, Canada, New Zealand, most 
European states, and the permanent members of the Security Council as part of their ranks. Despite the 
fact that an Article 121(5) reading would allow the exercise of jurisdiction to apply immediately 
following ratification by the state concerned, it would leave the decision to ratify – and thus be bound 
– firmly in each state’s hands. Those in favour of an Article 121(4) understanding comprised all of the 
African states, members of the Non-Aligned Movement, and most Latin American and Caribbean 
countries. These states were willing to accept the high number of ratifications required for entry into 
force of the amendments under Article 121(4) (seven-eighths of states parties) – and the delay this could 
mean for entry into force – as a trade-off for ensuring that the provisions did not lead to impunity.  
With delegations split to such a degree that a majority for either side seemed hopelessly out of reach, a 
compromise proposal was needed.  
As discussed above in relation to the trigger mechanisms, the first major proposal came from Argentina, 
Brazil and Switzerland (the ‘ABS proposal’),253 which divided the trigger mechanisms and allowed 
different provisions to be applied to each. Under the ABS proposal, Article 121(5) was to govern the 
provisions related to Security Council referrals, which would enter into force for those States Parties 
which have accepted the amendment one year after the deposit of their instruments of ratification or 
acceptance. The provisions related to proprio motu investigations and state referrals would enter into 
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force in accordance with Article 121(4), for all states after ratification by seven-eighths of States Parties. 
This initiative would ensure that the crime came into force immediately on the basis of Security Council 
referrals for those that accepted the amendments. No further conditions were foreseen for the exercise 
of jurisdiction.  The ABS Proposal would also have enshrined a protective regime for the other trigger 
mechanisms which would not rely on aggressor-state consent. It would instead apply uniformly to 
crimes committed by nationals of States Parties or on their territory in accordance with Article 12(2) 
regardless of whether they had accepted the provisions or not, but would only come into effect once 
seven-eighths of States Parties had agreed it should.  
This proposal demonstrated the willingness of states to make compromising choices in pursuit of 
consensus. It also managed to focus discussion on the question of aggressor-state consent under state 
referrals and proprio motu proceedings. The ABS Proposal was included in the WGCA Chair’s Rev.2 
of his Conference Room Paper on 7 June 2010,254 but much more work lay ahead. As drafted, it opened 
up the possibility of state referrals and proprio motu investigations proceeding regardless of whether 
the state concerned had consented to the provisions. It would have taken a huge shift in position for 
those delegations that favoured a purely consent-based regime, and an even bigger shift for the 
permanent members of the Security Council pushing for exclusivity with regard to the trigger 
mechanisms.  
Seeking to build on the ABS Proposal now contained within the Chair’s Rev.2 Conference Room Paper, 
the Canadian delegation submitted a further proposal on Tuesday 8 June 2010.255 The Canadian non-
paper took as its starting point that a determination by the Security Council would authorise the 
Prosecutor to proceed with an investigation. As for the other two trigger mechanisms, the non-paper 
proposed that the Pre-Trial Chamber, after six months of inaction, could only authorise an investigation 
to proceed provided that ‘all states concerned with the alleged crime of aggression – the state on whose 
territory the alleged offence occurred and the state of nationality of the persons accused of the crime – 
have declared their acceptance’ of the provisions. This proposal established a purely consent-based 
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regime for state referrals and proprio motu investigations, requiring that they opt-in to the provisions 
before they could be held responsible for crimes committed by their nationals or on their territory. 
What’s more, this proposal was in direct contradiction with the previous ABS Proposal which had 
removed the need for prior state consent for these trigger mechanisms.  
It was now imperative that the concerned states come up with a compromise acceptable to all, and the 
ABS and Canadian delegations entered direct negotiations to compile such a compromise text. 
Commonly referred to as the ‘ABCS Non-paper’, this compromise text was presented to the WGCA on 
the afternoon of Wednesday 9 June 2010.256 Leaving aside Security Council referrals, where it was 
assumed that no further jurisdictional conditions would be imposed, the ABCS Proposal focused 
entirely on the other two trigger mechanisms. The ABCS Proposal started from the basis that 
jurisdiction would apply to crimes of aggression committed by a State Party’s nationals or on its 
territory, but then introduced three key restrictions.  
The first was that the exercise of jurisdiction would begin ‘five years after the entry into force of this 
article for any State Party’. This insertion extended the delay of entry into force following ratification 
from one year to five years for each state individually. This was seen as an insertion designed to placate 
those delegations that were concerned the Court was not yet equipped to deal with aggression cases. 
The second key feature was to introduce an opt-out clause. The text proposed that ‘the Court may 
exercise its jurisdiction over the crime of aggression committed by a State Party’s nationals or on its 
territory, unless that State Party has filed a declaration of its non-acceptance of the jurisdiction of the 
Court’. This would enable states to explicitly establish that they did not wish to be bound by the 
provisions.  
The third key feature was that non-State Parties were excluded completely, with the Court not able to 
exercise its jurisdiction over the crime of aggression when committed by a non-State Party’s nationals 
or on its territory.  
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It is not explicitly stated whether the ABCS Non-paper intended to apply an Article 121(4) 
understanding whereby all states would be bound following ratification by seven-eighths of States 
Parties; an Article 121(5) understanding whereby the amendments would enter into force only for the 
ratifying state; or indeed – as Claus Kreß contends – that the proposal represented an ingenious 
compromise whereby the ABCS non-paper took as a starting point that jurisdiction could be extended 
to crimes committed on the territory and nationality of states in accordance with Article 12 of the ICC 
Statute regardless of whether they had ratified or not, but softened this by recognising the absence of 
state consent through excluding those states that had opted out or were not States Parties. This would 
appear to be in conflict with the idea of Article 121(5) applying only to ratifying states on an individual 
basis, and would require an interpretation whereby Article 121(5) applied only to the extent that a 
threshold of ratifying states was reached. The ambiguity created by applying an Article 121(5) 
understanding, alongside a threshold of required ratifications to trigger jurisdiction and an opt-out 
clause, is discussed in more detail in subsequent chapters.  
What is clear is that the ABCS Non-paper significantly influenced the shape of the final text. As 
discussion moved from the WGCA to the plenary session, Christian Wenaweser issued his Non-Paper 
by the President of the Assembly at 11pm on Thursday 10 June 2010.257 This non-paper closely mirrored 
the provisions contained within the ABCS Non-paper.  
Additionally, it included two interesting developments. The first, seen as a concession to the permanent 
members of the Security Council was the suggestion of an additional threshold requirement, either on 
the basis of ratifications or a number of years passed before the Court’s jurisdiction would be activated. 
In his Second Non-Paper by the President of the Assembly, submitted at 4:30 pm on 11 June 2010, it 
was confirmed that the amendments would not come into force until ‘one year after the ratification or 
acceptance of the amendments by thirty States Parties.’ The second inclusion was clarification that the 
provisions shall enter into force in accordance with Article 121(5).  
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Explicit reference to Article 121(5), on the face of it appeared to confirm that the aggression 
amendments would enter into force individually for each ratifying State, but the inclusion of both an 
opt-out clause and the additional requirement that thirty states must ratify the amendments before they 
take effect raised the possibility that Article 121(5) only applies insofar as it is necessary to reach that 
threshold. At which point the amendments apply to all States Parties, conditional on the provisions 
contained within the amendments, not least the option to opt-out. These provisions led to a great deal 
of confusion in subsequent years, specifically in relation to whether states were also required to first 
ratify the aggression amendments before they could be considered bound by them, or whether under 
Article 12 all delegations would be considered to have accepted the provisions in relation to the core 
crimes (including aggression) and would thus be bound unless they opted out. Indeed, the confusion 
surrounding this goes to the heart of objections at the time of adoption that the provisions were on a 
dubious legal foundation.258 All of these issues are considered in detail in the following chapter 
examining the outstanding question to be resolved and the subsequent chapter looking at the final 
jurisdictional regime adopted.  
4.4. The Final Act 
As detailed in the earlier sections of this chapter, the final hours of discussions had been left to the 
‘question of questions’ and the Security Council’s exclusive role in authorising the Court to proceed 
with an investigation. As we have seen, the Second Non-Paper of the President of the Assembly had 
answered this at 4:30pm on the final day of the Conference, deciding that a referral from the Security 
Council would suffice and that in the absence of a Security Council referral the Pre-Trial Division of 
the Court could, after six-months inaction by the Security Council, authorise an investigation to 
proceed. In spite of the progress made in all other areas, this proposal still divided delegations. In his 
last act, the Final Non-Paper by the President of the Assembly, Ambassador Wenaweser proposed a 
compromise: an ‘activation formula’ that would make the exercise of jurisdiction over the crime of 
aggression for state referrals, proprio motu investigations and Security Council referrals conditional on 
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an activation decision ‘to be taken after 1 January 2017 by the same majority of States Parties as is 
required for the adoption of an amendment to the Statute’, requiring a two-thirds majority of States 
Parties. States would also be required to resolve ‘to activate the Court’s jurisdiction over the crime of 
aggression as early as possible’, demonstrating a political will for this decision to be taken as soon as 
possible in 2017.  
With the final day of the Kampala Review Conference drawing to a close, countless WGCA discussions, 
plenary sessions and meetings in the margins had resulted in an array of proposals, counter-proposals, 
non-papers and working documents. The proposal on the table was a final chance to reach agreement. 
Failure would likely have resulted in agreement on the definition only, with the question of jurisdiction 
to be decided at some undetermined date in the future.  
The final amendment on the table comprised the previously agreed definition, a draft-enabling 
resolution, and the draft provisions on the conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction which now read: 
Article 15 bis. Exercise of jurisdiction over the crime of aggression (state referral, proprio motu)  
(1) The Court may exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression in accordance with Article 
13, paragraphs (a) and (c), subject to the provisions of this article.  
(2) The Court may exercise jurisdiction only with respect to crimes of aggression committed 
one year after the ratification or acceptance of the amendments by thirty States Parties. 
(3) The Court shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression in accordance with this 
article, subject to a decision to be taken after 1 January 2017 by the same majority of States 
Parties as is required for the adoption of an amendment to the Statute.  
(4) The Court may, in accordance with Article 12, exercise jurisdiction over a crime of 
aggression, arising from an act of aggression committed by a State Party, unless that State Party 
has previously declared that it does not accept such jurisdiction by lodging a declaration with 
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the Registrar. The withdrawal of such declaration may be effected at any time and shall be 
considered by the State Party within three years.  
(5)  In respect of a State that is not a party to this Statute, the Court shall not exercise its 
jurisdiction over the crime of aggression when committed by that State's nationals or on its 
territory.  
(6)  Where the Prosecutor concludes that there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an 
investigation in respect of a crime of aggression, he or she shall first ascertain whether the 
Security Council has made a determination of an act of aggression committed by the State 
concerned. The Prosecutor shall notify the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the 
situation before the Court, including any relevant information and documents.  
(7)  Where the Security Council has made such a determination, the Prosecutor may proceed 
with the investigation in respect of a crime of aggression.  
(8)  Where no such determination is made within six months after the date of notification, the 
prosecutor may proceed with the investigation in respect of a crime of aggression, provided that 
the Pre-Trial Division has authorized the commencement of the investigation in respect of a 
crime of aggression in accordance with the procedure contained in Article 15, and the Security 
Council has not decided otherwise in accordance with Article 16.  
(9)  A determination of an act of aggression by an organ outside the Court shall be without 
prejudice to the Court's own findings under this Statute.  
(10)  This Article is without prejudice to the provisions relating to the exercise of jurisdiction 
with respect to other crimes referred to in Article 5.  
Article 15 ter. Exercise of jurisdiction over the crime of aggression (Security Council referral)  
(1) The Court may exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression in accordance with article 
13, paragraph (b), subject to the provisions of this article.  
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(2)  The Court may exercise jurisdiction only with respect to crimes of aggression committed 
one year after the ratification or acceptance of the amendments by thirty States Parties.  
(3)  The Court shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression in accordance with this 
article, subject to a decision to be taken after 1 January 2017 by the same majority of States 
Parties as is required for the adoption of an amendment to the Statute.  
(4)  A determination of an act of aggression by an organ outside the Court shall be without 
prejudice to the Court's findings under this Statute.  
(5)  This article is without prejudice to the provisions relating to the exercise of jurisdiction 
with respect to other crimes referred to in Article 5.  
Following a short interval for final consultations, delegations were asked if they could agree to the 
amendments as proposed. They were adopted by consensus.  
Delegations had finally arrived at an agreed framework outlining the Court’s jurisdiction. A following 
chapter on the jurisdictional regime adopted will provide an in-depth account of these provisions, taking 
a critical look at the final package adopted. 
In agreeing that there must be 30 state ratifications or acceptances of the provisions,259 and that once 
this threshold had been reached, States Parties must take the decision to activate that jurisdiction not 
before 1 January 2017,260 delegations had created two additional hurdles on the path to activation: a 
ratification threshold and an activation decision to be taken by the ASP.  
As highlighted earlier – and which the next chapter will demonstrate – there was still one outstanding 
issue that required attention. The decision to adopt an imaginative compromise that applied an Article 
121(5) understanding, alongside a threshold of required ratifications to trigger jurisdiction and an opt-
out clause, caused confusion amongst states. As such, although a legal framework had been agreed, the 
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105 
jurisdictional question of who the provisions would apply to once they came into force had, for many, 
not been answered with sufficient clarity. An outstanding question of who exactly would be bound by 
the provisions persisted. Specifically, whether states must ratify the amendments in order to be bound 
by them, or whether all states are bound once the amendments came into force, unless they formally 
opt out.  
In the intervening years between agreement in Kampala and the decision to activate the crime, states 
would need to ratify the provisions in sufficient numbers, reach agreement over who was to be bound 
by them, and take the final decision to activate. The next chapter will document this process and 
critically assess the final round of negotiations to take place to solve this outstanding issue.  
  
106 
Chapter 5 – The Outstanding Question: To Whom the Provisions Will Apply 
The Kampala negotiations required 30 States Parties to ratify the amendments before states could 
activate the crime of aggression, a threshold that was reached when Palestine ratified the amendments 
in June 2016. As a decision on the activation of the crime drew nearer, disagreement persisted 
surrounding the Court’s jurisdiction and who was to be bound when the provisions came into force. 
The opening section of this chapter will bring the reader up-to-date with the ratification process that 
formally enabled a decision to be taken by the Assembly of States Parties. Section 2 will look critically 
at the major outstanding question still to be answered: whether a positive or negative understandings 
of Article 121(5) would prevail, and each interpretation’s conformity with existing law on treaties. 
Section 3 will assess the way in which negotiations to find an agreed interpretation progressed, and 
section 4 will document the historic decision taken by the ASP to activate the crime of aggression.  
5.1. Introduction 
As we saw in the previous chapter (4) documenting the negotiations in Kampala, states emerged with 
agreement on a definition and – for the most part – a jurisdictional remit for the crime. There were, 
however, additional hurdles put in place before the crime could be activated: States Parties in Kampala 
decided that the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction over aggression would require 30 ratifications or 
acceptances,261 and that once this threshold had been reached, States Parties must take the decision to 
activate that jurisdiction not before 1 January 2017.262 Furthermore, States Parties resolved to activate 
the Court’s jurisdiction over the crime of aggression ‘as early as possible’.263  
Heavily involved throughout the process, it came as no surprise when Liechtenstein became the first 
state to formally ratify the aggression amendments on 8th May 2012. A steady stream of ratifications 
from States Parties around the globe followed: 2 more in 2012, a further 10 in 2013 and 7 more still in 
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107 
2014. 6 ratifications in 2015 took the figure to 26. Ratifications continued to trickle in throughout 2016 
and on 26th June 2016, Palestine became the thirtieth ICC member to ratify the text. The number has 
risen steadily since (to 35 at the time of writing), and Parliamentarians for Global Action report that 
government or parliamentary officials in at least 28 additional States Parties are actively working on 
ratification of the aggression amendments. Many more have made concrete commitments to ratify.264 
With the 30-state threshold reached, the final hurdle to overcome was a decision to be taken by States 
Parties at an ASP after January 2017.  
One question, however, remained unanswered. How were the Article 121 provisions to be interpreted? 
In plainer terms: were states required to ratify the amendments in order to be bound by them or did they 
come into force for all States Parties that had not explicitly opted out? With states claiming different 
interpretations of what had actually been agreed in Kampala, clarification was demanded before any 
decision could be taken to activate the amendments.  
As the 2017 milestone grew closer, states began to take concrete steps to influence the adoption process. 
Activation of the aggression amendments was discussed at the 15th ASP session in November 2016; a 
‘working group facilitation process’ was established under the auspices of the New York Working 
Group to provide a space for States Parties to meet and work through remaining issues and report back 
to the ASP; a focal point - Ms. Nadia Kalb of Austria - was appointed to propose an activation text; and 
‘activation of the Court's jurisdiction over the crime of aggression’ was formally placed on the 
provisional agenda of the 16th ASP session in New York, setting the 4-14 December 2017 as the 
timeframe for States Parties to make a decision on activation.265  
5.2. The Outstanding Question 
It appears on the face of it that delegations in Kampala adopted – through expressions of reliance on 
Article 121(5) and an opt-out clause – two provisions that were not in complete harmony. With the 30-
                                                          
264 Parliamentarians for Global Action, ‘Status of ratification and implementation’, available at: https://crimeofaggression.info/the-role-of-states/status-of-
ratification-and-implementation/ (accessed 11 September 2017) 
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state threshold already met and a meeting of the ASP to adopt the provisions looming, the effect was 
confusion over whether the ICC - in the absence of a Security Council referral - would have jurisdiction 
over all States Parties. That is over aggression committed by the nationals of all States Parties unless 
they opt out. Or whether the ICC would only have jurisdiction over nationals of States Parties who have 
ratified the amendment, again unless that State Party opts out.266 The answer to this question would 
have far-reaching ramifications for states and the Court, and was the difference between the ICC having 
jurisdiction over all 123 States Parties once the amendments come into force (except for those that 
formally opt out), or only over the 35 states that have thus far ratified the amendments, assuming that 
they do not subsequently opt out.  
Two competing understandings stem from different interpretations of the Article 121(5) provisions: a 
‘negative’ interpretation of the provisions, whereby the second sentence of Article 121(5) (‘in respect 
of a State Party which has not accepted the amendment, the Court shall not exercise its jurisdiction 
regarding a crime covered by the amendment when committed by that State Party’s nationals or on its 
territory’) is taken on face value to mean that States Parties must have accepted the amendment in order 
to be bound; and a ‘positive’ understanding, whereby Article 12(1) sets aside the second sentence of 
Article 121(5) in establishing that – as signatories to the ICC Statute – states have already accepted the 
jurisdiction of the Court over the crime of aggression, and this is logically confirmed by the opt-out 
clause under Article 15 bis (4).  
States and academics alike were divided by this question and broadly came to fall within one of the two 
camps. Which interpretation would prevail remained the primary open question to be resolved, with the 
Understandings adopted in Annex to the Kampala amendments failing to definitively clarify the correct 
approach. It is necessary to look critically at these two positions before we examine the final outcome 
that was agreed at the ASP in December 2017. The next section will therefore look at the arguments 
advanced in favour of both the ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ understandings of Article 121(5), critically 
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assess to what extent they are in conformity with the existing law on treaties, and look at how these 
arguments came to shape the discussion in the run-up to – and during – the December 2017 ASP.  
5.2.1. A Positive Understanding of Article 121(5) 
Stefan Barriga, acting as assistant to Ambassador Wenaweser – the President of the Review Conference 
– during the Kampala negotiations, was clearly aligned with the camp pushing the positive 
understanding that only an opt-out will exclude States Parties from falling within the remit of the 
Court’s jurisdiction. As he summarises, the approach that Ambassador Wenaweser presented in 
Kampala was strongly based on Article 12(1) of the Statute, under which States Parties have already 
accepted jurisdiction over the crime of aggression. Consequently, non-ratifying and allegedly 
aggressing States Parties that do not accept the Court's jurisdiction under Article 15 bis would have to 
submit an opt-out declaration provided for by Article 15 bis (4) in order to prevent the Court from 
exercising jurisdiction.267 Indeed, statements made by some delegations at the time confirm such an 
understanding,268 and Ambassador Wenaweser hinted at such himself when clarifying that he had 
presented the compromise proposal to the plenary as a ‘sui generis solution on the basis of the 
acceptance already given by States Parties under Article 12 of the Rome Statute.’269  
Such an understanding relies on a creative and nuanced interpretation of the Article 121(5) provisions 
whereby reference to Article 12 of the ICC Statute is key.  
Article 12 establishes that ‘a state which becomes a Party to [the ICC] Statute thereby accepts the 
jurisdiction of the Court with respect to the crimes referred to in Article 5’, including aggression, and 
that the nationality and territoriality principles thus apply. This is then taken as the starting point for the 
crime of aggression. Despite contradicting Article 121(5), Article 12(1) should be seen ‘as a more 
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concrete provision (as regards its relationship to the crime of aggression), and therefore as the lex 
specialis that prevails over the more general rule of Article 121(5), second sentence.’270  
It is further argued that the positive understanding is confirmed by the new opt-out provision of Article 
15 bis (4), which provides that the Court ‘may, in accordance with Article 12, exercise jurisdiction over 
a crime of aggression, arising from an act of aggression committed by a State Party, unless that State 
Party has previously declared that it does not accept such jurisdiction by lodging a declaration with the 
Registrar’. This is supplemented by operative paragraph 1 of the Resolution RC/Res.6 adopted in 
Kampala, which establishes that the State Party may declare their opt-out ‘prior to ratification or 
acceptance’ of the aggression amendments. It is argued that it would be illogical to include a provision 
allowing States Parties to opt-out of the provisions before they had accepted them if a negative 
understanding of Article 121(5) applied and states were not in fact bound until they had ratified in any 
case. The other provisions contained within Article 15 bis, namely the opt-out, is therefore included to 
‘soften’ the taken assumption that states are bound once the crime of aggression comes into force 
because they have already accepted the jurisdiction of the Court as States Parties.  
Under this understanding, Article 121(5) was referenced to ensure that states were bound individually 
once they had ratified, but only up until the point that the threshold of 30 ratifications was reached. At 
this point, subject to the decision to be taken by the ASP, Article 121(5) would cease to apply and the 
crime would take effect for all States Parties. It is argued that relying on the second sentence of Article 
121(5) would completely undermine the effect of the opt-out clause. As Stefan Barriga asserts, ‘if the 
negative understanding of the second sentence of Article 121(5) held up, it would pull the rug from 
underneath the concept of an opt-out system; instead, it would be an ‘opt-in-then-opt-out’ system, which 
defies the logic of the negotiations at the Review Conference’.271  
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It is certainly true that this interpretation would have the benefit of giving full effect to the opt-out 
provision, placing the emphasis on states to opt out of the provisions if they do not wish to be bound by 
them. It also makes sense when viewed in negotiating terms: that, as Claus Kreß recognises, ‘the idea 
of an opt-out declaration was born precisely in order to bridge the gap between those in favour of 
applying the jurisdictional scheme under Article 12(2) of the ICC Statute without modification (the 
ABS Proposal) and those who preferred a strictly consent-based regime (the Canadian Proposal).’272 
Binding states once the established threshold had been reached and states had voted at the ASP to 
activate the crime, but then allowing States Parties to opt-out if they desired would be a compromise 
between these two positions, and would make logical sense as a negotiated outcome. It would also make 
better sense of the 30-state threshold provision, giving it a clear purpose in providing an additional 
procedural hurdle before the triggering of jurisdiction of the Court for all States Parties.  
These benefits – however appealing at this stage – do not settle all remaining questions. Nor do they 
make it the case that such an understanding was the intention of all delegations at the time of adoption 
in Kampala.  
Accepting for a moment the proposition that a positive understanding should apply, it would logically 
follow that once the Court had been granted jurisdiction over the crime of aggression, all States Parties 
would be bound even if neither party had ratified the amendments, assuming neither had opted out. 
Curiously though, Stefan Barriga as a key proponent of the positive understanding, does not go this far. 
As the positive understanding is bound so closely to Article 12, which establishes that the Court may 
exercise its jurisdiction if one or more of the states are parties to the Statute, Stefan Barriga argues that 
it ‘follows from the logic of Article 12 of the Rome Statute to which Article 15 bis (4) refers [that] the 
amendment must have entered into force either for the state of nationality or the territorial state’.273 For 
Barriga, ‘the aggression amendments establish a true opt-out regime that would allow the Court to 
exercise jurisdiction over an aggressor State Party even if it had not ratified the amendments’.274  
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To have suggested that all states should be bound on the basis that they had already accepted the 
jurisdiction of the Court under Article 12 would have brought the jurisdictional remit of the crime of 
aggression in line with that which applies to the other core crimes, save the option for those states to 
opt-out. To have suggested that there must be a nationality or territoriality link from both states would 
have brought the positive understanding much closer to a negative understanding explored below. In 
opting for a middle way, Stefan Barriga has sought to establish that there must be some national or 
territorial link to a state that has explicitly accepted the amendments through ratification. Similarly, 
Lichtenstein have confirmed that they ‘strongly believe that the Kampala agreement provides legal 
protection to ratifying states vis-a-vis all States Parties, in accordance with the principle of territoriality 
- just as we all enjoy legal protection vis-a-vis non-State Parties with respect to other Rome Statute 
crimes.’275 As such, the interpretation espoused by Lichtenstein, Barriga and others would allow acts of 
aggression committed by non-ratifying States Parties to be prosecuted when committed on the territory 
of ratifying States Parties.  
As Ben Ferencz has opined, Article 121(5) is a mixed provision which does little to advance the cause 
of clarity, and that when read in isolation, ‘would appear to entirely exempt nationals of non-ratifying 
States Parties from the Court's exercise of aggression jurisdiction. Yet, there is simply no way that such 
a construction can be squared with the broader language of the Statute, nor with the delicate balance of 
compromises that were arduously negotiated and ultimately agreed to in Kampala.’276 As the following 
section demonstrates, not all agree.  
5.2.2. A Negative Understanding of Article 121(5) 
Others have maintained – both at the time and subsequently – that the second sentence of Article 121(5) 
already precludes the Court from exercising jurisdiction with respect to nationals or the territory of non-
ratifying States Parties.277 This interpretation relies on a literal reading of the second sentence of Article 
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121(5), which states: ‘in respect of a State Party which has not accepted the amendment, the Court shall 
not exercise its jurisdiction regarding a crime covered by the amendment when committed by that State 
Party's nationals or on its territory.’ This would mean that if any state involved in the aggression had 
not ratified the aggression amendments, the Court would be unable to exercise jurisdiction over any of 
the victim or aggressor participants to the crime. The negative understanding establishes Article 121(5) 
as an exception to the general jurisdictional regime under Article 12.  
Proponents of the negative understanding – including the US, France and the UK – pushed for greater 
clarity that the inclusion of opt-out provisions in the Kampala agreement do not in any way override 
their interpretation of Article 121(5), namely that only those states that ratify the provisions are bound.  
As Sarah Sewell, United States Under-Secretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy and Human 
Rights, stated in a speech discussing the outcome of the Kampala Review Conference, ‘US] concerns 
about uncertainty [over aspects of the amendments] have been exacerbated by the efforts of some 
supporters of the amendments to promote an interpretation which [the US] believes flies clearly in the 
face of the plain language of the Rome Statute, contending that the Court’s aggression jurisdiction 
would extend even to the nationals of States Parties that do not ratify the amendments.’278  
Speaking in 2015 with the Head of the UK Delegation in Kampala, Chris Whomersley, it was also his 
view that the ambiguity the opt-in provision introduces was being exploited by those states that would 
prefer a more expansive jurisdictional regime. Any understanding that would allow a State to be bound 
regardless of whether or not they had ratified the provisions ‘was not in the spirit of what had been 
agreed... [you’re bound] if you ratify, otherwise you’re not.’279 It was his view that the opt-out clause 
was either wilfully accepted by some states at the time as a hook for later pushing an understanding that 
all states are bound unless they opt out, or it represents a situation that has since been seized upon as an 
opportunity to push the same understanding.  
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5.2.3. Conformity with the Law of Treaties 
As Dapo Akande recognises, it is not clear that it was within the remit of the Review Conference to 
decide on how the aggression provisions were to come into force and as such whether the interpretation 
of Article 121(5) is in any way binding.280 It has been argued that the question of which interpretation 
should apply is a matter of fact, and treaty law.281 As such, the validity of the Kampala – and subsequent 
ASP 16 – agreement could be open to challenge by those that oppose this decision or have an interest 
in it being overturned.  
Furthermore, despite paragraph 1 of the adopting resolution making it clear that the amendments ‘shall 
enter into force in accordance with Article 121, paragraph 5’, it is clear that the additional conditions 
imposed in Article 15 bis ensure that, as Japan recognised at the time, the jurisdictional regime adopted 
fails to reflect either Article 121(4) or Article 121(5) faithfully. Indeed, right up until the provisions 
were agreed, Japan questioned whether delegations were placing the provisions on a sound legal 
footing.282 This further opens up the creative solution negotiated to legal scrutiny.  
The possibility of this becoming an issue the Court may have to rule on is dealt with by the fact that a 
positive understanding of Article 121(5) raises its own legal issues. As the positive understanding is 
premised on states having already accepted jurisdiction over the crime of aggression when they signed 
up to the ICC Statute, it must be asked whether this is in conformity with the applicable rules of treaty 
law. Specifically, whether states can be bound by amendments to existing treaties that they have not 
explicitly consented to.  
Here the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) is informative, stating that ‘[t]he amending 
agreement does not bind any state already a party to the treaty which does not become a party to the 
amending agreement’.283 In such instances Article 30, paragraph 4(b) applies, and provides that ‘[w]hen 
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the parties to the later treaty do not include all the parties to the earlier one... as between a state party to 
both treaties and a state party to only one of the treaties, the treaty to which both states are parties 
governs their mutual rights and obligations.’ Here, the abiding international law principle is that states 
cannot be bound without their consent.284  
It is certainly true that the ICC Statute provided in Article 5(2) that ‘the Court shall exercise jurisdiction 
over the crime of aggression once a provision is adopted […] setting out the conditions under which the 
Court shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to this crime.’ States thus accepted that delegations would 
at some stage come to define the jurisdictional regime for the crime of aggression and that this may 
vary from the regime governing the other core crimes. Similarly, Article 12(1) confirms that a state 
which becomes a Party to this Statute thereby accepts the jurisdiction of the Court with respect to the 
crimes referred to in Article 5, including the crime of aggression. It is contended though, that this does 
not exempt states from the requirement that if they are to be bound, they must first consent to the newly 
agreed provisions. As the VCLT sets out, states are only bound by the original treaty to which they are 
signatories until the point that they accept the amendments. While Article 5(2) and Article 12(1) 
demonstrate an acceptance amongst states that new jurisdictional provisions will be agreed and the 
Court will have jurisdiction over them once they have, their acceptance relates to the process of agreeing 
a new jurisdictional remit rather than tacit acceptance of whatever it is that might be agreed. Here, 
international treaty law is clear: consent to the amendment provisions is a legal necessity.  
As such, it seems an unacceptable argument that states would have agreed with the exercise of the 
Court’s jurisdiction over the crime of aggression as defined by the Review Conference – in whatever 
form the Review Conference might decide – as far back as 1998. Such an interpretation appears to be 
at odds not just with the provisions adopted in Kampala but also with the general law of treaties.285  
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5.3. Working Towards Agreement 
The ambiguity that surrounded the interpretation of Article 121(5) weighed heavily on states deciding 
which steps to take next regarding ratification. Members of the UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office 
attest to having been in meetings in which UK representatives discussed how a state could best ensure 
that they were not to be bound by the provisions.286 With no confidence in the way in which the 
provisions would be interpreted, various options – including not ratifying and simultaneously lodging 
an opt-out declaration – were considered. 
From speaking with delegations present in Kampala, and given the last-minute introduction of the opt-
out provision, it seems likely that the provision was ‘hastily inserted in Article 15 bis without bringing 
it completely in coherence with the articles dealing with the amendment procedure’, or at least without 
full consideration first being given to what the provision entailed.287 This uncertainty left open the 
possibility that the amendments could pass at an ASP without it first being clarified how Article 15 bis 
(4) should be applied.  
If the amendment were to pass without further clarification, states that wished not to be bound would 
be forced to lodge a public opt-out, explicitly stating that they did not wish to be bound by the crime of 
aggression amendments. Another option would have been to rely on judicial interpretation in the first 
instance, a risky strategy that would have left the decision out of state hands. It is also not inconceivable 
that – had the amendments passed without further clarification – the Security Council might seek to 
block any investigation initiated on the premise that all states are bound regardless of whether or not 
they ratify. States that did not wish to be bound by the provisions in particular, were understandably 
keen to avoid these scenarios, and so work began behind the scenes to influence any decision taken 
before activation of the amendments came to pass at the ASP.  
With a decision possible after the mandated date of 1 January 2017, the 16th ASP session in December 
2017 was earmarked for an activation decision. When the 30-state ratification threshold was reached in 
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June 2016, the 15th ASP session in November 2016 became the first opportunity for States Parties to 
lay down markers regarding any activation decision.  
Even though the crime of aggression was not formally on the agenda of the 15th ASP session, a handful 
of states took the opportunity to reiterate the importance of maintaining momentum in the drive towards 
activation and to encourage other states to ratify the amendments. For Germany, the new provisions 
would have an important preventative effect by influencing the mind-sets of state leaders that might 
otherwise be inclined to war, and as such, the German delegation urged all states to work together with 
a view to taking the concrete activation steps required under the Rome Statute.288 Similarly, in a joint 
statement the EU and its Member States stressed their collective commitment to continuing to work 
together towards the common goal of achieving universality following the recent ratifications of the 
amendments on the crime of aggression.289 
Others, however, took the opportunity to voice concerns, particularly about varying interpretations as 
to the application of the jurisdictional provisions adopted.290 As Ben Ferencz noted, it was no secret that 
the UK, Canada, France, Japan, and Norway each had misgivings about the application of the 
jurisdictional provisions adopted in Kampala as part of a compromise package.291  
5.3.1. The New York Working Group 
Indeed, the 15th ASP session was used by the UK and France to call for greater clarity over the 
jurisdictional reach of the Court before any decision was taken. Specifically, they requested a new 
working group to ‘develop a common understanding of how the jurisdiction will be exercised.’ France 
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opened the discussion, arguing in its statement to the ASP that a dedicated working group would allow 
further discussion of the issue of activation of the crime of aggression in 2017, enabling all states to 
have a clear and common understanding of the consequences of the implementation of the amendments 
of Kampala.292 The UK supported the proposal for a working group ‘so that states take the responsibility 
for ensuring clarity rather than leaving such hugely difficult and political issues to the Court to resolve 
in future individual cases.’293 For the UK, ‘further discussion and greater clarity regarding activation of 
the Court’s jurisdiction over the crime of aggression’ was needed, ‘not to undo or re-open the 
amendments agreed in Kampala, but instead to develop a common understanding of how the jurisdiction 
will be exercised.’294 Unsurprisingly, after the conclusion of the ASP the US delegate argued in support 
of the Franco-British proposal on the basis that ‘it is in the interests of justice’ to continue debating the 
issue.295  
Following these calls for greater clarity, the ASP agreed to create a ‘facilitation’ that would be:  
Based in New York, open only to States Parties, to discuss activation of the Court's jurisdiction 
over the crime of aggression [...] which will make every effort to reach consensus and will 
submit a written report directly to the Assembly ahead of its sixteenth session.296 
As such, the New York Working Group (NYWG) – a formation already in being which, along with The 
Hague working group, conducts substantial preparations for each ASP – was mandated to discuss, in 
State-Party-only format, activation of the Court’s jurisdiction with regard to the crime of aggression, 
and to submit a written report to the ASP ahead of the 16th session in December 2017. Specifically, the 
NYWG would discuss the following question: are nationals of States Parties that do not ratify or accept 
the Kampala amendments, and which also do not opt out of ICC jurisdiction as provided for in those 
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amendments, subject to ICC jurisdiction over aggression in cases where the situation is referred to the 
Court by a state, or the prosecutor takes up the matter proprio motu? 
The answer to this question was intended to inform the text put forward for approval at the 16th ASP 
session. Ms. Nadia Kalb was appointed focal point for the activation of the Court's jurisdiction over the 
crime of aggression, and was responsible for proposing this text.  
Since being mandated to discuss activation of the crime of aggression, the NYWG did so on five 
occasions.297 A number of questions remained unanswered, including the position with respect to states 
which ratify or accept the Rome Statute after the Kampala amendments were adopted and whether they 
are to be regarded as having ratified the Kampala amendments of 2010 or only the original Rome Statute 
of 1998.298 It was also still to be decided whether non-parties to the ICC Statute can make declarations 
under Art. 12(3) accepting the jurisdiction of the Court over aggression, as they can and have done with 
respect to the other crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction.299 Important as these issues might be, states 
appeared relatively untroubled by the prospect of the Court reaching a conclusion on these at a later 
stage. The same cannot be said for the core issue still that was still to be resolved and as the interventions 
of states at the 15th ASP indicate, the outstanding jurisdictional question remained the most contentious 
issue.  
The first meeting of the group on 22 March 2017 was convened to seek the views of delegations 
regarding which issues should be discussed in the framework of the facilitation; to take general views 
of the delegations, including on planning; and to map out the way forward for discussions. In subsequent 
meetings, the NYWG invited esteemed academics to present and participate in discussion on the core 
issue dividing states. These series of presentations were ‘designed to prepare delegations to participate 
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in the December meeting of the ASP’, and as such, a variety of views were sought from academics in 
the field.  
At a meeting on the 25th April 2017, Jon Heller300 and Roger Clark301 gave presentations on the 
repercussions of each interpretation of the Art.121(5) provisions and participated in the discussion that 
followed. It is worth noting that Jon Heller and Roger Clark fall into different camps when it comes to 
this interpretation, a diversity of opinion – from two respected academics heavily involved throughout 
the aggression process – which the ASP sought to replicate in subsequent meetings. Dapo Akande and 
Noah Weisbord followed on the 2nd June 2017, again advocating different sides of the divide. The 
process was designed to encourage dialogue between States Parties, bringing in trusted academics to 
help facilitate that process. As Jon Heller has subsequently reported, however, it was clear that in spite 
of the NYWG’s efforts states remained deeply divided over the issue of who is to be bound once the 
provisions come into force.302 As such, although proving useful as a focal point for discussions, the 
NYWG resulted in a report on the facilitation on the activation of the jurisdiction of the International 
Criminal Court over the crime of aggression303 that provided little more than a summary of State Parties’ 
positions.  
5.4. ASP 16 decision to activate the Crime of Aggression 
The ASP took place over nine working days, from 4-14th December. With a number of agenda items to 
get through, not least the election of numerous officials including six judges, a President and two Vice-
Presidents, there was limited time to discuss the crime of aggression amendments. This was complicated 
by the fact that states arrived in New York ahead of the 16th session of the ASP firmly divided. Four 
States Parties became the focal point of discussions, and were the four states most entrenched in their 
positions. The UK and France in one camp, arguing for a negative understanding of Article 121(5) that 
                                                          
300 Professor of Criminal Law, SOAS, London 
301 Board of Governors Professor of Law, Rutgers University New Jersey 
302 Jon Heller, (2017) ‘UN Presentation on the Aggression Amendments’, Opinio Juri Blog, savailable at: http://opiniojuris.org/2017/05/05/my-un-presentation-
on-the-aggression-amendments/ (accessed 11 July 2018) 
303 ICC-ASP/16/24 
121 
would exclude non-ratifying States Parties from the Court’s jurisdiction, and Lichtenstein and 
Switzerland in the other, arguing for a positive understanding of Article 121(5) that would ensure States 
Parties had to formally opt out in order not to be bound.  
The US, as an observer state, was active in lobbying behind the scenes in line with the UK and French 
position. As the decision was, however, to be taken by the ASP - and so limited to States Parties - the 
US was not directly involved in the December 2017 negotiations. For the US, the big concession they 
had been seeking - that non-States Parties should be exempted from the aggression amendments 
completely - had already been secured in Kampala. While they strongly favoured a restrictive 
interpretation of Article 121, they had to be content with allowing the US and France to lead the charge.  
For Ben Ferencz, the bottom line was that the whole question of which states are to be bound ‘is rather 
moot’, insofar as a mechanism for opting out has been specifically put in place for those that do not 
wish to be bound. Given that states have been given this power, to opt out of the Court’s proprio motu 
or state party referral jurisdiction for the crime of aggression should they so wish, the suspicion was 
that ‘the motivation in raising the Article 121(5) issue may well be that certain countries would prefer 
not to have to overtly opt out in order to avoid the Court’s jurisdiction, as it may tend to draw unwanted 
attention to their interest in remaining beyond the reach of the ICC as far as the crime of aggression is 
concerned. Mere non-ratification would seemingly be a much less conspicuous route to impunity.’304  
Lichtenstein certainly sought to frame discussions in a similar way, expressing concern that states are 
not allowed to re-open the negotiated outcome in Kampala. At ASP 16, Lichtenstein adopted an 
identical position to that submitted in an earlier April 2017 paper. In that paper, and with a view to 
assisting the discussions in the facilitation process leading up to the activation decision at the ASP in 
December 2017, Lichtenstein concluded that in any event, ‘the scope of the issue should be kept in 
perspective. There is no difference of view about entry into force, only about exercise of jurisdiction. 
States Parties that wish to ensure that they will not be subject to the Court’s jurisdiction do not have to 
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convince others [of their interpretation]. Instead, they can at any time simply inform the Registrar of 
their legal position: that they do not accept the Court’s jurisdiction over the crime of aggression in the 
absence of ratification of the amendments. As a result, they will be exempt from jurisdiction with the 
exact same effect as if the second sentence of Art. 121(5) applied.’305 
It is undeniably true that states have open to them the possibility to opt out and avoid any doubt as to 
the inapplicability of the aggression amendments to their nationals as a result. Stated plainly, however, 
this somewhat misses the point: that avoiding such a public declaration was likely a consideration for 
concerned states during Kampala, and would have likely been a motivating factor at the December 2017 
ASP.  
That being said, the UK and others were steadfast in both public and private discussions that it was their 
clear understanding – both now and at the time of Kampala – that only through ratification would states 
be bound. They were subsequently disinclined to give up this point, particularly when to do so would 
necessitate a potentially damaging public proclamation that they want to be exempt from the reaches of 
international justice over the crime of aggression. That the reader may well think this a morally 
questionable position to adopt does not alter the fact that these states maintain the belief that they have 
been put in this position by states pushing for a more expansive jurisdictional regime than was agreed 
in Kampala.  
While it remains true that the opt-out is at hand for those willing to use it, the implementation of an 
interpretation that grants the Court jurisdiction over all States Parties that have not opted out, in the 
view of the UK and others, would have subverted the agreed text and placed the emphasis on states to 
opt-out rather than on states to opt-in. This was not a compromise these states were likely to concede 
willingly, and as such, the UK and France held firm that they were not prepared to support the 
amendments without clarity that only ratifying States Parties would be bound.  
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With their opening positions well established, it fell to Austria to facilitate discussions between the two 
camps. Other states who were not wedded to one particular interpretation or tied to a particular camp 
sought to break the deadlock. One such compromise text was tabled by Brazil, Portugal and New 
Zealand, who suggested affirming a positive understanding of Article 121(5), with an annex to be 
included detailing the States Parties that wished to opt-out. This proposal was to form the basis for 
future texts and by the penultimate day – Wednesday 13 December – States Parties had before them a 
revised text that provided three options: activate the Court’s jurisdiction without offering any further 
clarity as to how the Court’s jurisdiction should be interpreted; activate the Court’s jurisdiction with 
clarification that non-ratifying states were not bound by the amendments (the UK, France position); or 
a middle ground whereby the Court’s jurisdiction would be activated but states that had made their 
desire not to be bound – as reflected in the Report on the facilitation on the activation of the jurisdiction 
of the International Criminal Court over the crime of aggression306 – would be exempt in respect of the 
crime of aggression when committed by nationals or on the territory of these States Parties.307  
This third option was intended to offer a less conspicuous way for states to opt out. It is also worth 
noting, that the effect of the third option would have been to place States Parties in the same position 
as if they had not ratified the amendments at all, meaning that those States Parties that had expressed a 
willingness to not be bound by the amendments would be exempt from acts committed by their nationals 
and for acts committed on their territory. This is different from states that utilise the Kampala opt-out, 
which ensures that the nationals of States Parties that opt out cannot be prosecuted, but does not prevent 
acts of aggression committed on the territory of the State Party that has opted out from being prosecuted. 
That there is a difference between the two is an imbalance addressed in chapter 6 on jurisdiction.  
As Nikolas Stürchler - Head of the International Humanitarian Law and International Criminal Justice 
Section at the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs – recalls, this compromise option garnered 
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support from a number of delegations in the room, with only the UK and France openly objecting.308 
On that basis, draft resolution ICC-ASP/16/L.9 was presented309 which was then followed by a second 
slightly amended version.310 Both sought to build on the third option compromise and formed the basis 
of discussion on the final day.  
By the final day of negotiations, the UK and France continued to hold firm in their belief that it had 
already been decided in Kampala that non-ratifying states were not bound and it became clear that 
consensus was not going to be achieved on the basis of the previously circulated draft resolution. At 
17:00 on the final day – Thursday 14 December – the UK and France circulated their own draft 
resolution that would adopt the amendments on the basis that non-ratifying states were not bound. By 
this point the Austrian facilitators had stepped down and – with the President of the ASP now absent – 
it was left to the two Vice-Presidents, Sergio Ugalde (Costa Rica) and Sebastiano Cardi (Italy), to find 
a way forward.  
Going into the final hours of the final day, there were a number of considerations – of which states were 
acutely aware – weighing on the way in which negotiations were to proceed. The first was that, were a 
draft resolution to be put to a vote rather than be adopted by consensus, it would require a two-thirds 
majority of States Parties in order to pass. As Stefan Barriga has stated, this carries a certain logic: 
‘given that at least a two-thirds majority of States Parties is required to adopt amendments, it seems 
appropriate to require the same level of political support for a decision that gives them full effect.’311 
As the governing Article 121 of the Rome Statute makes no reference to the vote being restricted only 
to those ‘present and voting’, it is taken that two-thirds of all States Parties must vote for the 
amendment. The number of States Parties currently stands at 123. This means that, as a minimum, 82 
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States Parties would have been required to vote for any resolution on the table. A number of delegations 
had already left at this stage in proceedings, with Nikolas Stürchler of the Swiss delegation placing the 
number of delegations present in the room at barely 100.312 It was therefore far from clear whether a 
vote on the resolution would pass.  
Secondly, and as a member of the UK delegation confirmed in interview, had the calling of a vote been 
raised as a realistic prospect, the feeling was that states would have decided instead to delay activation 
of the crime.313 For those that had worked so hard over the years towards activation of the crime, further 
delay – over seven years after the Kampala Review Conference and almost 20 years after the crime was 
included in principle in the ICC Statute in Rome – would have felt like failure. Indeed, as Lichtenstein 
pleaded in their paper released in the run-up to ASP 16, ‘in light of the extremely difficult compromise 
achieved in Kampala, the many obstacles overcome over years of negotiations, and the fact that the 
amendments provide for a greatly reduced, consent-based jurisdictional regime, the concerns voiced 
should not be considered of such a nature as to endanger the completion of this historic project.’314  
Finally, to have the amendments accepted by consensus had been the desired outcome from the start. It 
was the way in which the Kampala amendments had been accepted and it was considered that anything 
else would be an unwelcome sign of division.  
These three factors combined to strengthen the hand of any delegation prepared to take the amendments 
to a vote and ultimately see them fall, and meant that the UK and France felt emboldened to hold out 
for their interpretation of the crime of aggression jurisdiction.  
After holding two separate meetings, one with the UK and France, and the other with Lichtenstein and 
Switzerland, the two Vice-Presidents presented – at 23:00 on the final day – a ‘take it or leave it’ 
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proposal. After some initial errors had been ironed out, it provided what was to become ICC-
ASP/16/Res.5, the final resolution on the activation of the crime of aggression amendments.  
The ‘take it or leave it’ draft contained four substantive paragraphs. In addition to calling on States 
Parties to ratify the amendments (paragraph 4), the resolution set the activation date as 17 July 2018 
(paragraph 1), exactly 20 years after the ICC Statute was adopted my consensus in Rome.  
As to resolving the outstanding question that had dominated discussion of the crime of aggression 
amendments since Kampala in 2010, Paragraph 2 confirms in no uncertain terms that: 
“the Court shall not exercise its jurisdiction regarding a crime of aggression when committed 
by a national or on the territory of a State Party that has not ratified or accepted these 
amendments.” 
As such, States Parties that do not ratify or accept the amendments will be in the same position as non-
State Parties, confirming the negative understanding of Article 121(5) as the prevailing interpretation.  
This was a major win for the UK, France and others that had refused to accept that only by opting out 
would states be excluded from the jurisdiction of the Court. It also came as a relief to the US, who 
despite being present at ASP 16 remained uninvolved in the negotiation process.315 It was also a 
significant concession on the part of Lichtenstein, Switzerland and others who had fought until the very 
last moments to have their positive interpretation of Article 121(5) adopted.  
The compromise element of the text came in paragraph 3, which reaffirms the independence of the 
judges of the Court:  
3. Reaffirms paragraph 1 of Article 40 and paragraph 1 of Article 119 of the Rome Statute in 
relation to the judicial independence of the judges of the Court; 
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This is an odd inclusion – added at the request of Lichtenstein and Switzerland – which, although not 
altering the unequivocal declaration of States Party intent in paragraph 2, does hint that the issue may 
not be entirely over. As Dapo Akande has since speculated, it seems that the intention of those who 
pushed for the addition of paragraph 3 to the ASP resolution ‘was to try to leave some scope for the 
Court to decide on the key contentious questions in a way that might be contrary to the ASP decision.’316 
But is the Court likely to make a determination that runs contrary to the express wording of the 
resolution?  
While the Court ultimately has authority to decide matters of jurisdiction, it is also bound to make any 
decision on the basis of relevant treaties. The Court is also ‘bound to decide on the basis of interpretation 
of the relevant treaty texts and in so doing must follow the applicable principles of treaty interpretation 
under the VCLT and under customary international law,’317 as outlined earlier in this chapter.  The 
resolution is perfectly clear on what State Parties agreed to. That the process was drawn-out and fought 
until the end does not alter that fact, and it would be wholly unusual for the Court to disregard it.  
The UK and France asked that paragraph 3 be removed from the resolution, fully aware that it was 
inserted with the intention of undermining the preceding paragraph. Ultimately – and despite a further 
two-hour delay – perhaps reassured that State Parties had been clear in their intention and in order to 
secure consensus, paragraph 3 remained.  
At around 00:40 on Friday 15 December, delegations adopted ASP/16/Res.5 by consensus, confirming 
activation of the crime of aggression from 17 July 2018.  
The operative paragraphs of the resolution read: 
1. Decides to activate the Court’s jurisdiction over the crime of aggression as of 17 July 2018;  
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2. Confirms that, in accordance with the Rome Statute, the amendments to the Statute regarding 
the crime of aggression adopted at the Kampala Review Conference enter into force for those 
States Parties which have accepted the amendments one year after the deposit of their 
instruments of ratification or acceptance and that in the case of a State referral or propio motu 
investigation the Court shall not exercise its jurisdiction regarding a crime of aggression when 
committed by a national or on the territory of a State Party that has not ratified or accepted 
these amendments;  
3. Reaffirms paragraph 1 of Article 40 and paragraph 1 of Article 119 of the Rome Statute in 
relation to the judicial independence of the judges of the Court;  
4. Renews its call upon all States Parties which have not yet done so to ratify or accept the 
amendments to the Rome Statute on the crime of aggression.318 
The following chapter (6) will take a critical look at the final package adopted by the Kampala Review 
Conference and ASP 16, examining the strengths and weaknesses of the crime of aggression 
compromise and the decision to exclude non-ratifying States Parties from the Court’s jurisdiction.  
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Chapter 6 – Examination of the Jurisdictional Remit 
This chapter will seek to provide an in-depth account of the provisions adopted in Kampala that, 
contained within Article 15 bis & ter, set out the mechanisms for and limits to the ICC's exercise of 
jurisdiction over the crime of aggression. The first part of this chapter will briefly look at the format of 
the jurisdiction provision, before the second section examines efforts to balance the role of the Security 
Council and the Court, and the third section analyses the rules that govern when the provisions can 
enter into force. The third and fourth sections will then critically assess the Article 15 bis provisions 
dealing with proprio motu investigations and state referrals – including the various mechanisms 
establishing a consensual-pillar for the crime; and the Article 15 ter provisions dealing with Security 
Council referrals. A critical part of this chapter will involve examining the implications of the decision 
to exclude non-ratifying States Parties from the Court’s jurisdiction, a question that was settled by the 
ASP 16 in December 2017. The final sections of this chapter take a critical look at the final package 
adopted, examining the strengths and weaknesses of the crime of aggression compromise. The 
provisions adopted are included in Annex in their entirety.  
 
6.1. The Structure of Article 15 
As we have seen in the previous chapter covering the negotiations in Kampala, the primary open 
question to be resolved was which trigger mechanism for the exercise of jurisdiction would be adopted. 
States were divided over whether it should be necessary for the Security Council to make a prior 
determination as to the existence of an ‘act of aggression' or explicitly request the Prosecutor to proceed 
with the investigation, or whether the Prosecutor should be empowered to act in the absence of such a 
determination. Wrangling over the primacy of the Security Council came to define discussions in 
Kampala. In the end, the Review Conference opted for a two-tier system, splitting the provisions dealing 
with jurisdiction in two: Article 15 bis sets out the conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction in the case 
of state referrals or the Prosecutor initiating proprio motu investigations, and Article 15 ter deals with 
Security Council referrals.  
From this we have agreement that a prosecution can in principle be initiated by any of the three trigger 
mechanisms: Security Council referral (Art.15 ter); state referral and proprio motu investigation (Art.15 
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bis). The first of these was largely uncontroversial and forms the primary pillar on which the Court’s 
jurisdictional regime rests. Negotiating the ‘consent-based’ pillars of proprio motu powers and State 
Party referrals was trickier and a number of limitations on the exercise of jurisdiction were put in place.  
6.2. A Balancing Act: Security Council vs. The Court 
As will be seen throughout this chapter, in adopting provisions aimed at establishing a consensual 
approach, the Review Conference was forced to find a balance between the role of the Security Council 
– as the primary body in respect of the maintenance of international peace and security – for initiating 
investigations, and the role of the Court, including both the Prosecutor and the judges – empowered to 
prosecute those who perpetrate the four core crimes that most threaten this peace and security. This is 
an issue that has been present since the foundation of the ICC, but was given renewed impetus during 
discussions on the crime of aggression.  
This is for two main reasons, both of which will be explored below. The first is that decisions to wage 
war are inherently political and are furthermore capable of being both legal and illegal depending on 
the circumstances. Provisions on the crime of aggression would give the Court jurisdiction to investigate 
future situations not dissimilar from those arising from decisions taken by a number of Heads of State, 
including western Heads of State, in recent times. The possibility that decisions to go to war could, in 
future, be scrutinised by an independent court made a number of states uneasy. 
These concerns were further compounded by the fact that the crime of aggression is unique in that it is 
only capable of being committed by an elite band of very senior officials, usually Heads of State. This 
focused the minds of Heads of State concerned about the possibility of their decisions being scrutinised 
and punished in a way never before possible.  
It was thus seen as essential for some states that political control be exerted by the Security Council, 
and so balancing the role of the Security Council with the Court became the primary issue driving 
negotiations in Kampala.  
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Going back to the fundamental role of both institutions, that the Security Council is the UN’s primary 
and most powerful organ is well established. Indeed, Article 1 of the UN Charter establishes that the 
organisation's first purpose is: 
“to maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective 
measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of 
acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and 
in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of 
international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace. 
It is with this primary purpose in mind that the great powers of 1945 were given permanent seats on the 
Council as those countries best able to perform this central role.319 The Security Council’s unique place 
within the UN structure is confirmed by Article 24 of the UN Charter, which confers on the Security 
Council “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security”. Article 25 
also sets out that “the Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the 
Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.” 
As such, the UN Charter grants the Security Council extraordinary powers, with it answerable to no 
other authority. This primacy is reflected in the fact that the UN Charter has primacy over the Rome 
Statute establishing the ICC.320  
The ICC, on the other hand, was established to be a credible, independent judicial body, able to 
adjudicate the most serious of international crimes fairly and impartially. While the Security Council 
played no direct role in establishing the ICC, the aims of both institutions – justice on the one hand and 
the maintenance of peace and security on the other – are intertwined. This interplay is recognised in the 
preamble to the Rome Statute, which affirms that grave crimes must not go unpunished, not only 
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because they ‘shock the conscience of humanity’ but also because they ‘threaten the peace, security and 
well-being of the world’.321  
The interplay between these two institutions is critical to efforts to ensure that threats to international 
peace and security do not go unpunished. With that in mind, and motivated partly by concerns that the 
inherently political nature of the Security Council may infect what needs to be an independent judicial 
body devoid of political motive, the Relationship Agreement between the UN and the ICC was 
negotiated and entered into force in 2004. This agreement recognises the Court ‘as an independent 
permanent judicial institution’322 and declares the principle that ‘the United Nations and the Court 
respect each other's status and mandate.’323 Furthermore, much of the formal interplay between the 
Security Council and the Court is governed by the Rome Statute, including the power of the former to 
refer a situation to the Court and to halt investigations under Article 16.  
Much has been written about the ways in which these institutions interact in reality, not all of it positive. 
Louise Arbour, a former Prosecutor of the ICTY, has commented that ‘international criminal justice 
cannot be sheltered from political considerations when they are administered by the quintessential 
political body: the Security Council.’ She goes on to assert that she has ‘long advocated a separation of 
the justice and political agendas, and would prefer to see an ICC that had no connection to the Security 
Council. But this is neither the case nor the trend.’324 Despite these concerns, that the Security Council 
not only plays a role but a decisive one, is a political reality. And in the absence of political will to 
establish alternative mechanisms, the Security Council will continue to be intrinsically linked to the 
way in which the Court exercises its jurisdiction.   
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With this ongoing debate firmly in their minds, delegations in Kampala were faced with the question 
of how this interaction should continue to play out with regard to the crime of aggression. Specifically, 
how to balance the role of both.  
Delegations in Kampala answered the question of how to balance the role of the Security Council with 
that of the Court in a number of ways. In making the decision to divide the trigger mechanisms for the 
crime of aggression and (as we will see below) applying stricter conditions on the non-Security Council 
triggers, delegations affirmed that the Security Council was the primary body responsible for 
determining whether an act of aggression had occurred, while also recognising the competence of the 
Prosecutor to investigate proprio motu or following a state referral.  
Delegations were also, however, mindful of the need to ensure that the Court’s role as an independent 
judicial body was not compromised. In order to ensure this, both Article 15 bis & ter contain provisions 
aimed at safeguarding the autonomy of the Court to make its own determinations vis-à-vis external 
bodies, including the Security Council. Paragraph 9 of Article 15 bis and paragraph 4 of Article 15 ter 
clarify that a ‘determination of an act of aggression by an organ outside the Court shall be without 
prejudice to the Court's own findings under this Statute.’ This goes some way to balancing the role of 
the Security Council with the need for independence and judicial autonomy on the part of the ICC, 
affirming that once an investigation has begun in accordance with the above provisions, the Court is 
free to come to an independent conclusion regardless of whether a contrary determination has been 
made by another body. This insertion is relevant to both the judges of the Court that will have to make 
a determination once a case is brought by the Prosecutor, and the Prosecutor who, subject to the 
conditions imposed below, must be free to initiate investigations where she sees fit based on the 
available evidence.  
Finally, delegations were also mindful of the need to ensure that the newly adopted provisions on the 
crime of aggression did not impact on the other crimes within the Court’s remit. To this end, Paragraph 
10 of Article 15 bis and paragraph 5 of Article 15 ter clarify that Article 15 bis & ter are ‘without 
prejudice to the provisions relating to the exercise of jurisdiction with respect to other crimes referred 
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to in Article 5,’ recognising that a number of novel provisions have been adopted with regard to the 
crime of aggression and that these should not impact on a reading of the ICC Statute regarding its other 
crimes. We will now look in detail at these novel provisions, starting with the rules that govern their 
entry into force.  
6.3. Delayed Activation 
To the question of when the provisions shall come into force, paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 15 bis & ter 
established an entry into force mechanism that applied to the crime of aggression in its entirety, 
regardless of the trigger mechanism used. It was agreed that the Court would only exercise jurisdiction 
over the crime of aggression subject to a decision to be taken after 1 January 2017 by States Parties and 
subject to the ratification of the amendment concerning the crime by at least 30 States Parties.  
This imposed two conditions on entry into force: first, that 30 States Parties ratify the provisions as per 
Article 15 bis & ter (2), and second, that once that threshold has been reached, the ASP shall take a 
decision after 1 January 2017, as per Article 15 bis & ter (3). These provisions imposed at least a seven-
year delay on entry into force.  
While such a delay was not the outcome that all had hoped for, the Conference Chair later commented 
that the consensus reached in Kampala reflected ‘very significant compromises that all interested parties 
were prepared to make both in the best interest of the International Criminal Court, but also to make, 
collectively, a big step to advance international criminal law.’325 The extent to which this view is shared 
by the academic community, NGOs, States Parties, and practitioners of international criminal law will 
be explored in following chapters. From a pragmatic standpoint, the seven years allowed time for States 
Parties to bring their national legislation into line with the provisions, allowed time for some of the 
more opaque provisions to be discussed at length, and gave the Court more time to establish itself as 
the primary judicial institution dealing with international crimes.  
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As the previous chapter (5) documented, these two requirements have now been met. At the time of 
writing, 35 states have ratified the aggression amendments and – following a decision by the ASP in 
December 2017 – the crime of aggression formally entered into force on 17 July 2018.   
6.4. Security Council Referrals 
As will be seen below, the consensual pillar of the Court’s jurisdiction over the crime of aggression 
carries considerable complexity and scope for divergent interpretations. Not so the primary pillar of 
Security Council referrals, and so we will deal with that briefly here.  
Set out in Article 15 ter, the rules governing Security Council referrals comprise five paragraphs. The 
opening paragraph confirms that the Court may exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression in 
accordance with Article 13, paragraph (b) [referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting 
under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations].  
Of the remaining paragraphs, Article 15 ter (2) and (3) simply mirror the entry into force provisions 
contained in Article 15 bis (2) and (3), while the final two paragraphs of Article 15 ter then mirror the 
clarifications on the independence of the Court and inviolability of the other crimes offered in Article 
15 bis (9) and (10) above.  
Article 15 ter contains no opt-out clause. Nor does it restrict the national or territorial jurisdiction of the 
Court in any way. This affirms that once the provisions have entered into force, a Security Council 
referral will authorise the Court to proceed with an investigation regardless of whether the state being 
investigated has signed up to the provisions or is even a State Party. For Security Council referrals, the 
same procedure applies to the crime of aggression as it does the other crimes under the ICC Statute. As 
such, no further screening by Pre-Trial judges is needed for the Prosecutor to commence 
investigations.326  
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This firmly establishes the Security Council pillar as the most expansive of the two jurisdictional 
regimes, but of course requires political agreement at Security Council level. The virtue of this is 
assessed along with other significant features of the provisions below.  
6.5. State Referrals and Proprio Motu Investigations 
That the Court may exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression through state referrals and proprio 
motu investigations is affirmed in paragraph 1 of Article 15 bis, in which it confirms that ‘the Court 
may exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression in accordance with article 13, paragraphs (a) 
[proprio motu] and (c) [state referrals].’ While this explicit reference to Article 13 of the ICC Statue 
appears to bring the jurisdictional remit of the crime of aggression in line with that which governs the 
jurisdiction of the other ICC crimes, the following paragraphs of Article 15 bis go on to limit this remit 
in novel ways.  
6.5.1. Procedural Hurdles 
The first way in which this jurisdiction is eroded is through the imposition of procedural hurdles that 
will apply before an investigation can proceed. Paragraphs 6 to 8 of Article 15 bis set out the procedure 
the Prosecutor has to follow in cases of state referral or proprio motu investigations. Once the decision 
has been made that there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation, the Prosecutor ‘shall 
first ascertain whether the Security Council has made a determination of an act of aggression committed 
by the state concerned… [and] notify the UN Secretary General accordingly’ (paragraph 6). If the 
Security Council has already made such a determination, the Prosecutor can proceed with the 
investigation (paragraph 7). In case no such determination has been made by the Security Council after 
six months, and provided the Pre-Trial Division has authorized the investigation in accordance with 
Article 15, and the Security Council has not decided otherwise in accordance with Article 16, the 
Prosecutor can also proceed with the investigation (paragraph 8).327  
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These provisions establish that the prosecutor can investigate crimes of aggression without an explicit 
determination by the Security Council. Nevertheless, a number of checks have been put in place:  
First, the Prosecutor is precluded from proceeding with investigations in the event that the Security 
Council has already made a determination that the Court should not proceed. That the Security Council 
can halt an investigation is not a new concept, applying as it does to the other crimes under Article 16 
of the ICC Statute. The Review Conference, perhaps to reassure the P-2 (France and the UK), still felt 
the need to restate it.   
Second, in instances where the Prosecutor – on the basis of an internal preliminary investigation – 
believes there to be reasonable grounds to proceed with an investigation and the Security Council has 
not made a determination, there is a requirement for the Prosecutor to wait six months before initiating 
a formal investigation. This six-month period gives the Security Council time to consider the situation, 
making a determination if it so wishes or indeed halting an investigation under its Article 16 powers. It 
is only once six months have passed and no such determination has been made that the investigation 
can proceed. This six-month waiting period is novel, and further sets the crime apart from the others 
within the ICC Statute. While this will inevitably delay future investigations, it is the first of many 
compromises that signal deference to the Security Council, but is – importantly – one that does not 
fundamentally alter the competence of the Court to investigate and prosecute acts of aggression.328 
Preliminary investigations by the Prosecutor have a tendency, since the establishment of the Court, to 
run for a number of years. At the time of writing there are eleven ongoing preliminary investigations, 
in the DRC; Uganda; Sudan; CAR; CAR II; Kenya; Libya; Côte d’Ivoire; Mali; Georgia; and 
Burundi.329 While a number of these preliminary investigations were initiated within the last year or 
two, some have been ongoing for many years. The DRC for instance has been under preliminary 
investigation since April 2004. Viewed in this context, it is eminently possible that any preliminary 
investigation into a crime of aggression would also have been running for a lengthy period, and begs 
the question: is a further six-month delay before a formal investigation can commence a significant 
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concession to make? With history demonstrating that preliminary investigations have a tendency to run 
into many years, it is suggested that an additional six-month period to give the Security Council time to 
consider any situation is not a concession likely to have a significant impact on the Court’s use of the 
aggression provisions.  
A third pre-condition is that the Pre-trial Division must have authorised the investigation. While 
requiring pre-trial judges to authorise proceedings is standard for proprio motu investigations into the 
other crimes within the ICC Statute, the pre-condition attached to the crime of aggression varies in two 
important ways from that which applies to the other core crimes. Firstly, pre-trial judges are also 
required to authorise investigations into crimes of aggression arising from state referrals, adding a 
further internal check to all investigations not referred by the Security Council. Secondly, investigations 
into crimes of aggression require that all pre-trial judges of the Pre-trial Division – rather than the less 
stringent requirement that the Pre-trial Chamber – authorise investigations. This was added to ensure a 
more thorough examination of the merits of proceeding with an investigation, reassuring those 
concerned about the possibility of ‘politically motivated and meritless cases’.330  
All three of these provisions represent small but significant limits on the Court’s ability to exercise 
jurisdiction over the crime of aggression. They also represent concessions made to secure a 
compromise, reasserting as they do the primacy of the Security Council as the primary body in respect 
of the maintenance of international peace and security.  
These additional hurdles subordinate the ICC to an inherently political organisation in the Security 
Council, leading some to question whether the crime aggression is merely ‘policy in disguise of the 
law.’331 The extent to which these provisions may come to limit the ability of the Court to prosecute 
crimes of aggression will also be considered in a later chapter, though it is contended here that none of 
these additional hurdles fundamentally changes the ability of the Court to initiate investigations 
following a request by the Prosecutor or States Parties. Much bigger obstacles to the Court’s jurisdiction 
                                                          
330 Barriga & Grover (2011), Op Cit. p.530 
331 Kreß (2010) ‘Time for Decision: Some Thoughts on the Immediate Future of the Crime of Aggression: A Reply to Andreas Paulus’, EJIL 20(4), p.1143 
139 
were put in place by the provisions governing over whom the Court will be able to exercise jurisdiction, 
provisions examined below.  
6.6. A Consensual Approach 
While paragraphs 2 and 3 establish when the provisions will come into force and paragraphs 6 and 8 
establish how the provisions will be applied, they do not definitively conclude over whom the provisions 
should apply: that is, whether the provisions should bind all states or only States Parties; and in the case 
of the latter, whether the provisions should apply to those that have explicitly or implicitly accepted the 
provisions.  
To these questions, the Review Conference and the subsequent ASP in December 2017 have answered 
that a strictly consensual approach will prevail in the absence of a Security Council referral, placing 
three key limits on the Court’s jurisdiction: the provisions will only apply to States Parties (Article 15 
bis (5)) that have accepted the provisions (Article 121(5)), and have not subsequently opted-out (Article 
15(4)). As we have seen, interpretation of the provisions was heavily disputed and questions of 
interpretation regarding who will be bound by the provisions persisted right up until the decision was 
taken to activate the amendments. These three decisions: of excluding non-States Parties under Article 
15 bis (5); of only including within the Court’s jurisdiction ratifying States Parties by applying Article 
121(5) and then interpreting it narrowly; and of including the opt-out provision provided for in Article 
15(4), will be considered in turn before we take stock of the overall state of the jurisdictional regime 
adopted.  
6.6.1. Exclusion of non-States Parties - Article 15 bis (5) 
Paragraph 5 of Article 15 bis limits the jurisdiction of the Court in instances of State-referred and 
Prosecutor-initiated investigations by setting out that: 
‘In respect of a state that is not a party to this Statute, the Court shall not exercise its jurisdiction 
over the crime of aggression when committed by that state’s nationals or on its territory.’ 
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This confirms that for the purposes of state referrals and proprio motu investigations, the ICC shall not 
exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression when committed by nationals of a non-State Party or 
on its territory. This departs from the Article 12(2) provisions that govern the other crimes in that States 
Parties have effectively deprived the ICC of jurisdiction over an act of aggression committed against 
themselves by a non-State Party.332 Had this line not been included, it would have been possible for the 
ICC to prosecute nationals of non-State Parties for the crime of aggression when those acts were 
committed against State Parties. Similarly, in agreeing that the Court shall not exercise its jurisdiction 
over the crime of aggression when committed on a non-State Party’s territory, delegations also ensured 
that the Court would not have jurisdiction over nationals of States Parties when committing acts against 
a non-State Party.  
While this insertion underlines the Review Conference’s intention to implement a consent-based 
approach to the crime, it led some states to argue that this was too restrictive and that Article 12(2) rules 
should apply equally to the crime of aggression, granting the Court jurisdiction in situations where one 
of the states involved was party to the Statute. Others pointed to the ‘extreme political sensitivity of 
prosecuting crimes of aggression - as compared to other crimes covered by the ICC Statute - and stressed 
the danger of the ICC’s legitimacy being jeopardized’333 should jurisdiction be granted over a state that 
had not previously signed up to the ICC Statute.  
It is questionable whether the Court’s legitimacy would in fact have been damaged had a more 
expansive regime, in line with article 12(2), been applied to the crime of aggression. There are already, 
of course, ongoing examinations into situations involving states that are not States Parties. The 
preliminary examination, which could on the basis of the available evidence become an investigation, 
into the situation in Palestine is one obvious example, opening up the possibility of Israel (a non-State 
Party) falling within the remit of the Court. If aggressor states can be pursued for the other core crimes, 
then why not for aggression? 
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The answer appears to be that the crime of aggression differs from the other core crimes in that its focus 
in practice will primarily be on Heads of State. While this will often be the case for the other core 
crimes, the crime of aggression is set apart in that only a very small, elite band of extremely senior 
figures will ever be capable of ‘planning, preparing, initiating or executing’ an act of aggression.  
It is certainly true that, for the other core crimes, there are ongoing formal investigations in which arrest 
warrants have been issued for sitting Heads of States that have not accepted the jurisdiction of the Court, 
namely Libya and Sudan. However, it is also the case that these investigations have only arisen 
following Security Council referrals. When it comes to the crime of aggression, the reality facing states 
was that whenever an investigation into the crime of aggression was to be initiated, it would almost 
certainly target a sitting Head of State, regardless of the trigger mechanism used. This goes to the heart 
of state unease over the political nature of the crime.  
This therefore raises legitimate concerns about the way in which the crime will come to be viewed by 
the international community and the impact it will have on the functioning of – and support for – the 
Court. 2016 saw Burundi, South Africa and Gambia announce their intention to withdraw from the ICC 
claiming that the Court is ‘an instrument of powerful countries used to punish leaders who do not 
comply with the West.’334 African opposition to the ICC reached a new peak at the beginning of 2017 
when – despite opposition from many African states – the African Union (AU) passed a non-binding 
resolution that adopted an ICC withdrawal strategy. While not committing to the idea of collective 
withdrawal, the resolution did call for further research into the idea and documented AU concerns with 
the Court, proposing to amend the Court’s Statute to exempt sitting leaders implicated in widespread 
atrocities.335  
Given AU concerns in particular surrounding the prosecution of sitting Heads of State, the extent to 
which the decision to adopt amendments into a crime that will specifically target Heads of State will 
impact on the future of the Court will be examined in more detail in subsequent chapters. What is clear 
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is that these concerns were felt by delegations in Kampala when they agreed to exclude – in the absence 
of a Security Council referral – situations involving non-States Parties from the reach of the Court.  
In the absence of a Security Council referral, the decision to completely exclude non-State Parties from 
the Court’s reach casts further doubt on the progress made at the Review Conference. It is clear that a 
number of prominent non-State Parties were keen to ensure that they would not be the subject of an 
ICC investigation into aggressive acts, even – and unlike the other crimes within the ICC Statute – when 
committed on the territory of a State Party.336 But the provisions go further still, exempting from the 
jurisdiction of the Court aggressive acts committed by State Parties that have not opted out if those acts 
are committed on the territory of non-State Parties. This asymmetry with the other core crimes does not 
escape Jon Heller, for whom there is no ‘legal rationale for the limitation’.337  
No legal rationale perhaps, but Jennifer Trahon does envisage a political one. Here, Trahan presumes 
that such an exemption was pushed by certain states with a view to facilitating coalition building.338 
Loosely using the US-led invasion of Iraq as a hypothetical, the United States (completely exempt as a 
non-State Party) could then encourage State Parties (such as the UK and France) to join a coalition in 
launching an intervention in the territory of a non-State Party (say, Iraq), safe in the knowledge that – 
even if both the UK and France had ratified the amendments and not opted out – neither State would be 
susceptible to an ICC investigation.339 This would certainly seem plausible, with the US having 
expressed concerns that the adoption of the amendments would ‘have a chilling effect on potential 
coalition partners in US-led military actions.’340 
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It is difficult at this stage to predict whether the worst fears of some will come to pass, that in 
subordinating the ICC to the Security Council through additional procedural hurdles and a complete 
exemption for crimes involving non-State Parties except when authorised by the Security Council, 
delegations have ensured that political considerations will outweigh legal ones. The possibility of this 
will be considered in a later chapter looking at the extent to which prosecutions are likely to arise from 
the provisions.  
6.6.2. Exclusion of Non-Ratifying States Parties, Part I – Article 121(4) vs. Article 121(5) 
This consensual approach – at least on the face of it – was further confirmed by the legal mechanism 
adopted for bringing the provisions into force. While the decision as to who would be bound by the 
aggression provisions (consent-based versus a more expansive approach) was inherently a political 
question partly answered by Article 15 bis (5), it also needed to be justified by adherence to a legal 
entry-into-force mechanism.  
As chapter 4 on the negotiations in Kampala explained, states were faced with a decision as to whether 
adopting the provisions entailed amending the core crimes of the ICC Statute (in which case Article 
121(5) would be the operative mechanism), or whether the Statute could be amended without amending 
the core crimes (in which case Article 121(4) could apply). This choice of legal mechanism for entry-
into-force would have different repercussions for who would be bound.  
Delegations in Kampala decided that they were in fact amending the core crime of aggression (in Article 
5) by effectively replacing Article 5(2) – a placeholder for a future agreement – with the new Article 8 
bis definition and Article 15 bis and ter jurisdictional conditions. As such, they made a clear choice that 
Article 121(5) would apply. As stated in paragraph 1 of the adopting resolution:  
the Review Conference ‘decides to adopt, in accordance with Article 5, paragraph 2, of the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court [...] the amendments to the Statute contained 
in annex 1 of the present resolution, which are subject to ratification or acceptance and shall 
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enter into force in accordance with Article 121, paragraph 5; and notes that any Party may 
lodge a declaration referred to in Article 15 bis prior to ratification or acceptance.’ 
When read alongside Art.15 bis (5) which sets out that the Court shall not exercise its jurisdiction over 
the crime of aggression in respect of a state that is not a party to this Statute when committed by that 
state’s nationals or on its territory, the decision to apply Article 121(5) severely limits the reach of the 
Court, ensuring it can only initiate proceedings against states that have explicitly ratified or accepted 
the aggression provisions, and only then when the acts of aggression are committed on the territory of 
another state that has also accepted the provisions and not also opted out (a further condition explored 
below). As we saw in the previous chapter, not all states favoured such a restrictive set of conditions, 
with many arguing that Article 121(4) should apply, even if this meant a lengthy delay while agreement 
between seven-eighths of States Parties was sought. In spite of this, practical considerations seem to 
have held sway, with delegations largely convinced that reliance on Article 121(4) and a seven-eighths 
threshold would mean that it would take a very long time for jurisdiction of the crime of aggression to 
be fully activated.  
6.6.3. Exclusion of Non-Ratifying States Parties, Part II - Interpreting Article 121(5) 
While it may have been settled in Kampala that Article 121(5) would be the appropriate mechanism for 
bringing the crime into force, as the previous chapter (5) demonstrated in detail, this did not stop states 
from arguing that the provisions should still – once adopted – apply to all States Parties regardless of 
whether they had formally ratified the amendments.  
As the numerous statements made by states such as Lichtenstein and Switzerland – along with 
influential and engaged individuals such as Ben Ferencz and Stefan Barriga – attest, many of the 
participants at Rome did not intend to create a regime based on a negative understanding of Article 
121(5). Yet as was agreed at the ASP in December 2017 – that was what came to pass. Indeed, the idea 
that the Chair of the Review Conference himself did not intend to create such a system, yet that is what 
was agreed, is staggering.  
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Any initial shock should, however, be tempered by the fact that it is clear that the jurisdictional 
arrangements adopted through the aggression amendments were extremely ‘complex, unclear and 
complicated and that to come to their satisfactory interpretation in the context of other relevant 
provisions of the Rome Statute is a very difficult mission.’341 Indeed, it has been stated that ‘to say that 
the jurisdictional picture that emerges from all this is complex would be an understatement’.342  
With a negative understanding of Article 121(5) prevailing, states completed a triumvirate of limitations 
on the reach of the Court. First, states are free to simply not ratify the agreement or indeed to opt out of 
it once they have. Second, the provisions explicitly shield non-State Parties from the Court’s reach. 
While the provisions enable the Court to proceed without the explicit authorisation of the Security 
Council, the price for breaking the Security Council monopoly on the initiation of investigations, was 
limitations so severe as to bring into question whether the Court is ever likely to initiate any.  
There is now substantial concern that it will be far too easy for states to insulate themselves from 
prosecution by simply not ratifying the provisions. This goes to the heart of the problem with a consent-
based approach: why would States Parties submit themselves to the jurisdiction of the Court if others 
are deciding not to. This question is not unique to the crime of aggression. Indeed, the ICC – much like 
most international institutions – is founded on the consent of states. The extent to which this was indeed 
a compromise too far is explored in later chapters, but it does raise here the question as to whether a 
meaningful number of states will ratify the amendments and not opt out. After all, it is hard to imagine 
that any of the states that have ratified are likely to wage aggressive war against another ratifying state, 
threat of prosecution or not.  
6.6.4. Exclusion of States Parties that Opt Out - Article 15(4) 
With delegations in Kampala clearly expressing the intention for the provisions to enter into force in 
line with Article 121(5), it would seem clear that the Court will only be able to exercise jurisdiction 
over states that have ratified the provisions. This rejection of an Article 121(4) approach, whereby states 
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would have been bound regardless of whether or not they had ratified, would appear to render an opt-
out provision unnecessary.  
Nevertheless, as we saw from the chapter on negotiations at Kampala, delegations agreed to the late 
addition of such an opt-out clause. Enshrined in Article 15(4), the Court may exercise jurisdiction over 
a crime of aggression unless the State Party in question ‘has previously declared that it does not accept 
such jurisdiction by lodging a declaration with the Registrar.’  
This brings into question the intention to only grant the Court jurisdiction over states that have accepted 
the provisions, and has forced commentators to ask: why would a State Party which has accepted the 
amendment want to then opt-out of the regime? Would it not be more sensible not to ratify the 
amendment in the first place? Furthermore, why would a State Party which has not accepted the 
amendment lodge a declaration of opting out, since Article 121(5) makes it crystal clear that the Court 
would not be able to exercise its jurisdiction regarding that crime?343 A number of answers to these 
questions have been proposed.  
A first, though far from compelling reason for including the opt-out provision could be for states to 
make explicit their intention not to be bound. Indeed, given the ambiguity regarding the interpretation 
of the provisions related to entry into force, this has the added benefit of granting states extra assurances 
that they will not be bound.  
Second, given the inclusion of the requirement for 30 states to ratify the amendments before they take 
effect, the inclusion of an opt-out provision makes sense for those that want to see the crime of 
aggression included within the remit of the Court, but do not themselves want to be bound by it. Given 
the duality between the trigger mechanisms established, this would have the effect of granting the 
Security Council the ability to refer situations while giving states the option of ensuring they are not the 
object of Prosecutor-initiated or state-referred prosecutions.  
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Third, and here Jon Heller goes further, arguing that states that ratify the provisions but also opt out are 
in fact in a better position than those that choose not to opt in at all. This brings us on to an asymmetry 
that results from the Kampala agreement. As Heller points out, ‘there is a fundamental difference 
between a State Party who opts in and then opts out and a State Party who never opts in.’344 While 
neither can be prosecuted for acts that they commit, the State Party that ratifies and then opts out is still 
protected from acts of aggression committed against it, while the State Party that does not ratify is not. 
The effect of this asymmetry – and the opt-out provisions more generally – on the ability of the Court 
to successfully prosecute illegal war will be assessed in a later chapter. Given this approach, it would 
seem likely that states that ratify the provisions may also decide to opt out. Indeed, other than risk 
perpetuating the perception that they do not fully support the work of the ICC and international justice, 
they have nothing to lose in doing so. 
A fourth reason for including an opt-out could in fact be because those that introduced the option during 
negotiations (Canada and others) intended all states to be bound unless they wielded an opt-out, an 
approach that would be in apparent contradiction with the decision to adopt an Article 121(5) 
understanding with regard to entry into force. This brings us to the key source of confusion as to what 
was agreed in Kampala.  
Jennifer Trahan raises the example of another prominent opt-out in international criminal law, the 
Article 124 war crimes opt-out, which – although subsequently deleted – was included in the Rome 
Statute to allow States Parties to opt out of jurisdiction over three specific types of war crimes 
concerning the use of prohibited weapons during internal armed conflict for seven years.345 Up until its 
deletion in November 2015, only two states, France and Colombia, exercised their right to this opt-out, 
something Trahan suggests might indicate an ‘embarrassment factor’ over any decision to exclude 
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liability. It remains to be seen whether states will deem it too politically risky to employ an opt-out, but 
early indications are that a more pressing concern is whether enough of the major international players 
will ratify at all. With ASP confirming that states simply need not ratify in order to be exempt, it seems 
the opt-out will be rarely used and largely irrelevant.  
6.7. The Package Adopted 
When finally adopted in Kampala, the aggression provisions comprise an enabling resolution 
(Resolution RC/Res. 6), seven amendments to the ICC Statute, an amendment to the Elements of 
Crimes, and a set of interpretive Understandings.346  
The resolution emphasises that in conformity with Article 12(1) States Parties have accepted the Court’s 
jurisdiction over all four crimes; clarifies that the amendments enter into force for each state that 
chooses to accept them one year after they deposit their ratification instrument in accordance with 
Article 121(5); and provides that the amendments will be reviewed seven years after the beginning of 
the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction, meaning that they will be reviewed again in 2025.  
The six amendments to the ICC Statute then implement the substantive provisions discussed above. 
Amendment 1 deletes the Article 5(2) mandate, now satisfied, to adopt the amendments on the crime 
of aggression.347 Amendment 2 adds a new Article 8 bis to the Statute, which defines the crime of 
aggression. Amendment 3 adds a new Article 15 bis to Statute, which provides for a consent-based 
jurisdictional pillar in describing the conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction in the case of State 
referrals and proprio motu investigations. Amendment 4 adds a new Article 15 ter to the Statute, which 
describes the conditions for exercising jurisdiction in the case of Security Council referrals. Amendment 
5 adds a new subparagraph to Article 25(3) of the Statute which confirms that secondary perpetrators 
are criminally responsible for a crime of aggression only if they also fulfil the leadership requirement 
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in Article 8 bis (1). Amendments 6 and 7 simply add – where relevant – reference in other parts of the 
Statute to the new Article 8 bis definition.  
The amendment to Elements of Crimes makes a number of clarifications concerning both the elements 
of the crime of aggression that the Prosecutor would have to prove to the Court and some aspects of the 
definition, as discussed in the previous chapter providing an examination of the definition of the crime 
of aggression.  
Finally, a set of seven interpretive Understandings were included, clarifying a number of points arising 
from the negotiations. Understandings 1-3 address Security Council referrals and the Court’s temporal 
jurisdiction; understandings 4 and 5 concern domestic jurisdiction, and understandings 6 and 7 concern 
the meaning of a ‘manifest’ violation of the UN Charter. All are included in Annex here.  
As we have seen in the chapter on the Kampala negotiations, these Understandings were particularly 
important to the US delegation, with Harold Koh, the State Department’s Legal Adviser, commenting 
after the negotiations that ‘[t]he United States considered the definition of aggression flawed, but a 
number of important safeguards were adopted. Understandings were adopted to make the definition 
more precise, to ensure that the crime will be applied only to the most egregious circumstances.’348 The 
extent to which the Understandings carry legal weight is disputed, though the prevalent view is that 
they are included as a supplementary means of interpretation that the Court would have the right to 
follow – or indeed ignore – once the aggression amendments have entered into force.349 Regardless, and 
as we have seen in previous chapters, they are an important tool in understanding the intention of the 
drafters, and proved useful as a mechanism for avoiding opening up the definition of the crime of 
aggression.  
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To summarise the provisions that came into effect on 17 July 2018, the Court can proceed with an 
investigation into the crime of aggression in one of three ways: through a Security Council referral, a 
State referral or by the Prosecutor initiating an investigation on her own.  
A Security Council referral is the most expansive in that it grants the Court the power to investigate any 
state regardless of whether they have adopted the aggression provisions or indeed regardless of whether 
they are even a State Party. State referrals and proprio motu investigations are less expansive. In these 
instances, the Court will only have jurisdiction to proceed with an investigation once the Prosecutor has 
notified the UN Secretary General of this intention and waited six months to give the Security Council 
the opportunity to respond, the judges of the Pre-trial Division of the Court have authorised the 
Prosecutor to proceed, and the Security Council has not formally objected through use of Article 16. 
Once these conditions have been met, the Court may seek to prosecute only states that are party to the 
ICC, have ratified the aggression amendments, and have not subsequently opted-out of the aggression 
provisions, and even then, only when the acts of aggression have been committed against a State Party.  
Jon Heller has produced a useful visualisation of when the Court will have jurisdiction. A summarised 
version of that table below is included below. The two actors refer to the state committing aggression 
(state of nationality) and the state against whom aggression is committed (territorial state). “OO” refers 
to a State Party that has opted out of jurisdiction.350  
  State Party & State Party —–> Jurisdiction 
  State Party & State Party OO —–> Jurisdiction 
  State Party & Non-State Party —–> No Jurisdiction 
  Non-State Party & State Party —–> No Jurisdiction 
There are many other possible formulations that do not lead to the Court having jurisdiction over 
aggressive acts, but the two examples above are the only instances in which the Court will be 
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empowered to act in the absence of a Security Council referral. Following chapters will be devoted to 
the likelihood of investigations and successful prosecutions arising from the amendments.  
The decision confirmed by the ASP in December 2017 to only include within the jurisdiction of the 
Court those that have ratified and not opted out, means that the Court’s reach – unless authorised by the 
Security Council – is limited only to those states that have ratified and not opted-out, which at present 
stands at marginally more than 30. Yet there is hope that political pressure will dissuade states from 
shielding themselves completely and that in the words of one UK delegate to the Kampala Review 
Conference, a ‘circle of virtuous states’351 will emerge. It has to be said though, given the extremely 
limiting provisions put in place, and the slow trickle of states that have ratified since Kampala, this 
seems optimistic.  
The answer to why these compromises were accepted by delegations is relatively obvious. A decision 
was taken that in order to bring the members of the Security Council on board, a restatement of the 
primacy of the Security Council and a commitment to a purely consent-based approach beyond that was 
needed. For a Court devoid of an enforcement mechanism beyond that granted by state cooperation, it 
is questionable whether it would have been possible to reach agreement without these concessions.  
While not everyone agrees, it is generally accepted that as ‘international law does not always evolve in 
perfect steps, and given the decades these steps can take to be achieved, the agreement reached is far 
better than no agreement.’352 The extent to which the provisions might lead to successful prosecutions 
and indeed the extent to which they strengthen or weaken the ICC will be explored in later chapters. 
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Chapter 7 – Role of Civil Society 
This chapter will seek to assess the role civil society has played in the criminalisation of aggression. 
Sections 1 and 2 will look at role civil society played and the impact NGOs were able to have at the 
Rome Conference to establish the ICC in 1998 and the Kampala Review Conference on the aggression 
amendments in 2010. Section 3 will highlight some of the geopolitical factors that served to dampen 
enthusiasm for the amendments in Kampala. Section 4 will then examine the differences in policy 
positions amongst civil society groups, explaining why civil society was unable to unite behind a 
common position and exert influence over the Kampala negotiations. Concluding thoughts will then be 
offered on ways in which civil society can play a positive and progressive role going forward.  
7.1. Introduction 
As previous chapters have documented, state delegations played a pivotal role in shaping the Review 
Conference outcome and the text adopted. But what of civil society? The influence of civil society 
groups at the Rome Conference some 12 years earlier has been well documented, and they have been 
credited with driving forward negotiations to establish the International Criminal Court.353 In contrast, 
they were notably absent for much of the negotiations in Kampala and played a much-diminished role 
as actors of change. As Noah Weisbord, who has provided perhaps the most comprehensive account of 
civil society engagement at Kampala, writes: ‘the majority of civil society groups focusing on 
international justice issues were supportive of the aggression project in principle, but the devil was in 
the detail and they were unable to exorcise him.’354 
This chapter will seek to examine this decline, charting the reasons why civil society found itself less 
able to influence discussions in Kampala and what this reveals about ‘the crime of aggression as an 
idea, the people engaging with it and the context in which those engaging with it are operating.’355 Many 
of the divisions inherent in civil society’s approach to the crime of aggression are mirrored in the 
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approaches of state delegations and the international community as a whole, and so as well as 
documenting the role of civil society in Kampala, this chapter also provides context for those to follow.  
7.2. The Rome Conference 
At the Rome Conference, civil society played a crucial role in driving forward and shaping the 
negotiations. The ability of civil society organisations to exert such influence was due largely to its 
coordinated approach to the Conference. Participating NGOs were accredited and represented by an 
umbrella organisation, the Coalition for the ICC, set up in 1995 ‘as a broad-based network of NGOs 
and international law experts.’356 The Coalition – initially a 25-strong group of civil society 
organisations formed in response to grave violations of human rights in impunity-fuelled conflicts in 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda – immediately began advocating for an international criminal court. Heavily 
involved in discussions to establish the ICC, the Coalition grew rapidly over the years and consisted of 
over 800 members at the time of the Rome Conference in 1998, 236 of which were physically present 
in the Italian capital. This made it the largest delegation to the Rome Conference by far.  
The Coalition represented human rights groups – including Amnesty International, Human Rights 
Watch and the International Federation for Human Rights. It also represented women’s groups, peace 
groups, global governance groups and religious groups among others. Given the breadth of interests 
contained within the group, the Coalition opted for a loose management structure: William Pace was 
appointed Coordinator of the CICC and a steering committee was put in place. The Coalition chose 
initially to formulate no common position except ‘to advocate for the creation of an effective, just and 
independent International Criminal Court.’357 It opted to be no more than a conduit of information 
between NGOs, state representatives, and the general public, and a resource for coordination between 
NGOs.  
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The influence the Coalition was able to exert is well documented.358 It facilitated contact between NGOs 
and states by arranging meetings on various ICC issues,359 coordinated demonstrations and press 
conferences. It actively lobbied governments, ministers, and parliamentarians to pressure national 
delegations into adopting a progressive stance to the negotiations and compiled regular reports of 
government positions on key issues which were then disseminated through the media.360 By way of 
example, wavering delegates from Mexico and Peru were pushed – through the Latin-American 
regional caucus – towards more progressive positions, partly through debates in their domestic 
newspapers.361  
The Coalition was also responsible for providing national experts and interns from civil society to aid 
governments in need of legal, technical and logistical assistance. These experts allowed state 
delegations to be present at more parallel meetings as well as helping to develop their legal arguments. 
A number of countries included NGO and academic representatives in their delegations, with some 
playing leading roles. These experts ‘came with independent views, which influenced state delegations 
from within.’362 The Coalition and NGOs more generally also played a key role in providing vital 
information. Legal expertise and position papers containing information, expert analysis, and 
assessment of legal provisions in the draft texts were prepared and widely disseminated by NGOs 
throughout the negotiations,363 and state delegations and UN officials came to rely on these outputs.364 
In sum, the Coalition was able to provide a coordinated and strategic approach that ensured NGOs and 
civil society representatives worked together as agents of change. The level of civil society involvement 
in the negotiations was unprecedented and the Coalition ensured that there was one focal point for UN 
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officials and state representatives. The year after the Rome Conference, the Coalition was nominated 
for the Nobel Peace Prize in recognition of its contributions to international justice.365  
7.3. Kampala 
Carrying on that tradition, there were some organisations that played an active role in Kampala and who 
worked tirelessly in furtherance of a negotiated outcome that brought aggression within the remit of the 
Court.  
The Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression was hosted by the Liechtenstein Centre for 
Self Determination at Princeton University. The SWGCA incorporated state and civil society 
representatives and provided ‘a new and informal space to break down, tackle and resolve the most 
contentious issues blocking an agreement on the crime of aggression.’366 As Stefan Barriga recalled, 
these meetings ‘allowed the participants to discuss the issues in a less politicised atmosphere and to feel 
a sense of achievement early on… Over time, the Group developed a sense of camaraderie that can 
rarely be found in negotiating processes on such sensitive issues, and that had a direct impact on the 
manner in which discussions were conducted: more interactive, focused, open and frank than is 
otherwise the custom.’367 Active participants in the SWGCA from academia and civil society 
organisations also went on to play prominent roles in Kampala, many of them as members of state 
delegations. Claus Kreß is perhaps the standout example, playing a prominent role as a member of the 
German delegation as well as chairing meetings and actively contributing to the negotiations.  
In addition, civil society organisations such Parliamentarians for Global Action (PGA) continue to work 
to strengthen the international community’s commitment to the provisions on the crime of aggression. 
A network of over 1,200 legislators in more than 140 elected parliaments around the globe, PGA work 
to encourage states to ratify and implement the aggression amendments. They also played an important 
role in the run-up to Kampala, encouraging their members to ensure their governments adopted 
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constructive positions at the Review Conference, and during the Conference where they organised a 
side-event: ‘an informal and inclusive discussion of the merits of proceeding with the negotiations.’368  
The Coalition itself was also still very much present in Kampala – having grown in the intervening 
years to include over 2,500 organisations in 150 different countries – working in partnership to 
strengthen international cooperation with the ICC; ensure that the Court is fair, effective and 
independent; make justice both visible and universal; and advance stronger national laws that deliver 
justice to victims of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.369 As William Pace recalls, 
more than 600 representatives from 143 NGOs played a crucial role in enhancing the dialogue at the 
Review Conference, through parliamentary assemblies, debates, roundtables, moot courts and press 
conferences. Indeed, Pace notes that ‘the role played by the CICC and civil society was acknowledged 
in the plenary and in speeches by states and other experts, as well as in most side events and panels.’370 
This is a view shared to some extent by stat participants, Chris Whomersley, Head of the UK 
Delegation, among them, who recalls that NGOs did play an important role as disseminators of 
information, and state delegates came to rely on that information.371 That being said, the role it played 
and the influence it was able to exert at the Review Conference was much diminished, in line with 
overall participation by civil society actors in Kampala.  
In Rome, there had been proactive civil society engagement on a wide range of thematic issues, from 
the Statute’s general principles and its relations with states to its composition of jurisdiction rules, 
definitions of crimes, rules relating to prosecutions and trial, and financing. What bound them was a 
Coalition able to unite delegations around one simple aim: the creation of an effective, just and 
independent international criminal court. In Kampala, support for the aggression amendments was not 
nearly as uniform as it had been for the creation of the ICC. With the CICC set up specifically to work 
for and then maintain a strong, effective and independent Court, a lot of its civil society members were 
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divided over whether aggression would contribute to that aim, and this led to varying approaches to the 
negotiations.  
Instead of actively pushing for the adoption of the amendments, ‘NGO participants in Kampala divested 
themselves of responsibility and then sat on the sidelines sniping in.’372 Civil society organisations were 
on the whole ‘indistinguishable from diplomats advancing national or organisational agendas and 
making personal contributions to the discussion.’ As Christopher Whomersley recalls, “NGOs had their 
job to do and they had a particular objective, which they were going to pursue.”373 For William Schabas, 
indifference was also a problem, with NGOs appearing ‘quite indifferent to the incorporation of 
aggression into the Statute.’374  
In failing to agree on a common approach, with organisations opting for different approaches to the 
aggression question in Kampala, civil society severely undermined its ability to influence state 
delegations. Before we take a look at these different approaches, it is worth considering a number of 
geopolitical factors that also contributed to civil society indifference when it came to the Review 
Conference.  
7.4. Geopolitical factors 
A number of geopolitical factors played a role in underwhelming civil society engagement with the 
Kampala process. The first of these was the physical location of the Conference. The decision to host 
the Conference in Kampala, Uganda had been taken in part to encourage participation amongst African 
states and NGOs. This was seen as particularly important at a time when African states were openly 
criticising the Court, objecting to the fact that all of the Court’s ongoing cases were in Africa. Helpful 
as this might have been for those African-based organisations, it did add to the expense incurred by 
organisations headquartered in western countries. With the Conference stretching from 31 May to 11 
                                                          
372 Weisbord, Op Cit. p.1313 
373 Interview with Christopher Whomersley, 18 February 2016, transcript on file with the Author 
374 Schabas, W. (2010) ‘An Assessment of Kampala: The Final Blog’, 17 June 2010, available at: http://iccreviewconference.blogspot.be/2010/06/assessment-
of-kampala-final-blog.html (accessed 11 July 2018) 
158 
June, it was also difficult for all but the most well-funded organisations to participate. The exclusive 
and remote nature of the resort chosen similarly dampened civil society participation.  
Second, were considerations brought to the fore as a result of renewed US engagement with the Court. 
For years, the US approach to the ICC was characterised by distant suspicion and at times outright 
hostility. The election of Barack Obama in 2008 heralded a shift in approach, and the US decided, as a 
non-State Party, to participate in the Review Conference and exert its influence over the crime of 
aggression negotiation process. Aside from indicating that the US was now serious about cooperating 
with the Court, it also made clear that it was opposed to the inclusion of the crime of aggression into 
the Rome Statute. This had an impact on some civil society organisations, who coveted future US 
engagement with the Court and were therefore reticent to damage this prospect by pushing forward with 
the crime of aggression amendments. This served to ‘dampen the enthusiasm of many civil society 
groups when it came to incorporating the crime.’375  
Third, the Review Conference came at a time when much of the world was still reeling from the effects 
of the 2008 global financial crisis. This was felt particularly keenly in Europe, from where much of the 
Court’s financing derives. These financial considerations impacted certain delegations at Kampala more 
than others. As Christopher Whomersley recalls, Greece was only able to send one delegate to the 
Conference and she stayed in a hotel remote from the Conference compound. In his opinion, this limited 
her impact.376 That a state delegation could be impacted so severely certainly points to the likelihood 
that civil society groups were similarly affected.   
Aside from direct impact, the crisis also contributed to an environment whereby states were more 
inclined to restrict rather than increase funding to the ICC. Funding has long been an issue for the Court, 
and as recently as November 2016, 11 states parties (Canada, Colombia, Ecuador, France, Germany, 
Italy, Japan, Poland, Spain, UK and Venezuela) put forward a proposal to limit the Court’s funding, 
citing the global financial crisis and inefficiencies in the court. As Amnesty International has reported, 
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this is part of a ‘damaging long-term effort by the biggest financial contributors to the court to curtail 
the ICC’s growth.’377 With the Court’s budget under increased scrutiny from some of its biggest donors, 
particularly following the financial crisis, many questioned the advisability of expanding its jurisdiction 
at the time.  
Fourth, was the rise of non-state groups and unconventional methods of warfare. The US and coalition 
forces had been fighting Al-Qaida for a number of years and the group now known as Islamic State (IS) 
or Da’esh were beginning to increase their influence in the Middle East. These groups had launched 
attacks on a number of countries, and there was a growing realisation that the crime of aggression as 
drafted was ill-equipped to deal with non-state groups. Furthermore, unconventional forms of warfare 
were becoming more common. The US was rapidly developing its drone programme and cyber-attacks 
were growing in frequency. With warfare increasingly disconnected from the state, questions were 
raised about the utility of pushing forward with a framework designed to combat traditional uses of 
force. As observers from the Conference have pointed out, ‘most civil society organisations sat on the 
side-lines donning sceptical expressions. They had little to say about the advisability of including non-
state attacks within the ambit of the crime of aggression, nor about the range of permissible responses 
to these attacks.’378 
Perhaps most importantly, there remained a number of divisive issues still to be resolved before the 
crime could be adopted. Issues around self-defence and humanitarian intervention divided international 
lawyers, states and civil society alike. The scope of the jurisdictional remit and the extent to which 
states were permitted to opt-out of the provisions was also controversial. These unresolved issues served 
to divide civil society groups, preventing the Coalition from presenting a unified approach. Some of 
these issues will now be explored in more detail. They serve to demonstrate not only why civil society 
groups were divided and thus unable to exert much influence over the process, but also to provide 
context to chapters to follow that examine in more detail the divisions of state delegations.  
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7.5. Issues that divided delegations 
7.5.1. Aggression vs. Other Human Rights Concerns 
The approach of a number of high profile NGOs – particularly human rights focused ones – was 
neutrality. In adopting this stance, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the ICRC and others 
hoped to maintain sufficient impartiality to be able to allow them to continue to document human rights 
abuses.  
Amnesty International argued that it ‘remains neutral on the question of the legality of the conflict so 
that it is seen as impartial when it addresses violation of human rights and humanitarian law by all sides 
to the conflict.’ Human Rights Watch adopted a similar stance in refusing to participate in the aggression 
discussions in the run-up to Kampala. The ICRC too argued that ‘it is precisely because the feelings we 
have towards the suffering of those we seek to assist are not “neutral” that we must adhere to political, 
religious and ideological neutrality – for that is what enables us to gain access to them.’379 
In adopting this stance, prominent human rights organisations essentially argued that the international 
use of force was not a human rights issue. For the ICRC, an organisation whose effectiveness ‘relies on 
its ability to gain reciprocal access to prisoners of war on all sides of a conflict,’380 there are legitimate 
reasons why neutrality in times of war may be a legitimate policy position. For those less beholden to 
considerations of unfettered access, their stance is more questionable. As was outlined in judgment at 
Nuremburg, ‘a war of aggression is not only an international crime; it is the supreme international crime 
differing only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the 
whole.’381 To ignore this, would be to ignore the ‘systemic violations of human rights, including the 
right to life, that occasion any large-scale and illegal use of armed force.’382 Beyond this, it is surely 
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right that humanitarian organisations take a stand against patently illegal wars. Theirs is an important 
voice capable of exerting a great deal of pressure and scrutiny on offending states.  
Beyond policy decisions taken for ostensibly pragmatic reasons, many NGOs shared some of the 
concerns of states about the inclusion of the crime of aggression. It is useful to introduce those here, 
before later chapters delve into them in more detail.  
7.5.2. The Political Nature of the Crime 
The first of these kind of arguments is that the crime of aggression is a political issue, and not a legal 
one, and as such it is inherently unsuited for adjudication at the ICC. For those who would argue this, 
the Council on Foreign relations among them, the decision to go to war is inherently political. As such, 
one side’s unjust war is another side’s just war, and the appropriate forum for adjudicating state 
disagreements that descended into war are through political processes. 
This line of argument fails to recognise the decades of progress made in expanding international law 
norms and the many times that states have worked towards empowering judicial bodies to make 
determinations over wars of aggression. The reality is that politics and the law are entwined, never more 
so than at the international level. In seeking to ensure accountability, states have opted to ensure that 
the ICC is equipped to impartially apply a universally applicable legal standard to a set of verifiable 
facts. While there were certainly questions that needed to be answered over how best to ensure the 
independence of the ICC from state and Security Council control, the nature of the crime itself should 
not prevent it from falling within the remit of the ICC, and attempts to do so should continue to be 
resisted.  
Closely linked to this argument were claims that the politically charged nature of the crime would 
weaken an already beleaguered court, overburdening it with an increased workload and opening it up 
to renewed criticism from disgruntled actors. As William Pace recalls, ‘many of [the Coalition’s 
members] were very worried that the aggression jurisdiction would heavily politicise the statute and the 
162 
court itself.’383 This concern was even expressed by NGOs claiming to take no position on crime of 
aggression amendments. Human Rights Watch among them issued a press release a few days before 
the start of the Conference suggesting that ‘making the crime of aggression operational could link the 
ICC to highly politicised disputes between states that could diminish the court's role - and perceptions 
of that role - as an impartial judicial arbiter of international criminal law.’384 
A similar, powerful contribution came from former ICTY Prosecutor, Richard Goldstone. Writing in 
the New York Times, he opined that it would be ‘a mistake to add the crime of aggression to the Court’s 
docket now.’385 Elaborating, he explained that ‘one of the greatest challenges as Prosecutor of the ICTY 
was convincing the Serbian people that the ICTY was not a politically motivated conspiracy against 
their country’:386 ‘This challenge would have been immeasurably greater – perhaps impossible – if the 
Tribunal’s jurisdiction had included the crime of aggression.’387 This view was echoed by the Open 
Society Institute and over forty NGOs who wrote a letter to foreign ministers just before the Review 
Conference arguing that ‘the current amendment proposal risks politicizing and overburdening the ICC, 
and undermining the integrity of the Rome Statute.’388  
Despite these concerns, there were plenty of NGOs committed to the goal of including aggression within 
the remit of the ICC. In response to the Open Society Institute’s letter, the NGO Citizens for Global 
Solutions and a number of other civil society organisations issued a press release on 4 June 2010 
distancing themselves from the Open Society’s position and offering their support to the definition of 
the crime of aggression.389 Halfway through the Review Conference and it was clear that NGOs 
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remained divided, unable to form a unified position over even the most basic of questions: should the 
ICC be granted jurisdiction over the crime of aggression. 
As to the issue of whether the use of force is inherently political and thus unsuited to adjudication before 
the ICC, states have through inclusion in Rome and adoption in Kampala made their own determination. 
That civil society was unable to gather around a unified position in Kampala as they had done in Rome 
was fatal to their aspirations to play a decisive role. While we will have to wait for a definitive answer 
as to whether the crime of aggression will now come to weaken the Court, it is encouraging that the 
positive consensus at the Review Conference included the support of previously hostile powers such as 
the United States. More consideration will be given to this question in later chapters.  
7.5.3. The Definition 
Aside from the overarching question of ICC suitability, questions were raised over the formulation of 
the definition. Given the technical nature of the drafting, this occupied the academic community in 
particular. Even here there was division, with the academic community struggling to reach a consensus 
over whether the crime was in breach of the principle of legality. Again, this will be considered in 
greater detail in later chapters, but it is worth introducing here.  
The principle of legality requires that crimes are sufficiently well defined so that it is clear what 
behaviour constitutes a crime at the time it is committed. Some – Tufts International law Professor 
Michael Glennon among them – have argued that the crime of aggression fails this test insofar as the 
‘prosecution under it would turn upon factors that the law does not delineate, rendering criminal liability 
unpredictable and undermining the law’s integrity.’390 This view was, unsurprisingly, taken up by the 
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United States391 and the Council on Foreign Relations who argued that the crime was – in contrast to 
the other core crimes – not reasonably well established in international law.392  
A number of leading academics have challenged this view. Kevin Heller has called the contention that 
customary international law does not criminalise aggression ‘truly bizarre’, while Jennifer Trahan has 
argued that the claim ‘rests on an incorrect construction of the definition, ignorance of the extensive 
negotiating history and travaux préparatoires that exist vis-à-vis the crime, and failure to consult the 
elements of the crime.’393 
It remains to be seen whether questions of legality will continue to be raised now the crime has come 
into force, but it seems unlikely. The SWGCA had already considered these complaints before Kampala 
and found them to be baseless. States took a similar decision in Kampala, refusing to open negotiations 
on an already agreed definition.  
7.5.4. The Jurisdictional Regime 
While issues surrounding the definition were largely confined to academics and those opposed to the 
crime’s inclusion, the jurisdictional regime divided civil society in much the same way it divided states. 
As the previous chapter on jurisdiction documented in detail, the outcome reached in Kampala was the 
result of painstaking negotiations and included a number of compromises necessary for an agreeable 
outcome. When it came to the jurisdiction of the Court, the same universal regime that applies to the 
other core crimes in the event of a Security Council referral was applied to the crime of aggression. 
When it came to cases referred by states or initiated by the Prosecutor, this jurisdiction was more limited 
than for the other crimes, not least through the opt-out clause.  
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For some NGOs, this compromise was a betrayal of established international standards. Amnesty 
International, for instance, hitherto neutral as to the negotiations decried the compromise as a ‘two-tier 
system of international justice where [states] can choose to stand above the law, retreating from the 
principles established in Rome.’394 Amnesty International must have been aware that the “two-tier” 
system created was necessary in order to prevent the negotiations from failing, and had decided that – 
in spite of this – their all-or-nothing approach was necessary to preserve the Court’s integrity. Others 
disagreed. FIDH and Citizens for Global Justice were just two of the prominent NGOs who decided 
that it was a compromise worth making. For these NGOs, the perfectionist stance adopted by Amnesty 
International was seen as a betrayal.395 To have followed their purist stance would have been to collapse 
the negotiations in line with the desired approach of the US and others that would have preferred the 
crime never entered the ICC statute books.  
The jurisdictional regime continues to be a divisive issue among civil society and the international 
community, not least because it substantially limits the ability of the Court to exercise jurisdiction over 
the crime. The extent to which this negotiated outcome can be seen as an important step forward for the 
ICC and international justice more broadly is assessed in later chapters. What is clear is that civil society 
was not immune from the division created by compromises over the Court’s jurisdiction.  
That being said, there were elements of the jurisdictional regime on which most civil society groups 
could agree: that giving the Security Council exclusive power to determine an act of aggression would 
threaten core principles of legality and undermine the independence of the Court. As Rutgers Law 
Professor and long-time participant in the SWGCA, Roger Clark, explained, ‘not only would a Security 
Council predetermination subvert the power of the Court to decide itself on the existence or otherwise 
of all the elements of the crime, but it would make it extremely difficult to build a criminal defence 
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around a structure where one of the key elements was decided elsewhere and potentially on the basis of 
totally political considerations.’396  
In any case, the majority of states also agreed, and as we have already seen, the Security Council was 
prevented from wielding exclusive power to make such a determination. This was an important 
provision, and came to be one of the few points of contention that civil society could agree on.  
7.6. Conclusion 
Civil society played a decisive role in establishing the International Criminal Court, preparing the 
groundwork for the Conference in Rome and working tirelessly to facilitate negotiations. As this chapter 
has documented, the same degree of influence was lacking in Kampala.  
Certain groups did play a positive and progressive role, particularly through the dissemination of 
information; civil society groups do continue to advance the aggression cause through encouraging 
states to ratify and adopt the provisions; and the academic community remains engaged with the crime 
of aggression and the issues still to be resolved. Regardless, a lack of unity amongst the NGO 
community curtailed civil society’s overall impact and clipped the wings of the usually influential 
Coalition for the ICC. While it is true that there were a number of geopolitical factors that served to 
dampen civil society engagement with the aggression amendments, it was the disparate policy positions 
of some of the largest and most influential NGOs and a fundamental failure to agree on a desired 
outcome from the negotiations that explains why civil society took a back seat in Kampala.  
As other chapters have documented, there remains a great deal of work to be done if the progressive 
ideal of ending impunity for the aggressive use of force is to be realised. This includes maintaining 
momentum by encouraging states to ratify and implement the amendments, helping to clarify the scope 
of the jurisdictional remit adopted, and working through legal and procedural issues before the first 
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defendants appears in the dock. Now that we have an agreed definition and jurisdictional remit for the 
crime of aggression, civil society should regroup and endeavour to lead these efforts.  
Having assessed in detail the amendments adopted, the following chapter will seek to apply those 
provisions to historic and contemporary conflicts to offer the reader an insight into the type of crimes 
the international community had in mind when the crime was added to the Rome Statute. It will also 
offer thoughts on the likelihood of future prosecutions for the crime of aggression in order to prepare 
the ground for later chapters looking at whether the provisions represent a step forward for the Court 
and its mission to end impunity for atrocity crimes. 
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Chapter 8 – Going Forward: The Likelihood of Investigations and Prosecutions 
Previous chapters have documented in detail the background to the crime, the negotiating processes 
that brought us to where we are, and the provisions that were adopted in Kampala and at the ASP in 
December 2017, and which came into force in July 2018. This chapter will briefly recap the provisions 
adopted and seek to cast light on the likelihood of future investigations and prosecutions. In order to 
do so, the definition will be applied to historic and contemporary conflicts to offer the reader an insight 
into the type of crimes the international community had in mind when the crime was added to the Rome 
Statute. We will then apply the Court’s jurisdictional regime to these conflicts, providing practical 
insight into the restrictive nature of the regime adopted. The final section will offer thoughts on the 
likelihood of future prosecutions for the crime of aggression, and the extent to which the amendments 
alter the international order by imposing additional considerations on those that might seek recourse 
to war. This chapter will prepare the ground for the following chapter that looks at whether the 
provisions represent a step forward for the Court in its mission to end impunity for atrocity crimes.  
8.1. Introduction 
As will become apparent, the definition of acts of aggression adopted is broad enough to cover a great 
deal of conventional conflicts that have taken – and still are taking – place around the world, though 
modern trends towards decentralised and non-state-led forms of warfare pose challenges to the crime’s 
continued relevance.397 The extent to which these acts will be considered of such gravity that they reach 
the manifest threshold will be key to determining whether they can also be considered crimes of 
aggression. The jurisdictional provisions place further limitations on the extent to which the Court will 
be able to intervene in situations absent Security Council referral.  
These shortcomings bring into serious doubt the extent to which the Court will be able to exercise its 
jurisdiction over crimes of aggression. Its success will therefore depend on the extent to which giving 
the crime a name and a clearly defined definition will act as a deterrent to state leaders. It will also 
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depend on whether the aggression amendments will come to be seen as a first step towards eradicating 
impunity for waging aggressive war, rather than representing the upper ceiling of the international 
community’s ambitions for the crime. The extent to which it is indeed a step forward is discussed in 
following chapters. In order to facilitate discussion as to whether this represents a forward step, it will 
be useful to conceptualise the application of the amendments. This section, will apply the definition to 
relatively recent uses of armed force to give an insight into the type of crimes the Court may come to 
have jurisdiction over.  
8.2. The Definition 
As chapter 3 on the definition documented, Article 8 bis sets out that the ‘crime of aggression’ means 
the planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a position effectively to exercise control 
over or to direct the political or military action of a state, of an act of aggression which, by its character, 
gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations.398 An ‘act of 
aggression’ means the use of armed force by a state against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or 
political independence of another state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the 
United Nations. Such use of armed force includes invasion, bombardment, blockade, attacking the 
armed forces of another state, contravening an agreement to station forces in another state, allowing 
one’s territory to be used by another state to attack a third state, and the sending of armed bands.  
As the following section will demonstrate, there are a multitude of examples of armed force having 
been used since 1945. Indeed, most examples of armed conflict will have involved the use of one of the 
enumerated acts that constitute an act aggression. What elevates the use of armed force from an act of 
aggression to a crime of aggression are the subjective elements contained with Article 8: that the act of 
aggression, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the 
United Nations. It is this additional, high threshold that ensures only the most flagrant violations will 
be considered a crime of aggression.  
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The test for the Court will always be: was there a use of armed force by a state against another state; 
and was that use of force serious enough to constitute a manifest violation of the Charter of the UN? 
Only then can we seek to establish who has individual criminal responsibility for those acts, i.e. who 
exercised effective control in planning, preparing, initiating or executing the use of force.  
Applying the definition adopted to past conflicts only tells part of the story. In order to fully assess 
whether the Court will truly be empowered to take action in response to future violations of international 
law it is also necessary to consider the restrictive jurisdictional remit of the Court and the limiting 
impact it will have, and this consideration will form part of the final section of this chapter.  
8.2.1. Applying the Aggression Amendments  
There have been many wars since 1945. Based on the definition we now have, which ones were crimes 
of aggression?  
The Security Council has been reluctant to pass resolutions expressly condemning aggressive acts and 
has only passed 31 such resolutions since its inception.399 Some of the more controversial uses of armed 
force have passed without Security Council condemnation. Now that we have a court equipped to try 
individuals responsible for the gravest breaches of international criminal law, the Security Council will 
be under increasing pressure to make appropriate determinations, free of political bias, and refer 
situations for investigation to the Prosecutor. This section will look briefly at some of the historical 
situations, which, had the Court been granted jurisdiction in advance of their commencement, might 
have resulted in international criminal law charges.  
These illustrative examples have been chosen primarily because they are some of the most well-known 
examples of the use of force of the past 30 years. This is partly due to the visibility that acts of aggression 
are now given in the age of modern media, but is also due to the involvement of Western states. As 
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readers will likely be familiar - at least in a cursory sense - with the debate surrounding the legality of 
these interventions, it may be useful to demonstrate how they might have been measured against the 
crime  in force today.  
It is certainly the case that the crime of aggression will not apply retrospectively and as such, there is 
no question that the Court will ever have jurisdiction over any of the following situations. In addition, 
these case studies are included along with the important caveat that they are illustrative only. A full 
exploration of the legality of these situations would, in any case, have been a role for the Court itself, 
utilising all of the investigative and prosecutorial expertise at its disposal. Something remotely close to 
replicating that is not in the slightest bit possible here, and nor is it attempted.  
Their inclusion is, rather, designed to provide practical application to the provisions adopted, breathing 
life into legalistic text and offering an insight into the type of crimes the court may one day have 
jurisdiction over. Perhaps more importantly, it should help to shed light on the impact the jurisdictional 
regime adopted will have on the ability of the Court to act in future.  
8.2.1.1. Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait, 1990 
Following a protracted period of diplomatic discord and disagreement related to financial payments and 
oil extraction, Saddam Hussein – on the 2 August 1990 – ordered 100,000 Iraqi troops into neighbouring 
Kuwait. In the days following the invasion, Saddam Hussein declared Kuwait the 19th province of Iraq, 
effectively annexing the state. The annexation lasted for seven months, and was ended only by a UN-
authorized military intervention of coalition forces led by the United States.400 
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Along with Nazi attacks on neighbouring countries, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait is seen as the classic 
example of aggression in the twentieth century, with there being little disagreement amongst 
international legal scholars that Saddam Hussein’s use of force amounted to a war of aggression.401 
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait comprised an invasion of the state of Kuwait, threatening its sovereignty, 
territorial integrity and political independence. The invasion and subsequent annexation constituted an 
outright attack on the Kuwaiti armed forces, and included a bombardment through aerial strikes of 
strategic Kuwaiti targets. The attack was not carried out in self-defence, nor was it undertaken for 
humanitarian purposes.402 Far from being authorised by the UN, the annexation was maintained in the 
face of no fewer than 12 UN Security Council resolutions demanding immediate withdrawal of Iraqi 
forces from Kuwait.403 Furthermore, given the of character, gravity and scale of the invasion and 
annexation – with Iraqi forces overpowering Kuwaiti forces, seizing complete control of the state, 
forcing the ruling Kuwaiti royal family into exile, conducting summary executions in response to 
localised uprisings, and plundering the vast wealth of the nation –  few international legal scholars 
would contend that Iraq’s actions did not amount to a manifest violation of the Charter of the UN.  
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait undoubtedly amounts to a crime of aggression, based on the definition we 
have today.   
8.2.1.2. NATO Intervention in Kosovo 
The Kosovo War had begun in late February 1998, and was fought by the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (the Republics of Montenegro and Serbia), and the Kosovo Albanian rebel group known as 
the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), supported by the Albanian army. Repeated Security Council 
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resolutions demanding the cessation of hostilities failed to end the systematic campaign of terror, 
including murder, rape, arson and severe maltreatments404 ongoing in the region, and in the spring of 
1999 NATO intervened.405 The 11-week NATO bombing campaign against the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia that followed ‘was the first sustained use of armed force by the NATO alliance in its 50-
year existence; the first time a major use of destructive armed force had been undertaken with the stated 
purpose of implementing Security Council resolutions but without Security Council authorisation; [and] 
the first major bombing campaign intended to bring a halt to crimes against humanity being committed 
by a state within its own borders.’406  
NATO’s use of armed force was at the time – and remains – controversial.407 The use of force almost 
certainly falls within the definition’s enumerated acts of aggression: the air strikes – lasting from March 
24 to June 11, 1999 – represented a sustained bombing campaign involving approximately one thousand 
aircraft operating from air bases in Italy and the aircraft carrier the USS Theodor Roosevelt stationed 
in the Adriatic Sea. Cruise missiles were also used.’408 The extent to which the intervention could fall 
within the broader definition of a crime of aggression insofar as it was not authorised by the Security 
Council and the use of force was sufficient in its character, gravity and scale to amount to a manifest 
violation of the Charter of the UN is less clear.  
For some, it was a welcome intervention in furtherance of humanitarian concerns from a broad 
international coalition, supported – if not authorised – by Security Council resolutions.409 Following 
UN inaction in Rwanda only a few years earlier, the NATO intervention was seen by many as morally, 
if not strictly legally, justifiable. Jürgen Habermas, for some the most important German philosopher 
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and social theorist of the second half of the twentieth century,410 suggested the intervention was ‘illegal 
but morally necessary’.411 For Michael Walzer, ‘though NATO certainly violated the territorial integrity 
of Yugoslavia, it did not put the survival of the Serbian nation in jeopardy. Hence the war was not, from 
a moral standpoint, an act of aggression. It also was not a wrong of any lesser sort; its “moral necessity” 
was full justification.’412  
As the previous chapter on the definition explored in more detail, the Kosovo case is used as the 
archetypal example of humanitarian intervention, a ‘grey-area’ of international law that was raised 
frequently during the Kampala negotiations. It falls within this grey-area of international law precisely 
because the weighing of moral and legal considerations inevitably divides opinion, making it difficult 
to delineate genuine acts of humanitarian intervention from unjustifiable acts of aggression.413 Indeed, 
Benjamin Ferencz has pointed out that ‘unauthorised humanitarian interventions can be morally 
legitimate, but it is not up to the protagonists to decide whether they are lawful. An illegal use of force 
does not automatically become lawful because it is done with good intentions.414  
Perhaps this conflict is the reason the aggression amendments and accompanying Understandings offer 
no definitive answer as to whether the Court will take an expansive approach with regard to including 
cases of genuine humanitarian intervention, though academic opinion suggests it would be wise for the 
Court to focus only on the most egregious of crimes. During an informal Panel Discussion at the 
Kampala Review Conference, Michael Scharf stated that cases of true humanitarian intervention would 
not come within the ‘manifest’ qualification.415 Claus Kreß, another veteran of the SWGCA process 
and key participant in Kampala, has also stated that ‘genuine humanitarian intervention, such as the 
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1999 NATO air campaign in Kosovo, is also open to genuine debate and is thus excluded from the 
scope of the draft of Article 8 bis.’416  
As such, there is broad academic support for the proposition that the NATO intervention in Kosovo 
would fail to meet the ‘manifest’ threshold on the basis that the threshold was designed specifically to 
exclude such cases of humanitarian intervention.417 That being said, it would certainly be wise for states 
looking to deploy their forces to prevent humanitarian catastrophes from unfolding to first seek Security 
Council approval. Without it, it might fall to the Court to determine whether the resulting use of force 
was justified or instead a manifest violation demanding prosecution.  
8.2.1.3. US-led Invasion of Iraq, 2003 
As we’ve seen already, uses of armed force fall along a spectrum. Classical wars of aggression such as 
the Nazi attacks on neighbouring countries in 1939 and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 constitute 
both acts and crimes of aggression. Others, such as the NATO intervention in Kosovo fall towards the 
other side of that spectrum insofar as they are unlikely to reach the manifest threshold required by the 
aggression amendments. The US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 falls somewhere between the two, and is 
perhaps the most controversial – and the most widely publicised – use of armed force of the twenty-
first century.418 
The 2003 invasion of Iraq began on 19 March 2003, lasting until 1 May 2003. The initial invasion 
involved the deployment of over 177,000 troops, the majority from the United States.419 The UK, and 
to a lesser extent Australia and Poland, were also major contributors. The initial invasion phase gave 
way to prolonged military occupation, with US troops stationed in Iraq until 2011. A conventional war, 
with heavy aerial bombardment, the invasion resulted in the capture of the Iraqi capital Baghdad, the 
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arrest of its President Saddam Hussein, and the eventual installation of a new Iraqi government. The 
invasion was premised on the existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, with the stated mission 
of the coalition being to ‘disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction, to end Saddam Hussein's support 
for terrorism, and to free the Iraqi people.’420 No weapons of mass destruction were ever found.  
As with the previous examples of warfare, that the coalition use of force constitutes one or more of the 
acts of aggression enumerated in the amendments is not in doubt. The term “shock and awe” - used by 
US Armed Forces officials421 - adequately hints at the ferocity of the simultaneous aerial bombardment 
and ground invasion inflicted on Baghdad, tactics designed to overpower the Iraqi forces.  
And so, we turn again to the legality of such use of force, and the extent to which it constituted a 
manifest violation of the Charter of the UN. To this end, more than one justification has been presented 
by those involved in the decision-making process, either at the time or subsequently: the invasion does 
not amount to a manifest violation of the Charter of the UN on the basis: (1) of earlier UN and Security 
Council resolutions authorising the use of force; (2) that it was taken in pre-emptive self-defence; and 
(3) that it was underlined by humanitarian considerations. The international community is broadly - 
although by no means unanimously – in agreement that none of these justifications render the invasion 
legal under international law.422 
As to the claim that the invasion was justified on the basis of early Security Council resolutions, two 
such resolutions are central. The first is Security Council resolution 678 of 29 November 1990 which 
had been issued almost 13 years prior and gave states explicit authorisation to use ‘all necessary means’ 
to force Iraq out of Kuwait and ‘restore international peace and security in the area.’ Having never been 
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formally rescinded, it was claimed as a basis for further action against Iraq to once again restore peace 
and security to the region, albeit in a different context and altogether different decade.  
As Kai Ambos – newly appointed Judge of the Kosovo Specialist Chambers – reasons, ‘the 2003 US-
led invasion in Iraq, albeit considered by most international lawyers as an unlawful act of aggression, 
might not have amounted to a crime of aggression due to the absence of a ‘manifest violation’ of the 
UN Charter in light of the fact that a respectable scholarly opinion existed according to which the 
invasion was justified, especially on the basis of Security Council resolution 678 of 29 November 
1990.’423 The existence of such scholarly opinion was also recognised by Claus Kreß,424 and indeed at 
least one of the current judges of the ICJ, Christopher Greenwood, opined at the time – and holds even 
today – that the war was legal by reason of Security Council resolution 678.425  
The majority, however, reject Security Council resolution 678 as capable of authorising the invasion, 
with the International Commission of Jurists expressing shortly before the invasion their ‘deep dismay 
that a small number of states are poised to launch an outright illegal invasion of Iraq, which amounts to 
a war of aggression.’426 Security Council resolution 678 makes specific reference to the government of 
Kuwait, the coalition against Saddam Hussein having been created for the specific purpose of liberating 
Kuwait. The coalition of nations to which the resolution was addressed was wholly different in 
composition from the one which invaded Iraq, and the context completely different. To most 
international lawyers, and indeed this author, it is difficult to accept that Security Council resolution 
678 could be interpreted– in good faith – so as to authorise the invasion of Iraq. 
Similarly, UN resolution 1441 was also considered by some to be justification enough. UN resolution 
1441, issued shortly before the invasion, gave Saddam Hussein ‘a final opportunity to comply with 
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its disarmament obligations’, but stopped short of authorising military action. In spite of this, the UK 
and US have pointed to repeated Iraqi violations of that and other resolutions as a pretext for war. Tony 
Blair’s attorney general, Lord Goldsmith, suggested at the time that UN resolution 1441 might allow 
‘all necessary means’ to remove Saddam without any further Security Council motion, though he 
admitted that he was not confident that any court would agree.427 
Lord Goldsmith was right to be sceptical. He is likely to have known that representatives in the Security 
Council, including from the US and UK, had been clear at the time the resolution was passed that the 
resolution contains no ‘hidden triggers’ and no ‘automaticity’ with respect to the use of force, and as 
such, a further authorising resolution would be required before recourse to war.428 In addition, France, 
Russia and China, three permanent members of the Security Council, had issued a declaration indicating 
that the resolution excludes such authority. As the International Commission of Jurists also concluded, 
‘war waged without a clear mandate by the Security Council would constitute a flagrant violation of 
the prohibition of the use of force. Security Council resolution 1441 does not authorise the use of force. 
The bottom line is that nine members of the Security Council, including the five permanent members, 
need to actively approve the use of force – such support is blatantly lacking.’429  
As such, there is broad consensus that the invasion took place without UN or Security Council 
authorisation.430 For Geoffrey Robertson, the ‘invasion without Security Council approval took us 
backwards towards the lawless world described by Thucydides, in which the strong do what they wish 
and the weak suffer what they must’.431 For Elizabeth Wilmshurst, deputy legal adviser to the British 
Foreign Office and a member of the Prep Com working group defining aggression, such an unlawful 
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use of force on such a scale amounted to the crime of aggression. She resigned her post on the eve of 
the invasion.432 
Additionally, some would claim that the manifest threshold was not reached on the basis that the 
invasion was taken in pre-emptive self-defence; that Saddam Hussein was capable of launching WMD 
at short notice. As the previous chapter on the definition outlined, proving legitimate self-defence is 
fraught with difficulty under international law, pre-emptive self-defence even more so. The contention 
that Tony Blair and George Bush genuinely believed that Saddam Hussein had been storing weapons 
of mass-destruction has been raised as a defence despite WMD having never been found, and this claim 
has been strengthened by the recent findings of the Chilcot Report, which, in deciding whether the 
decision to go to war was influenced by a ‘sexing-up’ of evidence of WMDs, concluded that ‘there is 
no evidence that intelligence was improperly included in the dossier or that No 10 improperly influenced 
the text’. Tony Blair may well point to the available evidence at the time and the UK House of 
Commons vote authorising UK action, and additionally suggest that it would have been unlikely that 
Security Council consent for an authorising resolution could have been obtained. Nevertheless, the 
extent to which this argument would be accepted by any competent Court is at least open to question, 
and he would be on shaky ground arguing pre-emptive self-defence before the ICC.  
As the ICJ concluded at the time, ‘the competency of the Security Council to authorize the use of force 
is not unlimited. It may only do so to ‘maintain or restore international peace and security’. As states 
resisting the use of force at this moment understand, the determination upon whether there is a present 
threat to international peace and security must be based on sufficient objective criteria. The evidence 
presented by states pressing for war is less than convincing.’433  
Finally, it may be claimed that the invasion was undertaken for humanitarian purposes, with the brutality 
of the Saddam Hussein regime and his multiple crimes against his own people well publicised. The 
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2003 invasion of Iraq, perhaps more than most conflicts, highlights the dangers of allowing 
humanitarian intervention and the human rights framework more generally to be used as justification 
for war. Saddam Hussein was certainly a tyrant and a mass-murderer, but few believe claims of 
humanitarian intervention justify the invasion. The hundreds of thousands killed in Iraq as a result of 
the invasion,434 the million-strong protest against it in London alone,435 and the subsequent instability 
created in the region,436 count against any claim of legitimate humanitarian intervention.  
As ICJ Legal Adviser Ian Seiderman wrote at the time, ‘the present regime in Iraq is certainly 
responsible for widespread and systematic human rights violations over the years. However, this 
reprehensible human rights record does not by itself provide a legal basis for resort to war. The 
appropriate method of addressing such gross abuses is to treat them as international crimes and to use 
and strengthen enforcement mechanisms, such as the International Criminal Court.’437 
Since 1945, the use of military force is regularly accompanied by an official legal justification, quite 
often with a far-fetched interpretation of the right to self-defence or claims of humanitarian intervention. 
The invasion of Iraq was no different. As ICC Judge Hans‐Peter Kaul has eloquently pointed out, 
‘everybody may have his or her own opinion about these so-called “justifications” for war-making.  
There is, however, a great risk and danger which cannot be overlooked. If these “justifications”, which 
often are the subject of massive propaganda campaigns, are indeed accepted by the international 
community, this acquiescence undermines the respect for the general prohibition of the use of military 
force under international law – one of the indispensable fundaments of international peace and 
justice.’438  
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The question of whether Tony Blair in particular439 could stand trial for the crime of aggression was 
raised even before the invasion took place, and in March 2003, the attorney general of the UK, Lord 
Goldsmith, sent a note to Prime Minister Tony Blair warning that, though the possibility of prosecution 
is remote, ‘aggression is a crime under customary international law which automatically forms part of 
domestic law. It might therefore be argued that international aggression is a crime recognized by the 
common law which can be prosecuted in the U.K. courts.’ The subsequent House of Lords case of R v 
Jones (2006) established that the crime of aggression was a part of customary international law and as 
such was ‘sufficiently certain to be capable of being prosecuted in international tribunals’, but stopped 
short of agreeing that the crime of aggression is automatically part of the law of England, requiring the 
additional step of legislative approval before it could be enforced in a UK court.440 As such, it is well 
established that Tony Blair could not face prosecution in the UK for the crime of aggression, and with 
the crime not yet in force internationally nor can he be tried in The Hague.  
That being said, there is a strong case to be made that the 2003 invasion of Iraq represented a manifest 
violation of the Charter of the UN. This view was supported both before the invasion and afterwards by 
UN Secretary General at the time, Kofi Annan, who commented that he had ‘indicated it was not in 
conformity with the UN charter [and] from [the UN’s] point of view and from the charter point of view, 
it was illegal.’441 Based on the current definition it also represents a crime of aggression. Had the Court 
been granted jurisdiction over the crime prior to the invasion, there would have been a case to answer. 
What is more, as Noah Weisbord has speculated: ‘had aggression been a prosecutable crime in 2003, 
Prime Minister Tony Blair — who relied heavily on the legal advice of his attorney general — may 
have never brought his country to war in Iraq without a Security Council resolution authorizing him to 
do so.’442 
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8.3. Jurisdiction 
As the previous chapter on the definition outlined, and this chapter has sought to illuminate, the 
aggression amendments have deliberately defined aggression more narrowly than does customary 
international law, incorporating a ‘manifest’ threshold that seeks to ensure that only the most egregious 
violations of the UN Charter are captured. This purposefully leaves out leaders implicated in ‘grey-
area’ interventions.443 What this section also demonstrates, however, is that there are uses of force in 
recent history that would have met this threshold and thus there are leaders that could have faced 
prosecution for crimes of aggression.  
Delegations in Kampala were acutely aware of this fact and sought – through the jurisdictional 
provisions – to limit the reach of the Court. These limitations have been well documented throughout 
and so will not be repeated here. For completeness though, it is important to demonstrate how those 
restrictions are likely to play out once the crime comes into force. The historical cases provided above 
are again instructive.  
In addition to establishing individual criminal liability for the acts of aggression listed above, it is 
necessary that the Court also has jurisdiction over those individuals.  
As the previous chapter on jurisdiction outlined in detail, a Security Council referral is the most 
expansive in that it grants the Court the power to investigate any state regardless of whether they have 
adopted the aggression provisions or indeed regardless of whether they are even a State Party. This 
means that, in theory, any state in the world could potentially fall within the remit of the Court, though 
of course permanent members of the Security Council could wield a veto to protect themselves or their 
allies from prosecution.  
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State referrals and proprio motu investigations far are less expansive. In these instances, the Court will 
only have jurisdiction over states that are party to the ICC, have ratified the aggression amendments,444 
and have not subsequently opted-out of the aggression provisions, and even then, only when the acts of 
aggression have been committed against a State Party. As such, there are numerous situations around 
the world involving non-States Parties in which a Security Council referral is the only possible route 
for granting the Court jurisdiction.  
8.3.1. Applying the Aggression Amendments 
Before applying the Court’s current jurisdictional regime to the historical uses of armed force outlined 
above, it is worth repeating the important caveat that they are illustrative only. Only a hypothetical 
evaluation is possible given that the Court did not have jurisdiction at the time and the provisions do 
not apply retrospectively. That being said, going forward the Court will need to consider in which 
situations it is empowered to act. This exercise mirrors that in which the Court will find itself engaged 
in the future, while providing an insight into the restrictive nature of the regime adopted.  
8.3.1.1. Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait, 1990 
And so, what would the prospects be for ICC action over the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait if it were 
committed today? Firstly, Iraq is not a state party. As such, the Court cannot initiate investigations and 
nor can another state refer the situation to the Court. The only avenue for prosecution would be via 
Security Council referral. Indeed, as Kuwait is also not a state party, a Security Council referral would 
be needed were the Court to investigate whether any of the core ICC crimes had been committed as part 
of the invasion and subsequent annexation.  
Given the willingness of the Security Council to authorise an armed response to the Iraqi invasion, it 
seems sensible to postulate that such a referral would be forthcoming.  
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8.3.1.2. NATO Intervention in Kosovo 
Turning now to the NATO intervention in Kosovo, as has been demonstrated above, it is unlikely that 
the manifest threshold required was met. The Prosecutor of the ICC would likely conclude, therefore, 
that she was not in a position to proceed with investigations into crimes of aggression arising from 
NATO’s use of armed force. Were this not the case however, and in fact it was determined that the 
intervention was of the character, gravity and scale required, the next step would be for the Court to 
establish jurisdiction. This would be a somewhat more complex task given the multitude of coalition 
partners that intervened under the NATO umbrella. The Balkan region has also undergone significant 
change since the conflict, fragmenting into disparate sovereign states. Were a similar conflict to break 
out in the coming years, the ICC would only have jurisdiction over NATO member states that were also 
State Parties to the Rome Statute, had ratified the aggression amendments and had not subsequently 
opted-out. There are currently eight such states: Belgium, Germany, Iceland, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, and Spain.445  
The Court could then exercise that jurisdiction once two conditions had been fulfilled: the first being 
that it could be established that the leaders of those states were in a position within NATO whereby 
they could exercise effective control in planning, preparing, initiating or executing the use of force. 
Such an evaluation is beyond the scope of this illustrative exercise, though it is likely that high-ranking 
NATO officials from these eight states were in such a position. The second necessary condition is that 
one of the victim states was also a State Party and had ratified the aggression amendments. Again, it is 
purely speculative given that the target of the NATO bombing campaign, the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, no longer exists in its current form. Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo – as they are now 
known – bore the brunt of the NATO bombardment. Of these, Serbia and Montenegro are both States 
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Parties to the ICC. Although neither have yet ratified the aggression amendments, they are actively 
working on ratification or have made concrete commitments to doing so.446  
Were all these conditions to be met, or were the Security Council to refer the situation, then the Court 
could take action. With the UK, US and France all involved in the NATO campaign, it is unthinkable 
that they would refer such a situation to the Court. It is also unlikely – even if they had insulated 
themselves from prosecution by not ratifying the amendments – that they would sit idly by while the 
Court investigated one of their coalition partners. As previous chapters have documented, the Security 
Council retains the ability under Article 16 to halt investigations, and it is certainly not unthinkable that 
they would use this power in such circumstances.  
8.3.1.3. US-led Invasion of Iraq, 2003 
Finally, we turn to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. As was demonstrated above, there is a strong case to be 
made that the invasion – based on today’s definition of aggression – represented a manifest violation of 
the Charter of the UN and thus a crime of aggression. But what of jurisdiction? For obvious reasons, 
even if the Court were to have had jurisdiction over the crime of aggression at the time, we could rule 
out the possibility of a Security Council referral. It is inconceivable that the US and UK would willingly 
open themselves up to investigation by the ICC into the decision to invade Iraq. Prosecutor-initiated 
and state referred investigations fare no better. As Iraq is not a State Party to the Rome Statute, the 
Court does not have jurisdiction over any crimes of aggression committed on its territory in the absence 
of a Security Council referral. Even if this were not the case, the US is excluded as a non-State Party, 
and the UK (and Australia) have not yet ratified the aggression amendments. Poland has ratified the 
aggression amendments, but this comes to nothing unless those acts of aggression were committed on 
the territory of another State Party. In relation to Poland, questions would also arise as to the extent to 
which the Court would want to proceed with an investigation into a relatively minor player in the 
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conflict, the extent to which its officials exercised effective control over coalition forces, and the extent 
to which the Security Council would seek to halt such an investigation.  
8.4. Likelihood of Future Prosecutions 
A persistent criticism of the aggression amendments has been that they have been neutered to such an 
extent that it is unlikely the Court will have the power to act in most instances where it might wish to.447 
The chapter on jurisdiction highlighted this fundamental flaw: that the consent-based regime ensures 
that those likely to commit acts of aggression will simply opt not to be bound by the provisions. The 
continued power of the Security Council opens up the possibility that the Court will be granted reach 
beyond States Parties and those that choose to ratify the amendments, but as this chapter has illustrated, 
this power is likely to be used sparingly, and rarely against the largely Western nations on the Security 
Council or their allies.  
Following chapters will look at whether the compromise represents a step forward for international 
justice or not, but here it is an unavoidable conclusion that very few conflicts will fall within the current 
remit of the Court: those involving consenting States Parties or those without strong ties to members of 
the Security Council.  
The power of the aggression amendments then perhaps flows not from the number of prosecutions 
brought, but from the strengthening of a commitment, however small, to international justice. As Noah 
Weisbord has suggested, ‘criminal accountability will not end war, [and a system that is only able to 
offer the vaguest prospect of prosecution even less so], but it may change the broader rules of domestic 
and international politics so that war is no longer such a tempting option.’448 Indeed, the example of the 
2003 invasion of Iraq above is just one example of a situation in which the use of armed force – at least 
without Security Council consent – may have been avoided had the Court had jurisdiction over the 
crime of aggression at the time. It is certainly reasonable to suggest that an international criminal court 
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with the power to try leaders for crimes of aggression may make those leaders think twice before 
resorting to war, even if they are insulated from prosecution.  
What’s more, the aggression amendments will hopefully come to be seen as a first step towards ending 
impunity for atrocity crimes. The jurisdictional regime adopted is weak, few cases are likely to be 
brought as a result, and continued reliance on the Security Council does nothing to counter claims of 
western imperialism. But frameworks can be strengthened and jurisdictional regimes improved. As 
more states ratify the amendments, the Court’s hand is strengthened, moving us all closer to a world 
free from impunity for atrocity crimes.  
A key question this thesis will seek finally to answer is the extent to which the aggression amendments 
represent a step forward in international criminal justice or whether they weaken an already beleaguered 
Court. The following chapter will do that by addressing lingering concerns surrounding the Court’s 
justiciability over the crime of aggression and whether the provisions are sufficiently defined and in 
accordance with established international law practice on the need for state consent; whether the crime 
of aggression is suited to domestic trials; and whether the aggression amendments will impede 
international efforts to promote peace and stability around the globe.  
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Chapter 9 – An Important Step Forward? 
This chapter will seek to assess whether the aggression amendments represent a step forward in 
international criminal justice or whether they weaken an already beleaguered Court. In doing so, 
section 1 will address lingering concerns surrounding the Court’s justiciability over the crime of 
aggression and whether the provisions are sufficiently defined and in accordance with established 
international law practice on the need for state consent. Section 2 will address concerns that aggression 
is ill-suited to domestic trials, looking at the way the crime of aggression applies to domestic courts 
through the principle of complementarity, expanded notions of jurisdiction, and challenges likely to 
arise should domestic courts seek to exercise jurisdiction. Section 3 will examine claims that the 
aggression amendments will impede international efforts to promote peace and stability around the 
globe by undermining state willingness to participate in humanitarian intervention, weakening the hand 
of negotiators in peace deals, and impeding the Courts ability to punish other atrocity crimes. Section 
4 will then offer some concluding thoughts as to whether the amendments are likely to weaken rather 
than strengthen the ICC.  
9.1. Introduction 
It might have been hoped that questions about the Court’s justiciability over the crime of aggression 
would have ended in Kampala, putting to rest critiques that the ICC is fundamentally incompetent to 
prosecute crimes of aggression.449 On the contrary, various arguments have since been advanced in 
challenge to the Court’s ability to prosecute acts of aggression, in spite of the fact that the international 
criminal nature of wars of aggression have been affirmed in a variety of international instruments since 
Nuremburg.450  
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These range from arguments that the aggression amendments are in breach of the nullum crimen sine 
lege principle insofar as the crime is insufficiently defined; that it breaches the principle of state consent 
as established by the par in parem imperium non habet rule; that they impede international efforts to 
promote peace and stability around the globe; and that the ‘political’ nature of aggression and its related 
issues of collective security and self-defence make it unsuitable for a judicial solution.451 All will be 
considered in this chapter, along with domestic avenues for prosecution and the unique challenges 
national courts also face.  
9.2. Are the provisions in accordance with the law?  
9.2.1. Principle of Consent 
Prior to the formation of international criminal courts, institutions – from the ICJ to arbitral decision-
makers like the WTO – derived their authority from the consent of states. The State Sovereignty452 and 
par in parem imperium non habet (‘an equal has no power over an equal’) maxims are accepted 
principles of international law, dictating that a sovereign power cannot exercise jurisdiction over 
another sovereign power. These principles restrict the ability of states to pronounce on the legality or 
otherwise of a foreign state act, including acts of aggression.  
This posed a dilemma for those involved in establishing international criminal courts. With it unlikely 
that a government sponsoring genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes would consent to the 
prosecution of its nationals, a purely consent-based regime would run the risk of ensuring that the Court 
was unable to obtain jurisdiction over international criminals. Rather than limit the Court’s reach solely 
to nationals of consenting states, with regard to the other core crimes (genocide, crimes against 
humanity and war crimes) the Court was also given the power to act based on a Security Council referral 
under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. In addition, Article 12 provides that the ICC will have 
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jurisdiction to prosecute the national of any state when crimes within the Court’s subject-matter 
jurisdiction are committed on the territory of a state that is a party to the treaty or that consents to ICC 
jurisdiction for that case.453  
While this jurisdictional fix raised questions about the Court’s justiciability,454 the common refrain has 
been that the consent rule is circumvented here because the Court is adjudicating on individual criminal 
responsibility for crimes committed rather than making a determination about the actions of the state 
from where the perpetrator was a national. Indeed, it can well be argued that any finding of individual 
criminal responsibility for the core crimes, particularly genocide and crimes against humanity, 
presuppose the involvement of a multitude of high ranking officials and that such a finding is 
tantamount to a finding of state responsibility. While this may well be the case, the Court is not called 
upon to make an explicit determination.455 
Following agreement at Kampala, questions about the Court’s justiciability resurfaced, particularly 
given that any prosecution for a crime of aggression necessarily presupposes a prior finding that the 
state has committed a breach of international law, notably by committing an ‘act of aggression.’456 
Accordingly, it is argued that any investigation by an international criminal court into a crime of 
aggression would require states to have first consented to the court conducting such an investigation. 
It should be pointed out here that the decision to separate the process for prosecuting aggression into 
two - first finding that a state has committed an act of aggression, and second identifying individual 
involvement of a person in a leadership position - was not the inevitable consequence of the drafting 
process in Kampala. As Ruys recognises, it would have been possible to merge the two steps so that the 
determination of a state act of aggression would have been implicit rather than explicit. This would 
                                                          
453 Morris, M. (2001) ‘High Crimes and Misconceptions: The ICC and Non-Party States.’ Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol.64; No.1, p.13 
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456 Ruys, Op Cit. p.19 
191 
have brought the crime into line not just with the approach adopted in Nuremburg457 but also with the 
other core crimes. This approach is also adopted in a number of national codes that criminalise the 
planning or preparation of an aggressive war without demanding a finding of state responsibility for an 
act of aggression.  
Regardless, this was not the approach taken and, as a result, questions of justiciability persisted. While 
such justiciability issues are most prominently raised in relation to domestic prosecutions and explored 
below in this chapter, they are closely linked to the principle of consent and the extent to which the ICC 
can make a determination of state aggression in a case where not all states have consented.  
Had a more expansive jurisdictional regime been adopted – perhaps in line with the positive 
understanding of Article 121(5) discussed in previous chapters – the issue of consent would have 
remained a much more prominent issue. Then states could have legitimately questioned whether the 
principle of consent established by both the VCLT458 and the ICJ’s Monetary Gold principle459 applied 
to the ICC and, if it did, whether it had been breached. Indeed, as Akande, the US and others warned in 
the run-up to ASP 16, ‘a prerequisite to the conviction of a state leader for the crime of aggression is a 
determination that a relevant state unlawfully used force in a manner inconsistent with the Charter of 
the United Nations,’460 that this determination would form the very subject matter of the decision, and 
as such, the absence of state consent would constitute a violation of the Monetary Gold principle.  
However, a negative understanding of Art.121(5) prevailed, and as such, only states that have explicitly 
consented by ratifying the aggression amendments and not subsequently opting out are bound by the 
provisions. This constitutes clear consent and as such, even if the Monetary Gold principle were to 
apply to the ICC, there would be no breach in this instance. 
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The only instance in which the crime of aggression can apply to non-consenting states is following a 
Security Council referral. Justification for the role of the Security Council in referring situations 
involving non-consenting states has been discussed in previous chapters and will not be rehashed here. 
Suffice to say, whatever its merits, the Security Council holds a unique position in world affairs as the 
primary body in respect of the maintenance of international peace and security, and it has long been 
accepted that it has the power to authorise investigations into atrocity crimes, even for those not party 
to the ICC Statute.  
9.2.2. Nullum Crimen Sine Lege 
The principle of non-retroactivity is an established principle in both domestic and international law, 
mandating that legal rules be proclaimed publicly before they are applied. The principle of non-
retroactivity is reflected in a variety of maxims, the most relevant here being nullum crimen sine lege 
(no crime without law). Enshrined in the Magna Carta,461 it has been reaffirmed in numerous documents 
since, from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights462 to the European Convention on Human 
Rights.463 Indeed, the nullum crimen principle’s importance in international tribunals was recognised 
by the ICC Statute, with Article 22 stating that a ‘person shall not be criminally responsible under this 
Statute unless the conduct in question constitutes, at the time it takes place, a crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Court.464 Closely related to this principle is the requirement that legal rules must not 
be so vague as to obscure their meaning or application.465 
Despite being explicitly recognised by the ICC in its founding statute, some have claimed the crime of 
aggression to be in breach of the nullum crimen principle insofar as the definition suffers from 
overbreadth and vagueness, and as such does not provide sufficient notice to potential defendants as to 
what conduct is permitted and what is proscribed.466  
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We will return to the charge that the definition is insufficiently precise in a moment. First, it is perhaps 
useful to reiterate why the crime of aggression is not open to criticism that it is being applied 
retrospectively, a charge that has been levelled at the Nuremburg and Tokyo tribunals over the years. 
At Nuremberg, crimes against the peace were defined after the commission of Nazi atrocities. 
Furthermore, until the creation of the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals, no international court capable 
of trying perpetrators was in existence. This led to sustained criticism that the Nuremberg tribunals were 
applying retroactive law, and forced Justice Robert Jackson to fall back on the claim that the defendants 
had been charged with crimes that had been ‘recognized since the time that Cain slew Abel.’467 
The crime of aggression no longer suffers from such defects. The definition of the crime of aggression 
was agreed at the Review Conference in Kampala in 2010 after numerous discussions between 
interested parties in the SWGCA. The Court now has jurisdiction over the crime of aggression, but only 
for crimes committed after the date it came into force - 17th July 2018. Any claims that the nullum 
crimen principle has been breached can only be made on the basis that the definition is insufficiently 
precise and that no crime exists under customary international law onto which the courts might fall 
back.  
To the contention that the crime does not exist under customary international law, the influential House 
of Lords judgment in R v Jones (2006) declaratively held that ‘the core elements of the crime of 
aggression have been understood, at least since 1945, with sufficient clarity to permit the lawful trial of 
those accused of this most serious crime.’468 These core elements have been refined through numerous 
instruments. As Jon Heller points out, the London Charter, the Tokyo Charter, and Control Council 
Law No. 10 all criminalised aggression.469 Individuals were convicted of aggression under all three and 
they represent ‘the starting points for the established opinio juris of the international community that 
waging aggressive war is criminal.’470  
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In addition, the UN General Assembly resolution 95(I) of 1946 expressly affirmed that aggression is an 
international crime.  Article 5(2) of the UN Definition of Aggression and Principle 1(2) of the Friendly 
Relations Declaration both define aggression as a crime against peace.  The ILC regarded aggression 
as an international crime in both the 1991 and 1996 Draft Codes of Crimes Against the Peace and 
Security of Mankind, and, as previously mentioned, aggression was included in the Rome Statute; ‘an 
expression of a belief in its criminality under customary international law.’471  
That the crime of aggression – as defined – is too vague was a criticism levelled at Nuremburg. It seems 
much less persuasive in 2018. As the previous chapter on the definition detailed, the crime is now 
defined as the ‘planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a position effectively to 
exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a state, of an act of aggression which, 
by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations.’ 
This is then supplemented with a lengthy explanation of what constitutes an act of aggression. In 
addition, following the Review Conference – as amended by resolution RC/Res.6 – the ICC Statute 
now includes the elements of the crime, informing potential perpetrators of the specific elements of the 
crime before they commit it.  
As we have seen from earlier discussions, there are aspects of the definition that require clarification. 
This will surely come as the international community continues to discuss the contours of the crime and 
as the judges of the ICC are called upon to pass judgment as a matter of statutory construction. What is 
also clear, however, is that the crime of aggression has long been a part of customary international law, 
that it will not be applied retroactively, and that it is sufficiently defined to pass the nullum crimen sine 
lege test.  
9.3. Is the Court the better forum for preventing crimes of aggression? 
9.3.1. Domestic prosecutions 
In addition to concerns regarding the ICC’s justiciability over the crime of aggression, a number of 
commentators were particularly worried about the way in which aggression might be prosecuted at the 
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national level. Indeed, the US delegation was particularly worried during the Review Conference that 
too little attention had been paid to the issue, and voiced concern that ‘the definition did little to limit 
the risk that State Parties would incorporate a definition into their domestic law, encouraging the 
possibility that under expansive principles of jurisdiction, government officials would be prosecuted for 
alleged aggression in the courts of another state.’472 They went on to say that ‘even if states incorporated 
an acceptable definition into their domestic law, it was not clear whether or when it would be 
appropriate for one state to bring its neighbour’s leaders before its domestic courts for the crime of 
aggression,’ and whether it could do so in a manner that promoted peace and security.473  
Section 2 of this chapter seeks to address some of those concerns, looking at the way the crime of 
aggression applies to domestic courts through the principle of complementarity, expanded notions of 
jurisdiction that may be employed by domestic courts, and challenges likely to arise should states seek 
to prosecute crimes of aggression in their own courts.  
9.3.1.1. Complementarity 
The principle of complementarity underpins the jurisdiction of domestic courts over crimes of 
aggression and is routinely used to describe the relationship between the ICC and domestic courts. 
Expressed in the Preamble and in Articles 1 and 17-19 of the ICC Statute, it ensures that the ICC may 
only exercise jurisdiction where national legal systems fail to do so, including where they purport to act 
but – in reality – are unwilling or unable to genuinely carry out proceedings.474 This principle ensures 
that the ICC is a court of last resort, recognising that states have the primary responsibility and right to 
prosecute international crimes.  
The principle of complementarity arose during preparatory negotiations for the ICC, and derives from 
a desire to: (1) respect state sovereignty and, in particular, states' rights and duties to exercise criminal 
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jurisdiction over international crimes;475 (2) recognise that states will generally have the best access to 
evidence and witnesses and the resources to carry out proceedings;476 and (3) ensure that serious 
international crimes do not go unpunished in instances where states prove unwilling or unable to 
prosecute domestically. This approach distinguishes the ICC from other institutions, including the ICTY 
and the ICTR.  
While not everyone embraced the principle of complementarity during the negotiations in and before 
Rome,477 there is now broad agreement that the principle is a useful and even necessary feature of the 
Rome Statute478 and has been lauded as a critically important feature of the ICC's design and 
acceptance.479 In practical terms, the principle is intended to ensure that the Court is not overburdened 
by cases that could otherwise be prosecuted at the national level. Indeed, former Prosecutor Luis 
Moreno-Ocampo remarked back in 2003 that ‘as a consequence of complementarity, the number of 
cases that reach the Court should not be a measure of its efficiency. On the contrary, the absence of 
trials before this Court, as a consequence of the regular functioning of national institutions, would be a 
major success.’480  
A corollary to this is that it forces the ICC and national legal systems to engage with one another, at the 
judicial as well as – sometimes – at the diplomatic or even political level.481 It also incentivises states 
to incorporate the substantive provisions of the atrocity crimes into their domestic penal codes to ensure 
the ability to exercise jurisdiction, and as such, national laws establishing universal jurisdiction over 
the atrocity crimes have proliferated since the Rome Statute was adopted in 1998.482 
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9.3.1.1.1. Complementarity and the Crime of Aggression 
The complementarity regime applies equally to all of the core crimes, including aggression. This does 
not mean, however, that it is unproblematic, with a number of commentators pointing out that the unique 
tension between aggression and complementarity demands the international community's attention.483 
These tensions arise from concerns that the unique nature of aggression – insofar as it requires a 
determination that a state, rather than merely an individual, has committed a breach of international law 
– makes it fundamentally unsuitable to domestic prosecutions. Proponents of this line of argument 
contend that to hand domestic courts the power to adjudicate on the actions of other states could 
‘destabilize conflict management and resolution efforts, deter states from undertaking certain military 
forms of humanitarian intervention, and even undermine the ICC's legitimacy and stability.’484 
Furthermore, with the crime of aggression exclusively a leadership crime, immunities and political 
obstacles may arise more frequently than for the other crimes.485 All of these concerns will be addressed 
below along with other challenges unique to domestic prosecutions of aggression, but first, it is useful 
to consider the steps taken to bring the crime of aggression within the complementarity regime, and the 
types of domestic prosecutions that may arise as a result.  
Prior to Rome, it had been recognised that the ‘unique character’ of the crime of aggression may require 
an alternative approach to the complementarity regime. In its 1996 Draft Code of Crimes, the 
International Law Commission recommended that the ICC enjoy exclusive jurisdiction over the crime 
of aggression, with a separate system of concurrent jurisdiction applying between States Parties and the 
ICC for the other core crimes.486 The ILC considered that asking the national court of one state to sit in 
judgment over another state ‘would be contrary to the fundamental principle of international law par in 
parem imperium non habet,’487 an issue returned to below. The only exception provided within the 
recommendation was that a domestic court should be empowered to try its own nationals for the crime 
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of aggression.  
States Parties at Rome ultimately rejected the ILC’s recommendation, opting instead for uniform 
application of the complementarity regime. With states unable to arrive at an agreed definition and 
wider jurisdictional regime for the crime of aggression at the time, a Preparatory Commission for the 
Establishment of an ICC was created, charged with ‘preparing proposals for practical arrangements for 
the establishment and coming into operation of the Court,’ as well as ‘preparing proposals for a 
provision on aggression, including the definition and Elements of Crimes of aggression and the 
conditions under which the International Criminal Court shall exercise its jurisdiction with regard to 
this crime.’488 In spite of this mandate, the Commission devoted only a limited amount of time to the 
issue of complementarity, and discussion ‘never moved beyond simple acknowledgments that a 
problem might exist.’489  
In further preparatory meetings on the crime of aggression, the ASP’s SWGCA discussed the principle 
of complementarity only during the first informal meeting at the Liechtenstein Institute in Princeton 
University in 2004. While the general feeling of the group was that there was no need for any special 
provisions on complementarity in relation to the crime of aggression,490 they also advised that the 
appropriateness of tying the crime of aggression to the complementarity regime was a question that 
‘merited being revisited’ once the ASP agreed on a definition of aggression and the conditions for the 
ICC's exercise of jurisdiction.491  
Some seven years since the Review Conference and the issue of complementarity has yet to be formally 
revisited by the ASP. Even during the Kampala negotiations – and in stark contrast to proceedings in 
Rome – discussions on complementarity played only a very minor role. For a great many states, that 
the complementarity regime would apply to aggression was seen as a done deal. For others, however, 
‘the important and complex issues surrounding complementarity and the crime of aggression have 
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remained under-theorized and under-discussed.’492  
At Kampala, the US was perhaps the most vocal with regard to the complementarity issue, consistently 
arguing that the Court should be granted exclusive jurisdiction over the crime of aggression. A number 
of the reasons underpinning US reticence to allow domestic prosecutions for the crime of aggression 
will be considered below. Suffice to say at this point, while the US delegation played a significant role 
in ultimately limiting the scope of the Court’s jurisdiction vis-à-vis the crime of aggression, they were 
unable to persuade others to exclude aggression from the complementarity regime. As we have seen in 
the previous chapter on the negotiations, the US was able to secure understandings on the obligations 
arising from the aggression amendments. Understanding 5 is most prescient, in that it affirms that ‘the 
amendments shall not be interpreted as creating the right or obligation to exercise domestic jurisdiction 
with respect to an act of aggression committed by another state.’493  
In spite of this, at the time of writing 35 states have ratified the aggression amendments. Of those, eight 
States Parties have incorporated the definition of the crime of aggression into their domestic legislation 
and a further thirty-two already have pre-existing domestic laws criminalising aggression that overlap 
with the Kampala Amendments.494 An additional 16 States Parties are preparing to ratify the 
amendments with it expected that implementing legislation will follow. 495 Before turning to some of 
the challenges these states may face if they were to initiate domestic proceedings to prosecute 
perpetrators, it is first useful to look at the various forms these domestic prosecutions could take in line 
with the complementarity regime.  
9.3.2. Types of domestic prosecution 
As we have seen, international law gives primacy to states willing and able to prosecute their own 
nationals for aggression against another state. In many ways, these are the ideal fora for prosecuting 
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crimes. States are more likely than international tribunals to have ready access to perpetrators, victims, 
witnesses and evidence. Trials can also have a cathartic effect, ensuring that those most impacted by 
the crimes feel included in the justice process.  
In order for domestic prosecutions to proceed, a number of steps need to be taken: 
First, laws criminalising international crimes need to be incorporated into national legislation, a process 
that has already begun in a number of states regarding the crime of aggression. This is an important 
requirement insofar as it effectively rules out domestic prosecutions on the basis of customary 
international law alone. In 2003, when considering the legality of any intervention in Iraq, the UK 
Attorney-General, Lord Goldsmith, cautioned that ‘aggression is a crime under customary international 
law which automatically forms part of domestic law. It might therefore be argued that international 
aggression is a crime recognized by the common law which can be prosecuted in the UK Courts.’496 
This question was answered by the House of Lords, who later held that international crimes are not 
automatically assimilated into English law, but require statutory enactment by Parliament.497  
Second, there must be the political will to prosecute, something that will vary given the situation post-
conflict, as discussed in chapter 8 looking at the likelihood of prosecutions for crimes of aggression.  
Third, there must be established jurisdictional grounds for prosecution. It is to this third point that we 
now turn. We have discussed at length the jurisdiction of the ICC as set out in the Rome Statute, 
specifically jurisdiction over the crime of aggression as agreed in Kampala. Neither the Rome Statute 
nor the Kampala amendments to it deal with domestic jurisdiction. Domestic jurisdiction is governed 
by principles that have through general practice become accepted by the international community as 
constituting international law. As will become clear, there is much disagreement about the validity of 
the various jurisdictional grounds for prosecution.  
Fourth, there must be no bars to prosecution. Head of State immunity is perhaps the most obvious 
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instance of a bar to prosecution, and its applicability to the crime of aggression will be examined below.  
Domestic jurisdiction is more expansive than that which applies to the ICC, and is usually granted on 
the basis of nationality: crimes punished by the state whose nationals were the perpetrators, or 
territoriality: crimes punished by the state on whose territory the acts were committed.  
Domestic prosecutions on the basis of nationality are the least controversial, with few arguing against 
the right of a state to prosecute its own nationals, and this can extend to instances where the aggressive 
acts were carried out by the prosecuting state’s nationals abroad. There is similarly broad acceptance 
among states that an act of aggression that takes place on the territory of the victim state falls under the 
jurisdiction of that victim state.498  
While both routes are broadly accepted as legitimate avenues for exercising jurisdiction, there are 
practical obstacles with the potential to limit the extent to which they are utilised. For domestic 
prosecutions to proceed on the basis of nationality, there must be the political will for a state to prosecute 
its own high-level officials. As we’ve seen with the other core crimes where regime change has opened 
the door to judicial cooperation,499 this is not beyond the realms of possibility, but it would almost 
certainly require a change in government if there is to be any real possibility of justice and accountability 
for past crimes.500  
Domestic prosecutions on the basis of territoriality carry their own issues. The traditional concept of 
territoriality holds that a victim state can prosecute individuals for acts of aggression carried out on their 
territory. Aside from the challenge of overcoming inevitable claims that victor’s justice was being 
applied, the devastation and lack of institutional infrastructure as a consequence of war may impact on 
a victim state’s ability to prosecute perpetrators of aggression.501 
The challenges faced by states looking to exercise jurisdiction on the basis of these well-established 
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grounds has led some states and commentators to openly explore other jurisdictional avenues of 
prosecution. These actors are also acutely aware of the restrictive nature of the ICC’s jurisdictional 
regime, which does not extend to states that have not ratified the Rome Statute. With this placing many 
of the more powerful states that stand accused of using illegal armed force beyond the reach of the 
Court, some see domestic prosecutions – on the basis of expansive modes of jurisdiction – as a means 
to close this impunity gap.502 
9.3.3. Extraterritorial Jurisdiction 
Expanded notions of extraterritorial jurisdiction include passive personality jurisdiction, protective 
jurisdiction, and universal jurisdiction. Each will now be considered. 
9.3.3.1. Passive personality jurisdiction  
This notion holds that a state has jurisdiction over crimes committed abroad against its nationals and is 
linked to the idea that states should be empowered to act to protect their nationals abroad. This notion 
has arisen in recognition that not all acts of aggression will take place on the victim’s territory, with an 
attack on a state’s armed forces stationed abroad an obvious example.  
The extent to which this principle applies to the crime of aggression is controversial. It has been 
accepted in relation to other crimes, including terrorism.503 It is also accepted as providing jurisdiction 
for war crimes, and both the Netherlands and the UK have brought successful prosecutions on this 
basis.504 While it remains to be seen whether this principle will prove a successful route to prosecution 
for the crime of aggression, the fact that it is generally accepted for other international crimes suggests 
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it might. It is also worth noting that most states that have criminalised aggression in their domestic 
codes have made the decision to contain reference to passive personality jurisdiction.505  
9.3.3.2. Protective jurisdiction  
Protective jurisdiction would allow a state to prosecute any individual that jeopardises the state’s 
national security interests. Although widely regarded as a legitimate means of asserting jurisdiction 
over extraterritorial activities that threaten state security, grounded as it is in self-defence,506 in reality, 
there is general agreement that the protective principle is redundant in relation to the crime of 
aggression. Practically all its imaginable uses in relation to international criminal law overlap with 
territorial, nationality or passive personality jurisdiction.507 That being said, crimes of aggression are 
seen as threats to international peace and security, and so it is feasible that states will look to utilise this 
principle.508 For instance, the invasion of a victim state coupled with the perception that the aggressor 
state had expansionist tendencies, may well prompt a state that shares a border with the victim state – 
and fears that it may be next – to employ this form of jurisdiction.  
9.3.3.3. Universal jurisdiction 
Universal jurisdiction – whereby any state is able to prosecute – is perhaps the most controversial 
ground for asserting domestic jurisdiction over the crime of aggression. There is a general presumption 
that universal jurisdiction impinges state sovereignty, but exceptions to this can exist in international 
law. A widely held view is that exceptions ‘recognise that occasionally certain commonly shared 
interests of the international community require an enforcement mechanism that transcends the interests 
of the singular sovereignty.’509 As such, ‘when crimes of the magnitude of genocide, crimes against 
humanity, and others in this limited category are capable of perpetration in a state, the international 
community may claim for itself some portion of that state’s sovereignty and may exercise jurisdiction 
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to bring the perpetrators to justice.’510  
Indeed, there have been various instances in which universal jurisdiction has been applied for 
international crimes. Beginning with prosecutions for piracy earlier in the nineteenth century,511 the 
principle was later adopted in the Nuremburg and Tokyo tribunals, and was further used to prosecute 
Nazi war criminals in countries such as Canada,512 Australia513 and Israel.514 515 Since the Second World 
War, there have been prosecutions or investigations for crimes under international law based on 
universal jurisdiction in seventeen states,516 including in the United Kingdom regarding the extradition 
of former President of Chile, Augusto Pinochet, in the 1980s;517 Denmark and Germany in trying 
Croatian and Bosnian Serb nationals for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in Bosnia 
in 1992;518 Belgium and Canada as a basis for prosecuting persons involved in the atrocities in Rwanda 
in 1994;519 and the United States in prosecuting Charles Taylor Jr. for torture committed in Sierra Leone 
in the 1990s.520  
Much has been written on the question of whether universal jurisdiction extends to the crime of 
aggression521 and those arguments will not be repeated in full here, though there is a convincing case 
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that it does. Starting first with those sceptical, a variety of reasons are advanced as to why universal 
jurisdiction should not apply to the crime of aggression. Some, David Scheffer – the former US 
Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes – amongst them, claim that the definition is still insufficiently 
defined, a contention tackled already above and in previous chapters. As was concluded already, though 
far from perfect, the definition of the crime should be considered detailed enough to pass any nullum 
crimen sine lege test. Furthermore, any disagreement over the scope or contours of the crime are just 
that, and should not deprive the offense of its character as an international offense, and one subject to 
universal jurisdiction.  
Others claim that the Nuremburg and Tokyo trials were not in fact based on universal jurisdiction but 
‘actually operated with the consent of the state of nationality of the defendants, even though such 
consent arose from the defeat of Germany and Japan, respectively.’522 Here Madeline Morris finds 
herself at odds with the weight of scholarly opinion. While it is true that the Nuremburg tribunal was 
not a proper international court, the consent of Germany has not been cited as the basis for the tribunals’ 
jurisdiction in any of the Nuremburg judgements. The conventional view is that there was effectively 
no sovereign German government at the time, which explains why no peace treaty which might have 
included provisions on consent was ever signed.523 
A final argument advanced is that a lack of state practice since Nuremburg undermines claims that 
universal jurisdiction applies. For Beth van Shaack, for instance, there is ‘little in the way of state 
practice or opino juris in favour of the exercise of domestic jurisdiction over the crime of aggression.’524 
In assessing whether customary law has indeed developed, a number of aspects are important, including 
uniformity, the quantity of state practice, official statements and so on. While it is the case that many 
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authoritative enumerations of international crimes under universal jurisdiction have omitted crimes of 
aggression, there is plenty to suggest that it should be included.  
Indeed, for its proponents, the crime of aggression is an international crime, and one of the four core 
crimes of the Rome Statute at that, and as such national courts are entitled to exercise jurisdiction over 
any perpetrator, even if they happen to be a national of a foreign state. As Benjamin Ferencz has pointed 
out, many renowned scholars, such as Professors Cherif Bassiouni, Claus Kreß, Antonio Cassese, 
William Schabas, and a host of other highly regarded authors, maintain that aggression is already a 
customary international crime that is subject to universal jurisdiction as a peremptory norm from which 
there can be no derogation.525  
For these commentators, the customary nature of the crime of aggression crystallised at Nuremburg. In 
1946, the UN General Assembly unanimously affirmed the principles from the Nuremberg Charter, and 
the International Court of Justice,526 the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,527 
the European Court of Human Rights,528 and several domestic courts have since cited this General 
Assembly resolution as an authoritative declaration of customary international law.529 Indeed since, the 
International Law Commission, established by the UN to codify customary international law, finished 
in 1996 its decades-long project of drafting the Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of 
Mankind. Article 16 of that document confirmed that the crime of aggression constitutes a crime under 
international law.530 
More recently in R v Jones, Lord Bingham stated that ‘the core elements of the crime of aggression 
have been understood, at least since 1945, with sufficient clarity to permit the lawful trial (and, on 
conviction, punishment) of those accused of this most serious crime. It is unhistorical to suppose that 
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the elements of the crime were clear in 1945 but have since become in any way obscure.’531 As has been 
pointed out already in relation to this case, the House of Lords, while recognising aggression as a crime 
under customary international law, they also cautioned that domestic legislation criminalising 
aggression would also be necessary for UK courts to prosecute it. This is cited as authority supporting 
the contention that as a crime under customary international law, aggression is capable of being tried 
on the basis of universal jurisdiction, providing the prosecuting state has incorporated the definition of 
aggression into its domestic criminal code.  
While the arguments for the application of universal jurisdiction to the crime of aggression are 
persuasive, it remains to be seen whether they will – on the basis of state practice – become conclusive. 
There have been plenty of attempts to frame the crime of aggression as outside the scope of universal 
jurisdiction and indeed outside the scope of domestic prosecutions more generally. As we have already 
seen, the insertion of Understanding 5 adopted at the Review Conference in Kampala is one particularly 
prominent example. That being said, it is widely accepted amongst commentators that only a formal 
change to the Kampala Amendments would be sufficient to grant the ICC exclusive jurisdiction, and 
even then, only over the 121 States Parties to the Rome Statute. A growing number of states have 
already incorporated the definition into their domestic criminal codes. It may well come to pass that 
universal jurisdiction provides a useful avenue for states looking to employ extraterritorial jurisdiction 
over the crime of aggression when the ICC’s hands are otherwise tied.  
9.4. Challenges to domestic prosecutions 
Establishing jurisdictional grounds for a prosecution is a vital step, but not the final one. It must also be 
established that there are no bars to the exercise of jurisdiction. It is these bars or challenges to domestic 
prosecutions that will now be discussed.  
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9.4.1. State Sovereignty and Par in Parem Non Habet Imperium  
As we saw above, the par in parem imperium non habet rule has been raised by those seeking to question 
the justiciability of the crime of aggression before the ICC. It was the opinion stated here that - with 
states in Kampala agreeing to limit the jurisdiction of the Court only to those states that have explicitly 
consented through ratification of the aggression amendments - the issue of consent raised by the par in 
parem rule was moot. In sum, the challenge to the ICC’s competence to rule on the crime of aggression 
on the basis that any case would breach the par in parem rule is weak given the restrictive nature of the 
regime arising from the Review Conference. The case has, however, also been raised in relation to 
domestic courts.  
The argument is much the same and is closely linked to the consent rule: following the Monetary Gold 
and East Timor judgments, states are as a matter of international law barred from sitting in judgment 
over another state without that state’s consent. As we’ve already documented, the definition of the crime 
will require ‘a showing of proof beyond a reasonable doubt that a state committed an act of aggression 
as a predicate to assigning individual criminal responsibility’532 and as such, domestic courts hearing 
aggression cases not involving their own nationals will essentially be sitting in judgment over the acts 
of a co-equal sovereign.  
It was this consideration that led ILC in its Commentary to the Draft Code of Crimes in 1996, to state 
that: ‘the determination by a national court of one State of the question of whether another State had 
committed aggression would be contrary to the fundamental principle of international law par in parem 
imperium non habet’,533 and determine that as such ‘the crime of aggression was inherently unsuitable 
for trial by national courts and should instead be dealt with only by an international court.’534 This 
argument has been advanced more recently by the U.S, who opined during the Review Conference that 
domestic prosecutions for the crime of aggression ‘would ask the domestic courts of one country to sit 
in judgment upon the state acts of other countries in a manner highly unlikely to promote peace and 
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security.’535  
This view is, however, subject to two important exceptions. Firstly, the principle would not prevent 
domestic courts from exercising jurisdiction over aggression committed by their own state, a condition 
explicitly recognised by the ILC at the time. As has been suggested above, it is widely accepted that 
states are free to prosecute their own nationals for crimes of aggression, and logically no breach of the 
state consent rule should flow from it.536 Secondly, a victim state would be free to prosecute for crimes 
of aggression committed against it. While this would appear to breach the consent rule, the US Supreme 
Court has previously stated that: ‘the public law of nations can hardly dictate to a country which is in 
theory wronged how to treat that wrong within its domestic borders.’537 As others have pointed out, 
where a victim state prosecutes acts of aggression committed against it, that state is in reality exercising 
a form of self-help – which is not proscribed (but only limited) by international law.538  
As will now be obvious to the reader, it is well established in international law that territoriality and 
nationality traditionally interpreted are both routes broadly accepted as legitimate for exercising 
jurisdiction. The par in parem rule does not alter that fact. As for the other forms of jurisdiction 
mentioned above, opinion divides as to whether they are legitimate and the extent to which the par in 
parem principle then applies. What is clear is that the principles are linked. Those that argue that 
universal jurisdiction does not apply to the crime of aggression would correspondingly argue that this 
is based at least in part on the notion that it would breach the par in parem rule. Any decision on the 
justiciability of cases brought domestically – and outside of the traditional concepts of territoriality and 
nationality – will inevitably involve grappling with the extent to which these forms of extra-territorial 
jurisdiction comply with the par in parem principle.  
The weight of scholarly opinion appears to have swung in favour of disregarding the par in parem 
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principle vis-à-vis the crime of aggression. This tallies with a general trend towards accepting universal 
jurisdiction as a legitimate basis for domestic trials, as noted earlier. For these commentators, domestic 
cases can be sufficiently distinguished in nature from those of international tribunals such that any 
general rule established by the ICJ does not apply. In addition, the application of the par in parem 
principle to domestic prosecutions for the crime of aggression is seen as a retrogressive approach that 
departs from customary international law in failing to take into account the shift away from absolute 
notions of state sovereignty since Nuremburg, ignores the role that national courts have always played 
in combating impunity for international crimes, and runs contrary to the ICC’s principle of 
complementarity.  
The extent to which the ICJ’s Monetary Gold and East Timor cases apply to the ICC is disputed and 
this is also the case with domestic courts. The ICJ is an international institution created by treaty, and 
as such it derives only as much authority as states allow. While establishing a general rule about the 
importance of state consent, it is far from clear that this should also apply to equal sovereigns in limiting 
the right of one state to take judicial action within its territory.539 Any domestic prosecution would 
impose no legal obligations on the aggressor state. Additionally, any domestic judgment would not 
carry the moral weight of a decision made by an independent judicial body which would otherwise 
render it difficult for a state to then argue that its use of force was in fact lawful. Any decision made by 
a domestic court could in theory be dismissed by the state of nationality as a disagreement between 
equals. 
In addition, the International Law Commission did not appear to take into account relevant state practice 
with respect to the criminalisation of aggression, ‘which had been developing since 1945 and resulted, 
over time, in a number of national criminal laws applicable to the crime.’540 There are numerous cases 
that support the ability of states to pronounce themselves on the legality of acts by foreign states, and 
various such examples were given above in relation to the application of universal jurisdiction. These 
cases also reflect the horizontal nature of international law, and mirror the international reality that 
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states respond to aggressive acts in various ways, from sanctions to the use of force.  
While it is conceded that the crime of aggression is different from the other core crimes in that 
prosecution requires a predetermination of state responsibility, the case can be made that the other 
crimes – particularly genocide – are ‘system crimes’.541 That is, any finding of genocide will usually 
implicate the state insofar as the crimes, by definition, are frequently controlled by the government and 
orchestrated in an organised and systematic way. As Michael Schaak states, ‘in a great majority of 
cases, crimes under international law would be inspired by the state and committed through its 
intermediary or with its support - and, in that sense, any qualification of a crime under international law 
by a foreign court might deteriorate its international relations with the state standing at the origin of the 
crime. Therefore, drawing a distinction between the crime of aggression and other crimes under 
international law, for that purpose, is quite unsubstantiated.’542 As such, the extent to which aggression 
can really be distinguished from the other crimes for the purpose of asserting that the par in parem 
principle applies is questionable.  
Ultimately, the extent to which domestic prosecutions can proceed extra-territorially will depend on 
both the application of those jurisdictional bases and the inapplicability of the par in parem principle to 
domestic prosecutions. In the view of this author, a strong case has been made for both. It is now worth 
looking at some of the other challenges to domestic prosecutions.  
9.4.1.1. Immunity 
As the crime of aggression is a leadership crime, accused individuals will usually be high-ranking 
officials or heads of state. As such, the issue of immunities is likely to arise. With regard to immunity 
before the ICC, Article 27 is clear: ‘official capacity as a Head of State or government, a member of a 
government or parliament, an elected representative or a government official shall in no case exempt a 
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person from criminal responsibility under this Statute.’543 This is not the case before domestic courts. 
There are two broad types of immunity: functional and personal immunity. Functional immunity holds 
that state officials shall never be held liable for state acts. That being said, the prevailing view – as set 
out in the Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction – is that for ‘serious crimes under international 
law’, including crimes against the peace, functional immunity does not apply.544 Much of the authority 
for this position stems from Nuremburg and the London Charter, both of which referred to crimes 
against the peace. As such, there are some commentators willing to contend that the crime of aggression 
(rather than its earlier incantation) may not enjoy the same exemption from functional immunity, though 
that is a minority view.  
It may also be possible to circumvent functional immunity if it could be demonstrated that the acts were 
private and unrelated to the individual’s official capacity.545 For the crime of aggression, however, any 
attempts to circumvent immunity on this basis would surely fail, with high-ranking officials unable to 
commit aggression without state action as part of official state policy.546  
Personal immunity provides that certain types of officials are immune as long as they hold a certain 
office. This type of immunity poses problems for domestic courts seeking to employ universal 
jurisdiction, as it continues to apply even to international crimes. Authority for this is derived from the 
ICJ’s Arrest Warrant case,547 which reflects customary international law.548 Attempts to challenge this 
rule have invariably failed.549 States are of course free to prosecute their own nationals, or indeed waive 
immunity to allow another state to prosecute, but in both instances the consent of the aggressor state is 
needed. As such, any domestic court would be barred from exercising universal jurisdiction over a 
sitting Head of State or government official for the crime of aggression, until such time as she were to 
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leave office.550  
9.5. Politicisation 
As we have seen, there are a number of possible avenues available to states intent on prosecuting acts 
of aggression committed by foreign actors. While the domestic prosecution of any international crime 
will inevitably draw accusations that international law is being politicised, this is particularly so for the 
crime of aggression. With the crime, by definition, involving individual criminal responsibility at the 
highest level arising from a prior determination of state responsibility, any domestic prosecution of a 
non-consenting foreign state will inevitably strain international relations. Beyond those countries 
immediately involved, such prosecutions have the potential to force third-party states to take sides, 
risking exacerbating an already volatile situation and raising the spectre of further retaliatory actions.  
Additionally, the legitimacy of domestic prosecutions is undermined by any blurring of the lines 
between politics and the rule of law. Domestic prosecutions face accusations that victor’s justice is 
being applied when the victim state commences proceedings against the aggressor state. Even in 
instances where third-party states intervene, there are likely to be accusations that proceedings are 
motivated by ‘other incentives, such as political ties, geopolitical alliances, or retributive justice for past 
harms’, all which may corrupt the legitimacy of any attempt to try alleged aggressors in a third-party 
state's courts.551  
These are certainly major concerns for those likely to engage in domestic prosecutions. Given the 
increased political nature of the crime of aggression, prosecutions by the ICC at least benefit from the 
legitimacy that comes with being instigated by an independent judicial body and with the backing of 
the international community. That being said, even the ICC cannot escape claims of politicisation, 
concerns which will now be discussed in section 3 of this chapter.  
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9.6. Are the provisions a step forward in promoting peace and stability? 
The opening words of Article 1 of the UN Charter enshrine as the UN’s primary purpose the 
maintenance of international peace and security, while the preamble to the Rome Statute recognises that 
the core crimes that shape its mandate are crimes that threaten the peace, security and well-being of the 
world. As the Prosecutor of the ICC reminded the UN Security Council in 2014, justice plays a crucial 
role in relation to the maintenance of international peace and security.552 As such, the extent to which 
the aggression amendments will promote peace and stability is a question that goes to the heart of the 
debate over whether or not the amendments represent a step forward for the Court.  
This section will examine claims that the aggression amendments will impede international efforts to 
promote peace and stability around the globe. They centre on three core contentions: that the prospect 
of indictment for crimes of aggression will dissuade states from supporting legitimate acts of 
humanitarian intervention; rule out the possibility of amnesty granting thus undermining the prospect 
for any peace deal; and embroil the Court in political considerations that impede its ability to punish 
atrocity crimes.  
9.6.1. The Crime of Aggression and Humanitarian Intervention 
The extent to which the definition of the crime of aggression excludes genuine acts of humanitarian 
intervention was discussed at some length in previous chapters. While we will not repeat that discussion 
here, it is worth recapping that humanitarian intervention is a term used to describe action taken for 
humanitarian purposes but without Security Council authorization and without the agreement of the 
state concerned.553 Opinion remains divided over whether there is an emerging norm of customary law 
that allows implementation of the responsibility to protect doctrine, or whether such intervention is 
indeed already lawful based on the continued existence of a customary law right which has not been 
displaced by the UN Charter.554 A similar lack of absolute clarity persists regarding the definition of the 
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crime of aggression, specifically whether the requirement that any act must be a ‘manifest’ violation is 
enough to exclude instances of humanitarian intervention, if indeed they’re deemed desirable. Despite 
US efforts to insert an additional understanding into the Kampala amendments – states felt it 
‘inappropriate to deal with key issues of current international security law in the form of understandings 
drafted not with all due care, but in the haste of the final hours of diplomatic negotiations.’555 As such, 
it will likely fall to the ICC’s judges to interpret the ‘manifest’ requirement.  
Arguments against the legality of resort to humanitarian intervention tend to centre around 
interpretations of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter which requires all members to ‘refrain in their 
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state.’556 While a few contested examples from the end of the twentieth may not 
yet make it possible to declare humanitarian intervention lawful per se under customary international 
law, it does fall within a grey area insofar as it is widely regarded as unlikely that genuine attempts to 
avert humanitarian catastrophe will be deemed to meet the ICC’s ‘manifest’ threshold.557 
This growing consensus is reflected in the General Assembly’s 2005 World Summit Outcome 
document, in which states agreed on two points: states have primary responsibility for ensuring they 
protect their own civilian population from the commission of crimes under international law; and that 
a subsidiary international responsibility arises in case of a failure of the state concerned to properly 
serve this protective function.558 As Claus Kreß recognises, ‘it is therefore no longer possible to 
maintain that a use of force to avert humanitarian catastrophe violates the sovereignty of the state 
concerned.’559  
This consensus has perhaps come into existence on the back of a developing view that, following 
catastrophes such as Rwanda and Kosovo, intervention may – in exceptional circumstances – be the 
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most effective way to save the lives of people threatened by impending humanitarian catastrophe.560 As 
such, it is entirely plausible to argue that, while not of immediate relevance for international criminal 
law, such intervention may be morally justifiable.  
With this in mind, and given the lack of clarity, it does seem conceivable that a ‘chilling effect’ on the 
willingness of states to engage in humanitarian intervention may occur, and as such, desirable that the 
law is clarified as quickly as possible. As Harold Koh warned, it would be ‘hugely tragic if this chilling 
effect discouraged states from stopping preventable genocide, war crimes, and crimes against 
humanity.’561 While this should not challenge the justiciability of the ICC, it does stand as a legitimate 
concern.  
That being said, there would be significant risks associated with a blanket acceptance of humanitarian 
intervention as a legitimate means of circumventing the aggression amendments, not least in deciding 
whether humanitarian concerns were indeed the motivating factor. As the ICJ warned in its Corfu 
Channel case, ‘intervention is perhaps still less admissible in the particular form it would take here; for, 
from the nature of things, it would be reserved for the most powerful states, and might easily lead to 
perverting the administration of international justice itself.’562 This recognises the potential for 
humanitarian intervention to be used as a means of avoiding international justice, particularly for the 
most powerful states.  
It is worth noting also that the aggression amendments do allow states to opt out of the ICC’s jurisdiction 
over the crime of aggression by lodging a declaration at any time, and as such, any impediment to 
involvement in humanitarian intervention is not absolute. It is, however, accepted that states will be 
unwilling to make such a public proclamation, carrying as it does the implication that those states are 
concerned about the prospect of indictment. As such, while there may well be a ‘chilling effect’ on 
military coalition partners and others looking to involve themselves in humanitarian intervention, even 
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if the virtue of certain acts of humanitarian intervention is accepted, it is difficult to propose an 
alternative route given the difficulty of sufficiently defining humanitarian intervention for the purposes 
of ensuring it does not constitute a crime of aggression.  
In any case, it is likely to be the case that genuine acts of humanitarian intervention will not meet the 
Court’s ‘manifest violation’ threshold, but that is a decision for the ICC’s judges. As to the uncertainty 
that this may cause to potential coalition partners, perhaps that is simply the price that needs to be paid 
for ensuring that states are led by international law considerations when deciding whether to act.  
9.6.2. The Crime of Aggression and Negotiating Peace Deals 
The contention that the crime of aggression weakens the hand of negotiators attempting to strike peace 
deals is often tied heavily to the question of amnesties. The argument that amnesties can play a positive 
role in bringing about peace and security is also not unique to the crime of aggression, and has been 
raised numerous times in relation to the other core crimes. Still, it is worthy of brief consideration here. 
Despite amnesties having a long tradition in regimes around the world, from Chile to South Africa, 
under international law generally, amnesties are now not recognised. Indeed, this has been the UN’s 
position since the 1990s.563 At the ICC, the situation is much the same. The ICC Statute’s preamble 
affirms that ‘the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must not go 
unpunished’,564 and the Prosecutor has taken a similarly dim view in refusing to take the possibility of 
amnesties into account when deciding which situations to pursue.565 Even with regard to domestic 
prosecutions, amnesties issued by one state do not bind other states or international bodies.566 With it 
generally accepted that the aggression amendments do not create a duty to prosecute aggression, it is 
theoretically possible that any amnesty granted may prevent the issuing state from bringing 
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prosecutions, though even here the failure of a state to act may simply lead to the Court exercising its 
powers to prosecute perpetrators itself.  
Despite recent trends to refuse the applicability of amnesties to international crimes, there are still some 
who claim that amnesties have a role to play in bringing conflict to an end. In Kampala, the US accepted 
that there was consensus that there could be ‘no peace without justice’ regarding the other core crimes, 
and as Harold Koh has recognised, when political solutions immunise those responsible for such 
atrocities, more damage than good may be caused to peace itself.567 He did, however, go on reject the 
notion that this consensus extends to the crime of aggression, arguing that the crime was of a 
‘fundamentally different’ character.  He went on to provide a hypothetical situation in support of his 
argument, asking whether two warring countries that are finally ready to sign a peace treaty on the basis 
that their leaders will not be prosecuted for starting the war, should be prevented from doing so.568  
This line of argument carries the implication that combatants and others will refuse to relinquish their 
weapons or power without promises of amnesties, and is relevant here.569 Indeed, such a claim has been 
advanced by Kurt Volker, a former United States Permanent Representative to NATO, suggesting that 
the possibility of prosecution by the ICC led to Muammar Gaddafi holding onto power in Libya rather 
than fleeing.570  
The persistence of claims that the aggression amendments weaken the hand of those seeking peace deals 
is not surprising. Similar claims have been present since the formation of the Court. In reality, there is 
little evidence that the Court or the aggression amendments serve to hinder peace deals, and more to 
suggest that the consistent and uniform application of international law will increase respect for it. There 
are essential, principled reasons for refusing amnesty to perpetrators of international crimes, including 
aggression. As Benjamin Ferencz put it: ‘to suggest immunity for those who propagate the illegal uses 
of force, which invariably result in the very atrocity crimes that the international community condemns, 
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seems a far cry from the historic precedents established at Nuremberg. To deter the Court from 
enforcing the law, rather than deterring those who would break it, may be seen by some as expedient in 
the short term, but such an approach does nothing to advance respect for the predictable and uniform 
rule of law.’571 
9.6.3. The Crime of Aggression and the Deterrence of Atrocity Crimes 
A third concern often voiced is that the crime of aggression will distract attention and resources from 
the other core crimes, and as such ‘will impair the Court’s ability to carry out its core mission – deterring 
and punishing genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.’572 At the heart of this argument lies 
the contention that the crime of aggression is overtly political, and will overburden the Court with 
considerations better left to political actors. As Harold Koh has said, ‘aggression determinations are 
different in kind: they fundamentally require a political assessment and political management, [and] 
assigning that role to an ostensibly apolitical court would inject the ICC into treacherous political waters 
that would threaten to undermine both the Court’s credibility and that of the greater international 
criminal justice project.’573  
Indeed, this is a valid concern and one that states have grappled with over the years. It was one of the 
reasons why defining the crime proved so difficult in Rome, and why the Review Conference over a 
decade was necessary to finally reach a consensus. That consensus has, however, largely taken the sting 
out of the argument. States in Kampala opted for a consent-based regime that has severely narrowed 
the Court’s jurisdiction scope. In the event that the Court proceeds on the basis of a Security Council 
referral, the political decision that an act of aggression has occurred will already have been taken. 
Absent a Security Council decision, non-States Parties are excluded entirely from the reach of the Court, 
and only those States Parties that have consented to the Court navigating these ‘treacherous political 
waters’ will be subject to it.  
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This restrictive jurisdictional regime will have the practical impact that far fewer cases will make their 
way to the ICC than might ordinarily have been the case. This was the price for addressing concerns 
over politicisation of the Court, but also undermines the contention that resources will be diverted away 
from the other atrocity crime. While there may have been significant merit to many of the concerns 
listed in this section prior to Kampala, they have been largely neutered by the approach taken at the 
Review Conference.  
9.7. Do the provisions weaken the Court?  
Throughout this chapter we have addressed many of the concerns levelled at the aggression 
amendments, looking at justiciability issues, domestic jurisdiction and challenges, and finally the 
impact the amendments might have on international peace and security efforts. I will conclude with a 
few thoughts on the impact the amendments are likely to have on the Court itself, and whether the 
special nature of the crime of aggression is likely to weaken the Court and hand ammunition to its 
detractors.  
I have sympathy for the argument that the crime of aggression is political in a way that the other core 
crimes are not, and that in accepting jurisdiction over the crime there will at least be the perception that 
the Court is involved in making inherently political decisions. The debate surrounding whether it would 
have been better to grant the Security Council exclusive competence to make these political decisions 
was addressed in chapter 4 on the negotiations and so will not be repeated here. That being said, the 
ICC’s newfound competence does risk placing it in a position whereby it can affect day-to-day politics 
depending on who wants to use it and how.574 As a result, granting the ICC jurisdiction over aggression 
will inevitably subject the Court to criticism that exercising such jurisdiction would be a political act in 
keeping with the political judgment that aggression has occurred.575 This is a risk that states were acutely 
aware of when they reached their conclusions in Kampala.  
It may be the case that the Prosecutor will need to be properly attuned to the real world impact her 
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decisions could have to a greater extent than the other core crimes. In any case, primary – even if not 
exclusive – competence to make these political decisions has been granted to the Security Council along 
with a host of limitations including Security Council recourse to Article 16 powers to halt an 
investigation, and state recourse to the opt-out clause. These firmly establish a consent-based regime 
that serves to address most of the concerns over politicising the Court.  
There are concerns occasionally voiced that in imposing a distinct and less far-reaching jurisdictional 
regime for the crime of aggression than the other core crimes, the international community has 
undermined its express commitment to ensuring that ‘that the most serious crimes of concern to the 
international community as a whole must not go unpunished.’ And that the international community 
has signalled that the crime of aggression is in some way less serious than the other core crimes insofar 
as state sovereignty has been allowed to trump international justice for atrocity crimes. These concerns 
are idealistic in the extreme. Compromise was always going to be necessary in order to secure 
agreement at Kampala. This was particularly important for a court that relies on the cooperation of 
states for the enforcement of its arrest warrants and the collection of its evidence. It can certainly be 
argued that states went too far in limiting the scope of the Court’s jurisdiction, but the steps taken in 
Kampala are positive, they advance international justice, and they provide a firm base from which the 
crime can develop.  
That the Court will be open to renewed scrutiny as a result of the amendments is also clear. Giving the 
Court additional powers that blur in any way the line between law and politics was always going to 
hand additional ammunition to those seeking to bring down the Court. This should not be a reason to 
halt the advance of international law, and the Court should be steadfast in facing down its detractors. 
What the Court needs now is the support of its State Parties, ready to remind those who would seek to 
diminish the Court of the important role it now plays in fulfilling the legacy of Nuremburg and ending 
impunity for all atrocity crimes.  
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Chapter 10 – Conclusion 
This thesis has taken a critical look at the development of the criminalisation of aggression, from the 
Nuremberg tribunals, through the establishment of the International Criminal Court, to the outcome of 
the Kampala Review Conference and beyond. Despite the vast amount of work that has gone into 
establishing a workable legal framework to punish individuals responsible for the waging of aggressive 
war, the aggression amendments remain divisive. This thesis has sought to address these issues, and 
offer thoughts on what the amendment’s imperfections mean for their future application and the 
legitimacy of the International Criminal Court. It is worth recapping those here. 
The definition presented to the Review Conference in Kampala was largely based on one adopted by 
the General Assembly in 1974, and had been discussed at some length in the preparatory meetings 
leading up to the conference. Despite the protestations of the United States, delegations resisted the 
urge to re-open the definition and it was adopted without further discussion. A number of criticisms 
persist, chief among them the extent to which the ‘manifest’ threshold requirement is sufficiently high 
as to exclude genuine acts of humanitarian intervention and pre-emptive self-defence from the remit of 
the Prosecutor. Ultimately, it will be for the Court to decide the scope of the manifest threshold. It is 
also clear, however, that its inclusion was intended to ensure that only the gravest breaches of 
international law should be prosecuted. This was further reflected in the Understandings adopted in 
Kampala.  
There is broad acceptance, including from the author of this piece, that genuine acts of humanitarian 
intervention would fail to reach that threshold. The status of pre-emptory self-defence as an acceptable 
justification for war is even less clear, though it should also be possible to imagine a case in which the 
use of proportionate force – based on the available evidence – and to prevent an immediate threat, was 
considered justifiable. The 2003 invasion of Iraq, presented as a case study above, hints at the difficulty 
of applying the definition to real-world events. That said, delegations – through the adoption of the 
aggression amendments – have placed their faith in the Court as the appropriate forum for making such 
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decisions. Ultimately, that is exactly what the Court will do, and the definition adopted is indispensable 
in that endeavour.  
The jurisdictional remit adopted is similarly controversial. Wrangling over the primacy of the Security 
Council came to define discussions in Kampala. In the end, the Review Conference opted for a two-tier 
system, splitting the provisions dealing with jurisdiction in two. In doing so, and as part of the 
compromise package, delegations departed from the established regime that applies to the other core 
crimes. Opting instead for a consensual approach to the aggression amendments, States Parties were 
handed the power – in the absence of a Security Council referral – to formally opt-out of the Court’s 
reach or indeed simply not to ratify the amendments at all. This so-called ‘negative understanding’ of 
Article 121(5) was the last big question to be decided by states, and represents a novel solution to 
reconciling the entrenched positions of opposing camps of states.  
For some, these jurisdictional provisions undermine the independence of the Court by subordinating it 
further to the Security Council, and undermine international criminal law standards by allowing states 
to decide not to be bound by the Court’s jurisdiction over one of the supreme international offences. 
These criticisms are legitimate, and in an ideal world would not have been necessary. But we do not 
live in a perfect world, hence the need for a Court to punish atrocity crimes. It is an inconvenient truth 
that the crime may well not exist at all were it not for these compromises. In the view of this author, it 
was a price worth paying.  
That states were able to agree to the provisions is testament to the work that has been done over the 
years by states and non-state actors alike. For long-time supporters of the Court being given jurisdiction 
over aggression, the amendments are welcome even if watered-down. For others, enough safeguards 
have been put in place to ensure they need not be too concerned about future prosecutions.  
It is evidently true that the scope of the Court is severely limited in cases where the Security Council 
declines to makes a referral. The likely outcome of this consensual approach is that only a small number 
of states will be bound by the aggression amendments, and the examples of aggression committed 
around the world will surely come to vastly outweigh the number over which the Prosecutor is 
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empowered to act. This is perhaps the most damning criticism levelled at the Kampala outcome. This 
state of affairs, in which the Security Council will often be the only viable route to prosecution, does 
little to address claims that the Court is a tool of western imperialism. Nor does it demonstrate that the 
international community is serious about ending impunity for the waging of aggressive war. That being 
said, Rome was not built in a day, and the Rome Statute is no different. International law develops and 
is strengthened over time, and it is a political reality that the crime of aggression – politically 
controversial as it is – should be no different. That the crime of aggression is to be enshrined as an 
offence under international law, with a permanent court equipped to prosecute those responsible for 
breaching it, is a big step. There will be renewed political pressure on states as a result of the crime of 
aggression’s acceptance as one of the core crimes of concern to the international community. Even in 
instances in which the Court is deprived of jurisdiction, political leaders will be keen to avoid 
accusations of being criminally responsible for waging war, even more so now that a definition of the 
crime is readily on hand and can be applied to the facts. Few prosecutions may result, certainly in the 
short-term, but the crime’s assent has the power to change the way in which the international community 
views the resort to violence.  
The next step is for states to continue to ratify the amendments, to work productively towards solutions 
to some of the issues outlined above, and to give the Court the public and financial support it needs to 
make the amendments a success. The future of the International Criminal Court depends on it.  
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Appendices 
Appendix I 
Resolution RC/Res.6, The crime of aggression  
Adopted at the 13th plenary meeting, on 11 June 2010, by consensus  
The Review Conference, 
Recalling paragraph 1 of article 12 of the Rome Statute, Recalling paragraph 2 of article 5 of the 
Rome Statute,  
Recalling also paragraph 7 of resolution F, adopted by the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court on 17 July 1998,  
Recalling further resolution ICC-ASP/1/Res.1 on the continuity of work in respect of the crime of 
aggression, and expressing its appreciation to the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression 
for having elaborated proposals on a provision on the crime of aggression,  
Taking note of resolution ICC-ASP/8/Res.6, by which the Assembly of States Parties forwarded 
proposals on a provision on the crime of aggression to the Review Conference for its consideration,  
Resolved to activate the Court’s jurisdiction over the crime of aggression as early as possible,  
1. Decides to adopt, in accordance with article 5, paragraph 2, of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (hereinafter: “the Statute”) the amendments to the Statute contained 
in annex I of the present resolution, which are subject to ratification or acceptance and shall enter 
into force in accordance with article 121, paragraph 5; and notes that any State Party may lodge a 
declaration referred to in article 15 bis prior to ratification or acceptance;  
2. Also decides to adopt the amendments to the Elements of Crimes contained in annex II of the 
present resolution;  
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3. Also decides to adopt the understandings regarding the interpretation of the above- mentioned 
amendments contained in annex III of the present resolution;  
4. Further decides to review the amendments on the crime of aggression seven years after the 
beginning of the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction;  
5. Calls upon all States Parties to ratify or accept the amendments contained in annex I.  
Amendments to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court on the crime of 
aggression  
Article 5, paragraph 2, of the Statute is deleted. 
The following text is inserted after article 8 of the Statute:  
Article 8 bis 
Crime of aggression  
1. For the purpose of this Statute, “crime of aggression” means the planning, preparation, initiation 
or execution, by a person in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political 
or military action of a State, of an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale, 
constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations.  
2. For the purpose of paragraph 1, “act of aggression” means the use of armed force by a State 
against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any 
other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations. Any of the following acts, 
regardless of a declaration of war, shall, in accordance with United Nations General Assembly 
resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974, qualify as an act of aggression:  
(a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of another State, or any 
military occupation, however temporary, resulting from such invasion or attack, or any 
annexation by the use of force of the territory of another State or part thereof;  
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(b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory of another State or the use of 
any weapons by a State against the territory of another State;  
(c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces of another State;  
(d) An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air forces, or marine and air fleets 
of another State;  
(e) The use of armed forces of one State which are within the territory of another State with the 
agreement of the receiving State, in contravention of the conditions provided for in the agreement 
or any extension of their presence in such territory beyond the termination of the agreement;  
(f) The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at the disposal of another 
State, to be used by that other State for perpetrating an act of aggression against a third State;  
(g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, 
which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount to the acts 
listed above, or its substantial involvement therein.  
Article 15 bis 
Exercise of jurisdiction over the crime of aggression (State referral, proprio motu)  
1. The Court may exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression in accordance with article 13, 
paragraphs (a) and (c), subject to the provisions of this article.  
2. The Court may exercise jurisdiction only with respect to crimes of aggression committed one year 
after the ratification or acceptance of the amendments by thirty States Parties.  
3. The Court shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression in accordance with this article, 
subject to a decision to be taken after 1 January 2017 by the same majority of States Parties as is 
required for the adoption of an amendment to the Statute.  
4. The Court may, in accordance with article 12, exercise jurisdiction over a crime of aggression, 
arising from an act of aggression committed by a State Party, unless that State Party has 
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previously declared that it does not accept such jurisdiction by lodging a declaration with the 
Registrar. The withdrawal of such a declaration may be effected at any time and shall be 
considered by the State Party within three years.  
5. In respect of a State that is not a party to this Statute, the Court shall not exercise its jurisdiction 
over the crime of aggression when committed by that State’s nationals or on its territory.  
6. Where the Prosecutor concludes that there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation 
in respect of a crime of aggression, he or she shall first ascertain whether the Security Council has 
made a determination of an act of aggression committed by the State concerned. The Prosecutor 
shall notify the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the situation before the Court, 
including any relevant information and documents.  
7. Where the Security Council has made such a determination, the Prosecutor may proceed with the 
investigation in respect of a crime of aggression.  
8. Where no such determination is made within six months after the date of notification, the 
Prosecutor may proceed with the investigation in respect of a crime of aggression, provided that 
the Pre-Trial Division has authorized the commencement of the investigation in respect of a crime 
of aggression in accordance with the procedure contained in article 15, and the Security Council 
has not decided otherwise in accordance with article 16.  
9. A determination of an act of aggression by an organ outside the Court shall be without prejudice 
to the Court’s own findings under this Statute.  
10. This article is without prejudice to the provisions relating to the exercise of jurisdiction with 
respect to other crimes referred to in article 5.  
Article 15 ter 
Exercise of jurisdiction over the crime of aggression (Security Council referral)  
1. The Court may exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression in accordance with article 13, 
paragraph (b), subject to the provisions of this article.  
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2. The Court may exercise jurisdiction only with respect to crimes of aggression committed one year 
after the ratification or acceptance of the amendments by thirty States Parties.  
3. The Court shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression in accordance with this article, 
subject to a decision to be taken after 1 January 2017 by the same majority of States Parties as is 
required for the adoption of an amendment to the Statute.  
4. A determination of an act of aggression by an organ outside the Court shall be without prejudice 
to the Court’s own findings under this Statute.  
5. This article is without prejudice to the provisions relating to the exercise of jurisdiction with 
respect to other crimes referred to in article 5.  
Appendix II 
Amendments to the Elements of Crimes  
Article 8 bis 
Crime of aggression  
Introduction  
1. It is understood that any of the acts referred to in article 8 bis, paragraph 2, qualify an act of 
aggression.  
2. There is no requirement to prove that the perpetrator has made a legal evaluation as whether the 
use of armed force was inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations.  
3. The term “manifest” is an objective qualification.  
4. There is no requirement to prove that the perpetrator has made a legal evaluation as the 
“manifest” nature of the violation of the Charter of the United Nations.  
Elements  
1. The perpetrator planned, prepared, initiated or executed an act of aggression.  
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2. The perpetrator was a person in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the 
political or military action of the State which committed the act of aggression.  
3. The act of aggression – the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial 
integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
Charter of the United Nations – was committed.  
4. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established that such a use of armed 
force was inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations.  
5. The act of aggression, by its character, gravity and scale, constituted a manifest violation of the 
Charter of the United Nations.  
6. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established such a manifest violation 
of the Charter of the United Nations. 
Appendix III  
Understandings regarding the amendments to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court on the crime of aggression  
Referrals by the Security Council  
1. It is understood that the Court may exercise jurisdiction on the basis of a Security Council referral 
in accordance with article 13, paragraph (b), of the Statute only with respect to crimes of 
aggression committed after a decision in accordance with article 15 ter, paragraph 3, is taken, and 
one year after the ratification or acceptance of the amendments by thirty States Parties, whichever 
is later.  
2. It is understood that the Court shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression on the basis 
of a Security Council referral in accordance with article 13, paragraph (b), of the Statute 
irrespective of whether the State concerned has accepted the Court’s jurisdiction in this regard.  
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Jurisdiction ratione temporis  
3. It is understood that in case of article 13, paragraph (a) or (c), the Court may exercise its 
jurisdiction only with respect to crimes of aggression committed after a decision in accordance 
with article 15 bis, paragraph 3, is taken, and one year after the ratification or acceptance of the 
amendments by thirty States Parties, whichever is later.  
Domestic jurisdiction over the crime of aggression  
4. It is understood that the amendments that address the definition of the act of aggression and the 
crime of aggression do so for the purpose of this Statute only. The amendments shall, in 
accordance with article 10 of the Rome Statute, not be interpreted as limiting or prejudicing in 
any way existing or developing rules of international law for purposes other than this Statute.  
5. It is understood that the amendments shall not be interpreted as creating the right or obligation to 
exercise domestic jurisdiction with respect to an act of aggression committed by another State.  
Other understandings  
6. It is understood that aggression is the most serious and dangerous form of the illegal use of force; 
and that a determination whether an act of aggression has been committed requires consideration 
of all the circumstances of each particular case, including the gravity of the acts concerned and 
their consequences, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.  
7. It is understood that in establishing whether an act of aggression constitutes a manifest violation 
of the Charter of the United Nations, the three components of character, gravity and scale must be 
sufficient to justify a “manifest” determination. No one component can be significant enough to 
satisfy the manifest standard by itself.  
Appendix IV 
Resolution ICC-ASP/16/Res.5  
Adopted at the 13th plenary meeting, on 14 December 2017, by consensus  
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Activation of the jurisdiction of the Court over the crime of aggression  
The Assembly of States Parties,  
Recognizing the historic significance of the consensual decision at the Kampala Review Conference to 
adopt the amendments to the Rome Statute on the crime of aggression, and in this regard recalling 
resolution RC/Res.6,  
Reaffirming the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,  
Recalling its resolve to activate the Court’s jurisdiction over the crime of aggression as early as 
possible, subject to a decision according to paragraphs 3 of article 15 bis and article 15 ter,  
Noting with appreciation the Report on the facilitation on the activation of the 1  
jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court over the crime of aggression , which summarizes the 
views of States Parties,  
Recalling paragraph 4 of article 15 bis and paragraph 5 of article 121,  
Recalling also that in paragraph 1 of RC/Res.6 the Review Conference decided to adopt, in 
accordance with paragraph 2 of article 5 the amendments regarding the crime of aggression, which are 
subject to ratification or acceptance and shall enter into force in accordance with paragraph 5 of 
article 121; and noted that any State Party may lodge a declaration referred to in article 15 bis prior to 
ratification or acceptance of the amendments,  
Decides to activate the Court’s jurisdiction over the crime of aggression as of 17 July 2018;  
1. Confirms that, in accordance with the Rome Statute, the amendments to the Statute regarding the 
crime of aggression adopted at the Kampala Review Conference enter into force for those States 
Parties which have accepted the amendments one year after the deposit of their instruments of 
ratification or acceptance and that in the case of a State referral or propio motu investigation the 
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Court shall not exercise its jurisdiction regarding a crime of aggression when committed by a 
national or on the territory of a State Party that has not ratified or accepted these amendments;  
2. Reaffirms paragraph 1 of article 40 and paragraph 1 of article 119 of the Rome Statute in relation 
to the judicial independence of the judges of the Court;  
3. Renews its call upon all States Parties which have not yet done so to ratify or accept the 
amendments to the Rome Statute on the crime of aggression.  
 
